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Congress’s Power over Military Offices
Zachary S. Price*
Although scholars have explored at length the constitutional law of officeholding with respect to civil and administrative offices, parallel questions
regarding military office-holding have received insufficient attention. Even
scholars who defend broad congressional authority to structure civil
administration typically presume that the President, as Commander in Chief,
holds greater authority over the military. For its part, the executive branch has
claimed plenary authority over assignment of military duties and control of
military officers.
This pro-presidential consensus is mistaken. Although the President, as
Commander in Chief, must have some form of directive authority over U.S.
military forces in the field, the constitutional text and structure, read in light of
longstanding historical practice, give Congress extensive power to structure the
offices, chains of command, and disciplinary mechanisms through which the
President’s authority is exercised. In particular, much as in the administrative
context, Congress may vest particular powers and duties—authority to launch
nuclear weapons or a cyber operation, for example, or command over particular
units—in particular statutorily created offices. In addition, although the
Constitution affords presidents removal authority as a default means of
command discipline, Congress may supplant and limit this authority by
replacing it with alternative disciplinary mechanisms, such as criminal penalties
for disobeying lawful orders.
By defining duties, command relationships, and disciplinary mechanisms in
this way, Congress may establish structures of executive branch accountability
that promote key values, protect military professionalism, and even encourage
or discourage particular results, all without infringing upon the President’s
ultimate authority to direct the nation’s armed forces. These conclusions bear
directly on recent legislative proposals to vest authority over cyber weapons,
force withdrawals, or nuclear weapons in officers other than the President. They
also enable a potent critique of the Supreme Court’s recent insistence on a
“unitary” executive branch in Seila Law LLC v. Consumer Financial Protection
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Bureau, and they shed new light on broader separation-of-powers debates over
executive-branch structure, conventions of governmental behavior, the civil
service’s constitutionality, and Reconstruction’s historical importance.
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Introduction
Recent events have highlighted office-holding’s importance as a
constraint on modern presidents. By vesting authorities in subordinate offices
rather than the presidency, Congress may place friction between presidential
desires and policy outcomes, even when the officer in question is subject to
at-will removal. Doing so may help maintain agency adherence to legal
requirements, ensure fidelity to agency statutory missions, and enable
political enforcement of norms and conventions regarding appropriate
conduct. Although examples of these effects stretch across American history,
President Donald Trump’s failure to fire a special prosecutor investigating
his presidential campaign provides a salient recent illustration: Because the
power to hire and fire special counsels belonged to the Attorney General, not
the President, Trump likely could have ousted the prosecutor only by firing
the Attorney General (or Acting Attorney General), but doing so would have
risked political backlash.
Congressional authority over offices—its power to vest duties in
subordinate offices and structure the executive branch—thus appears
practically important, as indeed scholars of administrative law have long
recognized. Yet despite extensive debate over relative presidential and
congressional authority with respect to regulatory policy and administrative
governance, parallel questions regarding military functions have received
insufficient attention. Even scholars who take broad views of congressional
authority in the administrative context have typically assumed that the
President, as Commander in Chief, must have plenary authority over military
functions.1 For its part, the executive branch, in legal opinions, signing
1. See, e.g., David J. Barron & Martin S. Lederman, The Commander in Chief at the Lowest
Ebb—Framing the Problem, Doctrine, and Original Understanding, 121 HARV. L. REV. 689, 769
(2008) (arguing that “the text, as reinforced by historical practice, makes a strong case for at least
some variant of a ‘unitary executive’ within the armed forces, particularly as to traditional functions
in armed conflicts”); Peter L. Strauss, Overseer, or “The Decider”?: The President in
Administrative Law, 75 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 696, 738 (2007) (“Unlike army generals, who may be
commanded, the heads of departments the President appoints and the Senate confirms have the
responsibility to decide the issues Congress has committed to their care—after appropriate
consultation, to be sure—and not simply to obey.”). Scholars with broader views of presidential
authority of course share this view. See, e.g., John Yoo, Administration of War, 58 DUKE L.J. 2277,
2280 (2009) (presuming that “[e]ven if inferior officers refused to carry out presidential orders, the
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statements, and other documents across multiple administrations, has
asserted remarkably broad theories of presidential command authority. Based
on its asserted view that “[i]t is for the President alone, as Commander-inChief, to make the choice of the particular personnel who are to exercise
operational and tactical command functions over the U.S. Armed Forces,”2
the executive branch has claimed authority to ignore statutory limits on who
may command U.S. forces in combat3 and even how many soldiers or sailors
must compose particular units.4
This pro-presidential consensus is mistaken. It is true that the President,
as Commander in Chief, must have some form of directive authority over
U.S. military forces in the field, and military officers may often hold a duty
to obey lawful presidential commands. This core presidential authority,
however, leaves Congress with extensive power to structure the offices,
chains of command, and disciplinary mechanisms through which the
President’s authority is exercised. In particular, much as in the administrative
context, Congress may vest particular powers and duties—authority to launch
nuclear weapons or a cyber operation, for example, or command over
particular units—in particular offices, even with respect to use of force.
Furthermore, although the Constitution affords Presidents removal authority
over these officers as a default means of command discipline, Congress may
to some degree supplant and limit this authority by replacing it with
alternative disciplinary mechanisms, such as criminal penalties for
disobeying lawful orders. By defining duties, command relationships, and
disciplinary mechanisms in this way, Congress may establish structures of
executive branch accountability that promote key values, protect military
professionalism, and even encourage or discourage particular results, all
without infringing upon the President’s ultimate authority to direct the
nation’s armed forces.

Commander-in-Chief Clause would seem to include the power to promote or demote officers and
to make duty assignments”); cf. Saikrishna Bangalore Prakash, The Separation and Overlap of War
and Military Powers, 87 TEXAS L. REV. 299, 384 (2008) (arguing that Congress “cannot create
independent military officers or agencies, it cannot force the Commander in Chief to use officers
that lack his confidence, and it cannot require the Commander in Chief to consult others prior to
exercising his constitutional powers”).
2. Placing of United States Armed Forces Under United Nations Operational or Tactical
Control, 20 Op. O.L.C. 182, 185 (1996).
3. Id. at 183.
4. Letter from the Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legislative Affairs, to Chairman Mac
Thornberry, Committee on the Armed Services, U.S. House of Representatives and Chairman John
McCain, Committee on the Armed Services, U.S. Senate (Nov. 8, 2017) [hereinafter “2018 NDAA
Views Letter”], https://www.justice.gov/ola/page/file/1010611/download [https://perma.cc/3A5DAAA7] (expressing views on the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2018, H.R.
2810, as passed by the Senate, and asserting that required “manning levels” for certain ships “would
contravene the President’s indefeasible authority as Commander in Chief”).
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Here, as in prior work, I will defend these conclusions using what I take
to be the “mainstream” approach to separation-of-powers interpretation.5
Under this approach, constitutional analysis is a holistic inquiry centered on
considerations of text, structure, original understanding, and subsequent
practice and precedent. Although the Constitution’s text and structure are
ultimately controlling, the broad contours of historical practice carry great
weight in resolving ambiguities, particularly in the absence of dispositive
court decisions.
By these lights, although my conclusions may be at odds with modern
intuitions about the President’s Commander-in-Chief power, they have the
virtue of according substantially not only with the Constitution’s plain text,
but also with our government’s actual practice over the past 150 years—or
so I will argue. Contrary to the widespread assumption that the President’s
military command authority is unusually broad, an unusually thick overlay
of statutes in fact regulates military office-holding at every stage. Statutes
regulate military offices with respect to everything from appointments6 and
promotions,7 to duties and assignments,8 to removals9 and other forms of
discipline,10 often to a degree well beyond the norm for civil and
administrative officers. Ironically, then, the frequent assumption that military
affairs are an area of special presidential authority relative to civil governance
may have it backwards in key respects.
Indeed, during at least one key historical period, Reconstruction,
Congress went even further, vesting authority over governance of the
defeated Confederacy in particular military officers and requiring that all
Army orders go through a top general who was also protected from at-will
removal.11 As a practical matter, these measures went beyond simply
structuring command relationships to encourage certain policy outcomes and
came close to stripping the President’s command authority altogether.12
Although some key decisions and scholarship, rather curiously, have treated
such Reconstruction-era precedents as dangerous anomalies,13 we shall see
5. H. JEFFERSON POWELL, TARGETING AMERICANS: THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE U.S.
DRONE WAR 191–93 (2016) (describing this approach); see also PHILIP BOBBITT,
CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION xv–xvi (1991) (offering a similar theory).
6. E.g., 10 U.S.C. §§ 531, 532 (2018).
7. E.g., 10 U.S.C. §§ 611, 624 (2018).
8. E.g., 10 U.S.C. §§ 125, 7065, 8062 (2018).
9. E.g., 10 U.S.C. § 1161 (2018).
10. E.g., 10 U.S.C. §§ 801–946a (2018).
11. See infra subsection II(B)(4)(a).
12. See infra subsection II(B)(4)(b).
13. See, e.g., NLRB v. Noel Canning, 573 U.S. 513, 585 (2014) (Scalia, J., dissenting)
(questioning the value as precedent of Reconstruction-era recess appointments in part because they
arose in “a period of dramatic conflict between the Executive and Congress that saw the first-ever
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that other precedents set during that period have remained central to the
military’s practical operation ever since.14 Given Reconstruction’s centrality
to the modern constitutional order, as well as its resonance with our own era
of unstable and conflicted politics, Congress’s maximal assertions of power
in that period warrant more respectful consideration, on this question among
others.
The analysis offered here bears directly on numerous current
controversies. In just the past few months, the Secretary of Defense
apparently withdrew military forces from certain domestic security functions
against the President’s wishes,15 the Navy Secretary resigned rather than
accept presidential interference with planned discipline for a wayward Navy
SEAL,16 controversy erupted over an aggressive military strike against a
senior Iranian officer in Iraq,17 and Congress created a new “Space Force”
within the Department of the Air Force.18 In addition, one recent statute

impeachment of a sitting President”); Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 544 (1969)
(characterizing Congress’s “abandonment of . . . restraint” in employing its exclusion power as
“among the casualties of the general upheaval produced in war’s wake”); Myers v. United States,
272 U.S. 52, 164–65 (1926) (characterizing statutes limiting presidential removal authority as
growing “out of the serious political difference between the two Houses of Congress and President
Johnson”). See generally DAVID J. BARRON, WAGING WAR: THE CLASH BETWEEN PRESIDENTS
AND CONGRESS, 1776 TO ISIS 179 (2016) (“The story of this broader power struggle [between the
President and Congress during Reconstruction] is now usually remembered . . . as an example of
Congress taking things too far. In the decades after the trial, the story of congressional overreach
burrowed into the national memory . . . .”).
14. See infra subsection III(A)(1)(b)(i) & section III(A)(2)(b).
15. Gordon Lubold, Trump Wanted to Fire Esper over Troops Dispute, WALL ST. J.
(June 9, 2020, 6:34 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/trump-wanted-to-fire-esper-over-troopsdispute-11591728235 [https://perma.cc/258F-4H9F] (“President Trump last week was on the brink
of firing Defense Secretary Mark Esper over their differing views of domestic use of active-duty
military, before advisers and allies on Capitol Hill talked him out of it, according to several
officials.”). Just as this Article was going to press, new controversy erupted over the Defense
Department’s role in failing to protect the Capitol from being stormed by riotous supporters of
President Trump. See, e.g., Dan Lamothe, Military Quick-Reaction Force Not Deployed During
Storming of Capitol Because of a Lack of Planning, Defense Officials Say, WASH. POST (Jan. 9,
2021, 2:57 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/national-security/2021/01/09/military-quickreaction-force-not-deployed-during-storming-capitol-because-lack-planning-defense-officials-say/
[https://perma.cc/4BFL-QHCB] (“A small quick-reaction force assembled by the Defense
Department to assist if needed during protests in Washington on Wednesday did not immediately
respond when a pro-Trump mob stormed the Capitol because of a lack of a prior planning with
Capitol Police over how it might be deployed . . . .”).
16. Ashley Parker & Dan Lamothe, Navy Secretary Forced Out by Pentagon Chief over
Handling of Navy SEAL’s War Crimes Case, WASH. POST (Nov. 25, 2019, 7:12 AM), https://
www.washingtonpost.com/national-security/2019/11/24/pentagon-chief-asks-navy-secretarysresignation-over-private-proposal-navy-seals-case/ [https://perma.cc/9ZN2-9V6W].
17. Isabel Coles, Tensions Rise in the Middle East After U.S. Killing of Iranian Military Leader,
WALL ST. J. (Jan. 3, 2020, 6:50 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/u-s-strike-in-iraq-threatens-tieswith-vital-middle-east-ally-11578058413?mod=hp_lead_pos1 [https://perma.cc/XVA5-KRBF].
18. United States Space Force Act, Pub. L. No. 116-92, §§ 951–953, 133 Stat. 1561, 1561–64
(2019) (codified at 10 U.S.C. §§ 9081–83 (2018)).
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vested authority over certain offensive cyber operations jointly in the
President and Secretary of Defense, rather than the President alone.19 Another
statute conditioned certain force withdrawals from South Korea on
certifications by the Secretary,20 though President Trump declared this
provision unconstitutional in a signing statement.21 Some have even called
for statutory limits on presidential discretion over nuclear weapons, among
other things.22
The validity of all these actions and proposals depends on the relative
extent of congressional and presidential authority to define military officers’
duties and their degree of independence from presidential dictates. Nor are
such questions likely to fade away. So long as our politics remain erratic,
conflicted, and polarized, it is not hard to image Congress employing its
19. John S. McCain National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2019, Pub. L. No. 115232, § 1642, 132 Stat. 2132 (2018) (codified at 10 U.S.C. § 394 note); see also Robert Chesney,
The Law of Military Cyber Operations and the New NDAA, LAWFARE (July 26, 2018, 2:07 PM),
https://www.lawfareblog.com/law-military-cyber-operations-and-new-ndaa
[https://perma.cc
/K7P7-UMKN] (noting peculiarity of “mak[ing] the ‘National Command Authority’ the relevant
decision maker” rather than “just the [P]resident”); Rebecca Ingber, Congressional Administration
of Foreign Affairs, 106 VA. L. REV. 395, 434 (2020) (noting this provision “appears to dilute the
delegation of power, at least as compared to a delegation to the President alone”).
20. National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2020, Pub. L. No. 116-92, § 1254, 133
Stat. 1198, 1671–72 (2019) (providing that no funds authorized by the statute “may be used to
reduce the total number of members of the Armed Forces serving on active duty who are deployed
to South Korea below 28,500 until 90 days after” the Secretary of Defense certifies, among other
things, that “[s]uch a reduction is in the national security interest of the United States and will not
significantly undermine the security of United States allies in the region”).
21. Presidential Statement on Signing the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
2020, 2019 DAILY COMP. PRES. DOC. 201900880 (Dec. 20, 2019) (indicating that “[s]everal
provisions of the Act, including section[] 1254 . . . , purport to restrict the President’s authority to
manage personnel, materiel, and logistical matters in the manner the President believes to be
necessary or advisable for the successful conduct of military missions and foreign affairs” and will
accordingly be “implement[ed]” in a manner “consistent with the President’s authority as
Commander in Chief and as the sole representative of the Nation in foreign affairs”); see also Letter
from Prim F. Escalona, Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legis. Affairs, U.S.
Dep’t of Justice to Senator James Inhofe, Chairman, Comm. on Armed Servs. (Nov. 27, 2019)
[hereinafter 2020 NDAA Views Letter], https://www.justice.gov/ola/page/file/1222061/download
[https://perma.cc/3LB7-W3KJ] (objecting to earlier version of this provision on the grounds that
“[t]he President’s constitutional authority to deploy personnel and materiel cannot be conditioned
. . . on certifications or waivers made by subordinate Executive Branch officials”).
22. See, e.g., Dakota S. Rudesill, Nuclear Command and Statutory Control, 11 J. NAT’L SEC.
L. & POL’Y (forthcoming 2021) (manuscript at 28–30); Richard K. Betts & Matthew C. Waxman,
The President and the Bomb: Reforming the Nuclear Launch Process, FOREIGN AFFAIRS
(Mar./Apr. 2018); Bruce Blair & Jon Wolfsthal, Trump Can Launch Nuclear Weapons
Whenever He Wants, with or Without Mattis, WASH. POST (Dec. 23, 2018, 5:00 AM), http://www
.washingtonpost.com/outlook/2018/12/23/trump-can-launch-nuclear-weapons-whenever-he-wants
-with-or-without-mattis [https://perma.cc/9D5B-GQTB]; Joseph Cirincione, No President Should
Have the Absolute Authority to Launch Nuclear Weapons, WASH. POST (Dec. 1, 2019,
12:44 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2019/12/01/no-president-should-haveabsolute-authority-launch-nuclear-weapons/ [https://perma.cc/694A-WY2B]; Editorial Board, The
President Alone Should Not Be Able to Start a Nuclear War, SCI. AM. (Apr. 2020).
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power to structure the military still more aggressively—nor to anticipate
Presidents pushing back with aggressive theories of Commander-in-Chief
power.
Beyond their immediate importance, the conclusions reached here have
significant implications for broader separation-of-powers debates. First,
although the Supreme Court recently suggested in Seila Law LLC v.
Consumer Financial Protection Bureau23 that “[t]he entire ‘executive Power’
belongs to the President alone” and that subordinate officers therefore
“wield” authorities belonging to the President,24 this view is wrong even for
the military, which even the Seila dissenters presumed is an area of greater
presidential authority.25 Seila notwithstanding, Congress’s extensive
authority to allocate military duties should put to rest the strongest versions
of so-called “unitary” executive branch theory, under which all power vested
in executive offices is thought to be necessarily vested in the presidency as
well.26
Second, the analysis highlights the importance of baseline constitutional
understandings about office-holding to sustaining the superstructure of
norms, expectations, and “conventions” about government behavior that
recent scholarship has underscored as a key feature of responsive and
accountable governance.27 Third, recognizing Congress’s authority over
military offices should strengthen arguments that parallel legal protections
for officers and employees in the civil service are constitutionally valid.28
Finally, the history addressed here should refocus scholarly attention on
Reconstruction’s importance not only to the constitutional law of civil
liberties, but also to operative understandings of separation of powers.29
My analysis proceeds as follows. Part I provides background on
constitutional debates over office-holding in general and military officers in
particular. Among other things, Part I maps out major schools of thought
regarding presidential authority over federal officers, explaining how the
arguments developed here fit into those debates. Part II then addresses a first
key question: whether Congress may assign particular duties and authorities
to military offices other than the presidency. This Part advances the view that,
contrary to frequent executive assertions and the undeveloped assumption of
many scholars, Congress in fact holds extensive authority to assign
authorities and responsibilities to particular offices, even if officers holding
those positions are under a duty to obey lawful orders from the Commander
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.

140 S. Ct. 2183 (2020).
Id. at 2197 (quoting U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 1).
Id. at 2233 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
See infra subpart IV(A).
See infra subpart IV(B).
See infra subpart IV(C).
See infra subpart IV(D).
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in Chief. Part III turns to removal and argues that Congress may limit
presidential removal of military officers provided it enacts alternative means
of command discipline. Part IV briefly addresses the four broader
implications described earlier. The Article ends with a conclusion reflecting
on these constitutional principles’ importance in our political moment.
I.

Background on Military Offices and Appointments

Article II of the Constitution, as Jerry Mashaw has observed, gives
remarkably little attention to administration.30 The Constitution, to be sure,
establishes a single President as head of the executive branch and
“Commander in Chief” of the military.31 It also prescribes the appointment
process for all “Officers of the United States.”32 It says nothing explicit,
however, about the President’s authority to remove officers and contains
maddening ambiguities about the degree of presidential control over federal
administration. These gaps in the text have fostered long-running debates in
scholarship, case law, and legislative practice over the precise content of the
President’s authority over the executive branch.
To lay groundwork for analyzing congressional authority over military
duties and command discipline, I begin here with a brief overview of relevant
Article II provisions on military office-holding, the questions about duties
and removal that these provisions generate, and the connection between these
questions and related, more developed scholarly debates over civil and
administrative office-holding. I then briefly address and set aside two key
threshold issues that are much contested outside the military but relatively
clear in this setting: which positions count as “offices” in the first place, and
what limits Congress may place on who receives those positions.
A.

Article II’s Text and Its Ambiguities
What does the Constitution say about military offices? To begin with,
of course, Article II makes the President “Commander in Chief of the Army
and Navy of the United States, and of the Militia of the several states, when
called into actual Service of the United States.”33 Article I, however, gives
Congress the power to “declare War,” “raise and support Armies,” “provide
and maintain a Navy,” and provide for calling the state militias into federal
service.34 It also empowers Congress to “make Rules for the Government and

30. JERRY L. MASHAW, CREATING THE ADMINISTRATIVE CONSTITUTION 30 (2012) (“The
American Constitution of 1787 left a hole where administration might have been.”).
31. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 1; id. § 2, cl. 1.
32. Id. § 2, cl. 2.
33. Id. § 2, cl. 1.
34. Id. art. I, § 8.
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Regulation of the land and naval Forces.”35 It does the same for state militia
forces when in federal service, except that the states retain power over “the
Appointment of the [militia] Officers, and the Authority of training the
Militia according to the discipline prescribed by Congress.”36
More generally, the Constitution’s Appointments Clause provides that
all “Officers of the United States” must be appointed by the President with
Senate advice and consent, unless Congress provides by law for appointment
of an “inferior Officer” by the President alone, the head of a department, or
a court of law.37 In addition, Congress holds overall authority to structure the
executive branch by virtue of the Necessary and Proper Clause. Though
better known for granting Congress authority to enact laws “necessary and
proper for carrying into execution” Congress’s other enumerated legislative
powers, the Necessary and Proper Clause grants Congress the same authority
with respect to “all other powers vested by this Constitution in the
government of the United States or in any department or officer thereof.”38
On the other hand, Congress lacks the power to impeach and remove military
officers. Although certain officers “shall be removed from office on
impeachment for, and conviction of, treason, bribery, or other high crimes
and misdemeanors,” this clause applies only to “[t]he President, VicePresident, and all civil [i.e., nonmilitary] officers of the United States.”39
Long-running debates address Congress’s authority to structure civil
and administrative offices under these and other related provisions.40
Although the Constitution’s plain text says nothing at all about removal of
executive officers through means other than impeachment, the First Congress
debated the issue at length. It apparently concluded, in its celebrated
“Decision of 1789,” that presidents have constitutional authority to remove
executive officers they appoint.41 Subsequent Supreme Court decisions have
rejected requiring Senate or congressional approval for removal of an
executive officer,42 but approved tenure protections for certain civil or

35. Id. § cl. 14.
36. Id. § cl. 16.
37. Id. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
38. Id. art. I, § 8.
39. Id. art. II, § 4 (emphasis added).
40. See generally HAROLD H. BRUFF, UNTRODDEN GROUND: HOW PRESIDENTS INTERPRET
THE CONSTITUTION 29–32 (2015) (discussing debates over presidential supervisory authority
during Washington’s presidency).
41. Id. at 30–32; see also Saikrishna Prakash, New Light on the Decision of 1789, 91 CORNELL
L. REV. 1021, 1075 (2006) (arguing that members of Congress who voted for statutes creating
executive departments in 1789 “knew that they were endorsing the President’s right to remove
[executive] officers by virtue of his executive power”). I discuss this historical debate and its
implications in more detail below in subsection III(A)(1)(a).
42. Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 720–21 (1986); Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 176
(1926).
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administrative positions.43 In its recent synthesis in Seila, which invalidated
tenure protections for an officer charged with interpreting and enforcing
multiple financial consumer protection statutes, the Court characterized its
past decisions as allowing tenure protections only “for multimember expert
agencies that do not wield substantial executive power, and . . . for inferior
officers with limited duties and no policymaking or administrative
authority.”44
Apart from the question of what removal authority presidents hold, the
question why they hold any such power at all is equally vexed. Some
authorities, including the majority opinion in Seila,45 base this power on the
so-called Vesting Clause, which vests “the executive power” in the
President;46 others locate it in the Take Care Clause, which obligates the
President to “take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed”;47 and still
others argue that removal authority may be inferred from appointment
authority.48
As a rough approximation, judges and scholars who have addressed
presidential removal authority with respect to administrative offices fall in
three main camps. A first perspective characterizes Article II as requiring a
“unitary” executive branch in which the President holds indefeasible power
to remove all executive officers.49 A second view maintains that while
presidents hold removal authority as a default, Congress may restrict or
regulate that power by statute when doing so is functionally justified.50
Finally, a third account maintains that Congress may impose removal
limitations as a matter of near-plenary discretion over administrative

43. Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 659–60 (1988); Humphrey’s Ex’r v. United States, 295
U.S. 602, 631–32 (1935).
44. Seila Law LLC v. CFPB, 140 S. Ct. 2183, 2199–2200 (2020).
45. Id. at 2197.
46. E.g., Saikrishna Prakash, Removal and Tenure in Office, 92 VA. L. REV. 1779, 1840 (2006).
47. See, e.g., MICHAEL MCCONNELL, THE PRESIDENT WHO WOULD NOT BE KING 165–66
(2020) (advocating removal power rooted in the Take Care Clause); cf. Seila, 140 S. Ct. at 2228
(Kagan, J., dissenting) (acknowledging that the Take Care Clause’s text “requires . . . enough
authority to make sure ‘the laws [are] faithfully executed’—meaning with fidelity to the law itself,
not to every presidential policy preference”).
48. See, e.g., Ex parte Hennen, 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 230, 233 (1839) (discussing removal power as
incidental to appointment power).
49. See, e.g., Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 697 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing that
the President’s “executive Power” entails removal authority); STEVEN G. CALABRESI &
CHRISTOPHER S. YOO, THE UNITARY EXECUTIVE: PRESIDENTIAL POWER FROM WASHINGTON TO
BUSH 4 (2008) (discussing the unitary executive theory); MCCONNELL, supra note 47 (advocating
at-will removal power with respect to civil officers based on the Take Care Clause).
50. See, e.g., Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 671–72 (1988) (upholding for-cause removal
limitation for independent prosecutor).
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design.51 As we shall see, parallel questions arise in the military context, but
the arguments are less well developed, some textual theories for civil officers
are not readily applicable, and the Commander-in-Chief Clause raises distinct
questions.52
A related and overlapping debate concerns Congress’s authority to vest
particular authorities in particular executive offices other than the presidency.
On this question, the predominant scholarly view holds that Congress may
vest civil and administrative powers and duties in offices other than the
President.53 Proponents of this view maintain that the Appointments Clause
and Necessary and Proper Clause grant Congress the power to create offices
and vest them with particular duties and authorities—duties and authorities
that may then be exercised only by those officers, not by the President
personally. On the other hand, proponents of a strong “unitary” executive
branch argue that the President, as a Chief Executive endowed with
“executive power” and obliged to ensure faithful execution of the laws,
necessarily holds authority to control subordinate executive officers’
functions or even personally discharge those officers’ duties.54 Though
51. See, e.g., Seila, 140 S. Ct. at 2227 (Kagan, J., dissenting) (emphasizing Congress’s “broad
authority to establish and organize the Executive Branch”); PETER M. SHANE, MADISON’S
NIGHTMARE: HOW EXECUTIVE POWER THREATENS AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 34–35 (2009)
(“Congress may structure the agencies to prevent the President from exercising his own supervisory
control over their policy discretion.”).
52. See infra Part III.
53. See, e.g., HAROLD H. BRUFF, BALANCE OF FORCES: SEPARATION OF POWERS LAW IN THE
ADMINISTRATIVE STATE 456–59 (2006) (discussing historical support for this view); HAROLD J.
KRENT, PRESIDENTIAL POWERS 22–23, 56–57 (2005) (noting that “Congress over the past two
centuries has delegated authority to officers independent of the president, and the president has
never exerted close control over all law enforcement nor over administration of governmental
policy”); MCCONNELL, supra note 47, at 349–50 (advocating congressional authority to vest duties
in civil offices as a limited qualification of unitary presidential control of the executive branch);
SHANE, supra note 51, at 143–44 (arguing that the President is properly an “overseer” rather than
the “decider” with respect to the federal bureaucracy); Thomas O. McGarity, Presidential Control
of Regulatory Agency Decisionmaking, 36 AM. U. L. REV. 443, 465 (1987) (Congress “may provide
that the President may not substitute his judgment (or the judgment of a member of his staff) for
that of the official to whom Congress has delegated decisionmaking power”); Robert B. Percival,
Who’s in Charge?: Does the President Have Directive Authority over Agency Regulatory
Decisions?, 79 FORDHAM L. REV. 2487, 2490 (2011) (“If an agency head refuses to accommodate
the President’s policy preferences, there is no constitutional problem with the President removing
him from office. But this does not imply that the President has the authority to dictate the substance
of agency decisions that regulatory statutes entrust to agency heads.”); Neomi Rao, Removal:
Necessary and Sufficient for Presidential Control, 65 ALA. L. REV. 1205, 1210, 1234–36 (2014)
(“[R]emoval provides the necessary and sufficient constitutional mechanism for ensuring
presidential control and the possibility of direction . . . .”); Strauss, supra note 1, at 698 (arguing
that “absent actual congressional delegation of decisional authority to the President, his role is
limited to executive oversight of the agency on which that authority is statutorily conferred”).
54. See, e.g., CALABRESI & YOO, supra note 49, at 4 (“All subordinate nonlegislative and
nonjudicial officials exercise executive power, and they do so only by implicit or explicit delegation
from the president. They are thus all subject to the president’s powers of direction and control.”);
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significant pre-Seila case law supported the former view,55 the Seila majority
opinion appears to embrace the latter theory. It asserts that “[t]he entire
‘executive Power’ belongs to the President alone” and characterizes
subordinate executive officers as mere assistants to the President, “whose
authority they wield.”56
As with removal, precisely the same questions may arise with respect to
military officers, but these issues have received far less attention in that
context. Even leading proponents of congressional authority in the civil and
administrative context have presumed that the military is different,57 and
presidents, as noted earlier, have repeatedly claimed a plenary authority to
reassign military duties.58 Yet the textual basis for this distinction is unclear.
Although the President is the military’s Commander in Chief under Article II,
the Appointments and Necessary and Proper Clauses apply by their terms to
military offices, and Congress holds specific authority not only to raise
armies and maintain navies, but also to enact rules for their governance.
Resolving these questions—the degree of congressional authority to
limit removal power and assign duties with respect to military functions—
will be the focus of this Article. Again simplifying greatly, most
administrative law scholars embrace either the unitarian view on both
questions (advocating an indefeasible removal power as well as a presidential
SAIKRISHNA BANGALORE PRAKASH, IMPERIAL FROM THE BEGINNING: THE CONSTITUTION OF THE
ORIGINAL EXECUTIVE 184–92 (2015) (arguing the President holds plenary directive authority over
executive officers and may revise their determinations); Steven G. Calabresi & Saikrishna B.
Prakash, The President’s Power to Execute the Laws, 104 YALE L.J. 541, 598–99 (1994) (indicating
that the President may “completely withdraw [an officer’s] authority should he feel that an officer
is no longer exercising authority consistent with his views” and then personally “make all those
decisions previously vested by statute in the now constitutionally disempowered officer”); Gary
Lawson, The Rise and Rise of the Administrative State, 107 HARV. L. REV. 1231, 1243–44 (1994)
(arguing that the President “necessarily has the power to nullify discretionary actions of
subordinates”); Adam White, The D.C. Circuit’s “Trump Card” for Executive Orders, NOTICE &
COMMENT BLOG (Mar. 13, 2017), http://yalejreg.com/nc/the-d-c-circuits-trump-card-forexecutive-orders/ [https://perma.cc/QSF6-6GGG] (suggesting that executive agencies may be
obligated to follow presidential directives).
55. See, e.g., Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 135 (1926) (indicating that the President
“may properly supervise and guide [executive officers’] construction of the statutes under which
they act”); Portland Audubon Soc’y v. Endangered Species Comm’n, 984 F.2d 1534, 1537 (9th Cir.
1993) (holding that ex parte communications between the White House and responsible executive
officials may be improper). See generally Strauss, supra note 1, at 708–13 (surveying case law).
56. Seila, 140 S. Ct. at 2197 (quoting U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 1).
57. See, e.g., Strauss, supra note 1, at 737–38 (distinguishing military officers from other
executive officers); cf. Peter M. Shane, The Originalist Myth of the Unitary Executive, 19 U. PA. J.
CONST. L. 323, 324 (2016) (challenging the “hard version” of unitary executive branch theory under
which Presidents hold “plenary authorit[y], which Congress may not limit, . . . to direct how
[administrative officials] shall exercise any and all discretionary authority that those officials
possess under law,” but conceding that “the President enjoys such control over subordinate
personnel who assist the President in performing specific constitutionally enumerated tasks, such as
negotiating treaties or commanding the military”).
58. See supra notes 2–4 and accompanying text; infra notes 80–81 and accompanying text.
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power to revise or control subordinates’ actions)59 or else the non-unitarian
view on both (advancing the second or third view described above on
removal while also defending congressional authority to define officers’
duties).60 At least one scholar maintains the intermediate position that the
President holds indefeasible removal authority but Congress may vest
statutory duties in particular offices.61
With respect to the military, I will defend yet another position: Congress
may assign powers and duties to offices, and it may also displace presidential
removal authority, but only if it provides a robust alternative disciplinary
mechanism for effectuating presidential command authority. In other words,
the President, unlike in civil settings according to non-unitarian accounts,
must have some form of directive authority over the military. But Congress
may nevertheless vest duties in particular offices other than the presidency,
so long as it provides either removal authority or some other robust
disciplinary mechanism for securing compliance with lawful presidential
directives as to how those duties are exercised. As a practical matter, these
congressional powers may enable Congress to place the Secretary of
Defense, other civilian officers within the chain of command, or even regular
military officers in much the same position as the Attorney General or
Treasury Secretary under current governing statutes: those officers may hold
powers that only they can exercise, but the President can fire or threaten to
fire or punish them to get his or her way. As we shall see, this constitutional
understanding has historically enabled Congress to structure the military and
impose procedural constraints in ways that effectively constrain presidents’
choices and shape policy outcomes.
I will return later to this position’s implications for administrative law
debates. To lay groundwork for these arguments, however, two other key
Article II ambiguities warrant brief attention. Whereas the removal and duty
questions have received at least an uneasy resolution in the civil and
administrative context but remain underexplored with respect to the military,
these next two issues have the opposite character: relative clarity with respect
to the military despite considerable debate outside it.

59. E.g., Calabresi & Prakash, supra note 54, at 598–99.
60. See, e.g., SHANE, supra note 51, at 34–35 (advancing “pluralist” model of the executive
branch in which “the degree of policy control the President may exercise is up to Congress, which
is limited, in turn, only by the Constitution’s constraints on the scope of the national legislative
authority”); Jack M. Beermann, Congressional Administration, 43 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 61, 107–08
(2006) (“In our system, . . . while the President may sometimes exercise independent organizational
power, it is largely Congress that decides what departments to create, how to organize those
departments into various authorities and agencies and whether to create agencies outside of any
department.”).
61. MCCONNELL, supra note 47, at 349–50.
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B.

Which Positions Are Offices?
The first such question is who counts as an “officer of the United States”
under the Appointments Clause in the first place. To be clear, this question is
not essential to resolving the duty-assignment and removal issues addressed
here. In principle, Congress might hold equivalent authority to assign duties
and limit termination with respect to nonofficer employees as well. Yet the
Supreme Court suggested in its 2010 decision in Free Enterprise Fund v.
Public Company Accounting Oversight Board62 that removal and
appointment questions might be linked,63 and in any event, clarifying terms
at the outset may help avoid confusion in discussing key governing
authorities regarding military officers.
Under governing case law, the Supreme Court has generally considered
a position an office if it entails both a degree of permanence—“tenure and
duration,” as opposed to ad hoc or temporary responsibility—and some
exercise of “significant authority under the laws of the United States.”64 As a
matter of current practice, within administrative agencies, only the most
senior officials—agency heads, assistant heads, deputy assistant heads, and
the like—have typically been understood to meet these twin criteria.
Prompted, however, by recent scholarship suggesting that the Framers
viewed a wider range of positions as offices,65 litigants and commentators
have begun raising challenges to existing statutory arrangements.66 In 2018,
in Lucia v. SEC, the Supreme Court entered this fray but offered little
clarification.67 Rather than adopting any new general framework for
identifying “significant authority,” the Court in Lucia held narrowly on the
62. 561 U.S. 477 (2010).
63. Id. at 506 (reserving the question “whether ‘lesser functionaries subordinate to officers of
the United States’ must be subject to the same sort of control as those who exercise ‘significant
authority pursuant to the laws’” (quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 126 & n.162 (1976) (per
curiam)).
64. Lucia v. SEC, 138 S. Ct. 2044, 2051 (2018) (citing United States v. Germaine, 99 U.S. 508,
511–12 (1879), for the first requirement and Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 126 (1976) (per curiam),
for the second). The Executive Branch has generally applied this same framework, see, for example,
The Constitutional Separation of Powers Between the President and Congress, 20 Op. O.L.C. 124,
141–42 (1996), but an Office of Legal Counsel opinion during the George W. Bush Administration
adopted a similar framework focused instead on whether the position is “continuing” and entails an
exercise of “sovereign power.” Officers of the United States Within the Meaning of the
Appointments Clause, 31 Op. O.L.C. 73, 73–74 (2007).
65. See generally Jennifer L. Mascott, Who Are “Officers of the United States”?, 70 STAN. L.
REV. 443 (2018) (exploring the original public meaning of “officer”); James C. Phillips, Benjamin
Lee & Jacob Crump, Corpus Linguistics and “Officers of the United States”, 42 HARV. J. L. & PUB.
POL’Y 872 (2019) (similar); Aditya Bamzai, The Attorney General and Early Appointments Clause
Practice, 93 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1501 (2018) (addressing understanding of early attorneys
general).
66. See, e.g., Lucia v. SEC, 138 S. Ct. 2044, 2050 (2018) (addressing whether certain
administrative law judges are “officers”).
67. Id. at 2052.
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facts of the case that the administrative law judges in question were officers
under the Appointments Clause because a closely analogous precedent had
so held.68
In contrast to this general ferment with respect to administrative offices,
in the military setting, statutes, executive practice, and judicial opinions all
point to a clear, and unusually broad, understanding of who counts as an
Appointments Clause officer. As the Justice Department’s Office of Legal
Counsel put it in a recent opinion, all “[c]ommissioned military officers are
‘Officers of the United States’ for purposes of the Appointments Clause of
the Constitution, and each promotion of a military officer from one grade
level to the next is considered a separate appointment to a new office.”69
Accordingly, within the military, the operative understanding of “officer”
converges with ordinary usage, ensuring that all commissioned officers, from
generals and admirals down to lieutenants and ensigns, must either be
appointed by the President with Senate consent or else, if Congress so
provides, by the President alone or the Secretary of Defense. Further,
although promotion within grade is viewed as a mere change in duties and
not a change in office, a promotion from one grade to the next requires a new
appointment in accordance with the Appointments Clause.
As noted, in Free Enterprise Fund, the Supreme Court suggested,
without resolving the issue, that tenure protections might be more permissible
for employees than for Appointments Clause officers.70 To the extent that
inference is sound (and it may well not be), the points discussed here with
respect to military officers may bear on current debates over civil-service
protections post-Lucia—a point I return to in Part IV.71 The key point for the
moment is that a very broad set of officials, stretching from the upper ranks
of the Defense Department down to nearly the most junior officers, qualify
as Appointments Clause officers.
C.

How Are Officers Appointed?
Another unusual, but seemingly settled, feature of military officeholding relates to appointment qualifications. Despite the broad definition of
Appointments Clause “officers” with respect to the military, in practice
68. Id. at 2052 (relying on Freytag v. Commissioner, 501 U.S. 868 (1991)).
69. Promotions of the Judge Advocates General Under Section 543 of the National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008, 32 Op. O.L.C. 70, 71 (2008) (internal citations omitted);
see also 10 U.S.C. § 531 (2018) (providing for appointment to new officer grades); Weiss v. United
States, 510 U.S. 163, 170 (1994) (indicating that military officers must be appointed in accordance
with the Appointments Clause); Dysart v. United States, 369 F.3d 1303, 1306 (Fed. Cir. 2004)
(same).
70. Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477, 506 (2009) (holding
that double-layer tenure-protection is unconstitutional for officers but might be permissible for
employees).
71. See infra subpart IV(C).
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military appointments are highly regulated. Even at the highest level, statutes
establishing military offices are rife with qualification requirements that limit
the pool of eligible appointees. At the very top, the Secretary of Defense may
not have served on active duty in the military within the past seven years.72
Similar or more onerous requirements apply to Assistant Secretaries and
other senior civilian offices.73 Requirements for regular military officers are
often even more restrictive. By their terms, governing statutes limit
candidates for promotion to those included on lists of qualified officers
prepared by boards of other military officers based on their assessment of
junior officers’ performance.74 Although presidents may remove candidates
from the lists, in effect this statutory framework limits their choice of
nominees to individuals recommended by other military officers.75
The executive branch has never fully accepted these statutes. In a series
of legal opinions, executive-branch lawyers have asserted that “Congress
may point out the general class of individuals from which an appointment
must be made, if made at all, but it cannot control the President’s discretion
to the extent of compelling him to commission a designated individual.”76 In
other words, in the executive branch’s view, “the President must retain
sufficient discretion in selecting nominees for Executive Branch offices”;
Congress cannot limit the choice too narrowly.77 Presidents, moreover,
appear to have occasionally acted on this understanding by appointing

72. 10 U.S.C. § 113(a) (2018).
73. See, e.g., 10 U.S.C. § 136 (2018) (requiring at least seven years in civilian life for the Under
Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness); id. § 137 (same for Under Secretary of Defense
for Intelligence); id. § 135 (same plus “significant budget, financial management, or audit
experience in complex organizations” for the Defense Department Comptroller).
74. E.g., 10 U.S.C. §§ 611, 616–618, 624 (2018); see also 10 U.S.C. § 9082(a) (2018) (requiring
appointment of the Chief of Space Operations from the general officers of the Air Force). Statutes
of this sort stretch back to the nineteenth century. See, e.g., Act of Apr. 21, 1864, 13 Stat. 53
(directing that “no line officer of the navy, upon the active list, below the grade of commodore, nor
any other naval officer, shall be promoted to a higher grade, until his mental, moral, and professional
fitness to perform all his duties at sea shall be established to the satisfaction of a board of examining
officers to be appointed by the President of the United States”).
75. See 10 U.S.C. § 618(d) (2018) (allowing the President or, in some cases, the Secretary of
Defense to remove names from lists recommended for promotion by promotion boards); id. § 624
(providing for officers’ appointments to more senior positions from promotion lists based on
approved promotion-board reports).
76. Issuance of Commission in Name of Deceased Army Officer, 29 Op. Att’y Gen. 254, 256
(1911).
77. Promotions of the Judge Advocates General Under Section 543 of the National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008, 32 Op. O.L.C. 70, 75 (2008). The Executive Branch applies
the same standard to nonmilitary appointments. See, e.g., Constitutionality of Statute Governing
Appointment of United States Trade Representative, 20 Op. O.L.C. 279, 280 (1996) (“Any power
in the Congress to set qualifications ‘is limited by the necessity of leaving scope for the judgment
and will of the person or body in whom the Constitution vests the power of appointment.’” (quoting
Civil Service Commission, 13 Op. Att’y Gen. 516, 520–21 (1871))).
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unlisted individuals.78 With these limited exceptions, however, the Executive
Branch appears to have acquiesced to a remarkable degree to this quite
restrictive process for making certain military appointments. Subject to some
residual presidential discretion that remains ill-defined, Congress has
effectively confined and professionalized the selection of individuals who
may hold certain key positions within the military.79
Executive acquiescence in this appointments process may, once again,
hold implications beyond the military; I will explore this theme briefly in
Part IV. With respect to the military itself, the most pressing questions about
presidential control relate instead to assignment of duties and removal of
officers. In other words, with respect to the broad set of military positions
universally treated as “offices” and appointed through the process just
described, what authority does Congress have either to vest particular
authorities and responsibilities in particular offices other than the presidency,
or to limit at-will presidential removal of individuals holding those offices? I
will now offer sustained analysis of these two issues.
II.

Assignment of Duties
The first key question regarding congressional authority over military
offices is whether Congress may not only impose qualifications on officers,
but also define the particular authorities and responsibilities that those
officers may perform. As we have seen, the executive branch has repeatedly
asserted that any such congressional power is nugatory. “As commander-inchief of the army it is your right to decide according to your own judgment
what officer shall perform any particular duty,” Attorney General Jeremiah

78. See, e.g., Promotion of Marine Officer, 41 Op. Att’y Gen. 291, 293 (1956) (upholding
President’s authority to temporarily appoint an individual outside the statutory framework for
promotions because “the President may not be bound in his selection of an officer or group of
officers merely because in the opinion of others they are better qualified for promotion”). Former
President and then-future Chief Justice William Howard Taft argued in a lecture on presidential
powers that although such promotion statutes are constitutionally valid, “[n]o court and no other
authority . . . can compel the President to make a nomination, and the only method of preventing
his appointing someone other than the one specified by law is for the Senate to refuse to confirm
him, or for Congress to withhold an appropriation of his salary, or for the Comptroller of the
Treasury to decline to draw a warrant for his salary on the ground of his ineligibility under the law.”
WILLIAM HOWARD TAFT, OUR CHIEF MAGISTRATE AND HIS POWERS 128 (1916).
79. An Attorney General opinion from 1911 describes, and properly rejects, the still broader
theory that Congress’s power to establish rules for the military entails power to make military
appointments on its own. Issuance of Commission in Name of Deceased Army Officer, 29 Op. Att’y
Gen. 254, 255–56 (1911).
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S. Black wrote to President James Buchanan in 1860,80 and later presidents
have nodded in agreement.81
Commentators seem largely to have agreed as well. Even a leading
proponent of congressional power over nonmilitary offices argues the
military is categorically different: Although “the heads of departments the
President appoints and the Senate confirms have the responsibility to decide
the issues Congress has committed to their care—after appropriate
consultation, to be sure—and not simply to obey,” “army generals” may
simply “be commanded.”82 Similarly, a leading account of congressional
authority over use of military force asserts in a footnote that although
Congress may vest particular duties in military officers, this congressional
authority may be limited to “certain internal functions apart from the conduct
of war.”83 Some with broader theories of presidential power have embraced
80. Memorial of Captain Meigs, 9 Op. Att’y Gen. 462, 468 (1860).
81. See, e.g., 2018 NDAA Views Letter, supra note 4, at 4 (invoking the Black’s Attorney
General opinion to indicate that “Presidents have asserted [the] authority [to assign military duties
to particular personnel] since at least 1860”); Legal Authorities Supporting the Activities of the
National Security Agency Described by the President, 30 Op. O.L.C. 1, 37–38 (2006) (disclosing
white paper on surveillance activities that cites Meigs for the proposition that “an act of Congress,
if intended to constrain the President’s discretion in assigning duties to an officer in the army, would
be unconstitutional”); Statement on Signing the Energy and Water Development Appropriations
Act, 2004, 2 Pub. Papers 1659 (Dec. 1, 2003) (“The executive branch shall construe provisions of
the Act that direct the Secretary of a military department to perform the Secretary’s duties through
a particular military officer in a manner consistent with . . . the constitutional authority of the
President to supervise the unitary executive branch and as Commander in Chief.”); Statement on
Signing the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1996, 1 Pub. Papers 226 (Feb. 10,
1996) (“[T]he Congress deleted the restriction on the President’s authority to make and implement
decisions relating to the operational or tactical control of elements of the U.S. armed forces, a
restriction which clearly infringed on the President’s constitutional authority as Commander in
Chief.”); Placing of United States Armed Forces Under United Nations Operational or Tactical
Control, 20 Op. O.L.C. 182, 184 (1996) (“Whatever the scope of this authority in other contexts,
there can be no room to doubt that the Commander-in-Chief Clause commits to the President alone
the power to select the particular personnel who are to exercise tactical and operational control over
U.S. forces.”); Training of British Flying Students in the United States, 40 U.S. Op. Att’y Gen. 58,
61–62 (1941) (observing that the President’s “authority” as Commander in Chief “undoubtedly
includes the power to dispose of troops and equipment in such manner and on such duties as best to
promote the safety of the country”); see also 2020 NDAA Views Letter, supra note 21, at 3 (“The
President’s constitutional authority to deploy personnel and materiel cannot be conditioned . . . on
certifications or waivers made by subordinate Executive Branch officials.”); Acquisition of Naval
and Air Bases in Exchange for Over-Age Destroyers, 39 Op. Att’y Gen. 484, 490 (1940) (calling it
“of questionable constitutionality” to “prohibit action by the constitutionally created Commander
in Chief except upon authorization of a statutory officer subordinate in rank,” but ultimately finding
it “unnecessary” to resolve this issue).
82. Strauss, supra note 1, at 737–38.
83. David J. Barron & Martin S. Lederman, The Commander in Chief Clause at the Lowest
Ebb—A Constitutional History, 121 HARV. L. REV. 941, 986–87 n.164 (2008); see also id. at 1102–
06 (discussing presidential command authority and suggesting that “[t]he ‘independence’ that is
permissible in [certain] areas [of civil administration] . . . might be constitutionally dubious with
respect to similarly consequential positions of authority in the military establishment”). More

PRICE.PRINTER.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

510

2/22/21 12:56 PM

Texas Law Review

[Vol. 99:491

Buchanan’s view explicitly. Professor John Yoo, for example, argues that
“[e]ven if inferior officers refused to carry out presidential orders, the
Commander-in-Chief Clause would seem to include the power to promote or
demote officers and to make duty assignments.”84
This view is mistaken. Presuming that the President can personally
discharge all military duties or reassign them at will is at odds not only with
the constitutional text and structure, but also with both contemporary and
historical practice. Instead, the text and history support broad congressional
power to vest military duties and authorities in offices, even if presidents, to
a greater degree than in civil administration, must have some means of
removing or disciplining officers who defy presidential directives.
This conclusion may matter. Outside the military, scholars have
recognized that “[f]iring [an officer to get the President’s way] typically has
much higher political cost to the President than (successfully) directing an
official’s exercise of discretion.”85 In consequence, legal understandings of
where powers are legally vested “likely influences the relative bargaining
positions of the [officer] and the President.”86 Similar benefits could flow
from vesting military functions in particular offices, even if the President
ultimately holds authority to direct officers to exercise those authorities in a
particular way. Indeed, in keeping with that assumption, Congress in recent
years has adopted several measures vesting key authorities, most notably
authority over certain cyber operations and withdrawals from South Korea,
in the Secretary of Defense, or in the Secretary in combination with the
President, rather than the President alone.87 Some have proposed measures to

generally, these authors indicate that the President’s Commander-in-Chief title “suggests that, at
least with respect to certain functions, Congress may not (by statute or otherwise) delegate the
ultimate command of the army and navy (or of the militia when in the service of the national
government) to anyone other than the President,” but they acknowledge that “the full extent of this
preclusive prerogative of superintendence remains uncertain.” Barron & Lederman, supra note 1,
at 769; cf. Mark Nevitt, The Commander in Chief’s Authority to Combat Climate Change, 37
CARDOZO L. REV. 437, 482 (2015) (arguing that the President’s Commander-in-Chief authority
likely includes power to form a “functional combatant command” to address climate change).
84. Yoo, supra note 1, at 2280 (calling these powers “central components of a president’s ability
to decide on strategy and tactics and ensure that the officers who are in place will carry them out”);
cf. MICHAEL D. RAMSEY, THE CONSTITUTION’S TEXT IN FOREIGN AFFAIRS 253 (2007) (“[T]he
commander-in-chief clause shows that Congress cannot assign ultimate command responsibilities
to someone other than the President . . . .”); John Harrison, The Executive Power 19
(June 2019) (unpublished manuscript), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3398427 (“The Commander in
Chief Clause . . . excludes . . . independent discretion in lower-level commanders.”).
85. Kevin M. Stack, The President’s Statutory Powers to Administer the Laws, 106 COLUM. L.
REV. 263, 295 (2006).
86. Id.
87. John S. McCain National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2019, Pub. L. No. 115232, § 1642, 132 Stat. 2132 (2018) (codified at 10 U.S.C. § 394 note); National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2020, Pub. L. No. 116-29, § 1254, 133 Stat. 1198, 1671–72
(2019).
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limit unilateral presidential responsibility for nuclear weapons launches,88
and other more mundane proposals and enactments govern assignment of
forces to particular ships, units, or commands.89 Whatever the wisdom of
such constraints—a point I return to below90—they all raise directly the
constitutional question considered here.
I will defend Congress’s authority to enact such statutes first as a matter
of constitutional text, structure, and contemporary practice and then as a
matter of historical tradition. I will close this Part by reflecting on some key
implications of this view.
A.

Text, Structure, and Current Practice

1. Congressional Authority Over Nonmilitary Duties.—Let me begin with
the general argument for congressional authority to allocate and define
nonmilitary officers’ powers. Although Seila’s reasoning casts doubt on this
understanding, the prevailing scholarly view, supported by substantial preSeila case law, holds that the President is ultimately an “overseer” and not a
“decider,” in Peter Strauss’s memorable formulation, with respect to powers
vested in civil and administrative offices.91 In other words, although the
President may oversee how other officers discharge their responsibilities, and
perhaps remove them from office if their performance is unsatisfactory,
authorities vested by statute in a particular officer ultimately belong to that
officer, not the President.92 On this view, Congress holds authority not only
to create offices as the Appointments Clause contemplates, but also, by virtue
of that power and the Necessary and Proper Clause, to vest those offices with
particular functions and duties that then belong to the individual officer, not
the President.
Article II’s text reinforces this conclusion in two places. First, by
empowering the President to seek “the Opinion, in writing, of the principal
Officer in each of the executive Departments, upon any Subject relating to
the Duties of their respective Offices,” the Opinions Clause implies that
“duties” may belong to other “officers,” even if those officers are subject to
presidential supervision.93 Second, by requiring the President to “take Care
that the Laws be faithfully executed,” the Take Care Clause implies that
officials other than the President may sometimes be doing the executing.94
88. See supra note 22.
89. See 2018 NDAA Views Letter, supra note 4, at 3–4 (discussing provisions to that effect).
90. See infra subpart II(C).
91. Strauss, supra note 1, at 737–38. For discussion of competing views on removal, see supra
subpart I(A).
92. Strauss, supra note 1, at 737–38.
93. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1; Strauss, supra note 1, at 702–03.
94. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3, cl. 3; Strauss, supra note 1, at 703.
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Seila notwithstanding, and despite one early Attorney General opinion
to the contrary,95 substantial practice and precedent support this
understanding.96 On some accounts, as noted, this view of congressional
authority over duty assignment further supports congressional power to limit
presidential direction and supervision.97 But even when the President may
remove the officer in question at will, Congress’s power to vest duties in
offices serves important practical purposes.
In particular, to the extent they hold authority to remove officers and
replace them with someone more pliable, Presidents may ultimately be able
to get their way. But needing to remove an officer to do so raises the political
stakes, enabling what I have called the “fire alarm function” of officeholding.98 If the officer believes the action the President seeks would be
unlawful or profoundly unwise—as, for example, when President Andrew
Jackson sought to require removal of treasury funds from the Bank of the
United States, or when President Richard Nixon demanded termination of a
special prosecutor—the officer may resign or force his or her own
termination, thereby elevating the issue’s political salience and bringing
maximum scrutiny and pressure to bear on the President.99 The simple
expedient of vesting authorities in a particular office other than the
presidency may thus enable political enforcement of legal requirements and
conventional understandings that surround particular government functions.
Insofar as the position requires Senate confirmation, furthermore, the
appointment process may ensure that only people with particular skills or a
particular outlook and proven sense of responsibility discharge the authorities
of particular offices, such as the Attorney General, Secretary of the Treasury,
or Environmental Protection Agency Administrator.
2. The Theory Extended to Military Duties.—Could this same constraint
on presidents extend to military functions? For the most part, yes. Contrary
to scholarship and executive branch assertions suggesting otherwise, there is
no compelling textual, structural, or historical reason to distinguish military
95. See Relation of the President to the Executive Departments, 7 Op. Att’y Gen. 453, 469–71
(1855) (“[N]o Head of Department can lawfully perform an official act against the will of the
President . . . .”). But see The President and Accounting Officers, 1 Op. Att’y Gen. 624, 625 (1823)
(“[I]t could never have been the intention of the constitution . . . that he should in person execute
the laws himself.”).
96. See, e.g., Strauss, supra note 1, at 705–15 (collecting precedents and examples).
97. See, e.g., id. at 710–11 (discussing precedent supporting this view).
98. Zachary Price, The Fire Alarm Function of Office-Holding, TAKE CARE BLOG (June 19,
2017), https://takecareblog.com/blog/the-fire-alarm-function-of-office-holding [https://perma.cc
/45QJ-9QN3].
99. See, e.g., MCCONNELL, supra note 47, at 349 (arguing that firing certain officials may carry
a high political cost); Stack, supra note 85, at 295–96 (“President Nixon’s efforts to remove
Archibald Cox as special prosecutor made apparent the political costs of firing an officer that refuses
to heed the President’s policies.”).
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offices from other positions when it comes to statutory assignment of duties
and functions. Indeed, if anything, the case for such congressional authority
with respect to the military is stronger. Congress, if it chose, could vest
control over nuclear weapons, or offensive cyber capabilities, or a particular
component of the Army, Navy, or Air Force in a particular officer who could
then be subject to removal, and perhaps other forms of command
discipline,100 for disobeying presidential directives but who would ultimately
be personally responsible for discharging the function in question.
Why? To begin with, the language governing office-holding in the
Appointments Clause and Necessary and Proper Clause makes no distinction
between military and nonmilitary offices. Both types of positions must be
“established by Law” under the Appointments Clause,101 and in both cases,
Congress holds authority to enact “all Laws which shall be necessary and
proper for carrying into Execution . . . all other Powers vested by this
Constitution in the Government of the United States or in any Department or
Officer thereof.”102 To the extent these provisions give Congress authority to
define civil officers’ functions and the organizational hierarchy within which
they operate, Congress holds precisely the same authority with respect to the
military.
In fact, even if one doubted Congress’s power to allocate statutory
authorities with respect to civil and administrative officers, as the Supreme
Court appeared to in Seila,103 Congress’s specific constitutional powers with
respect to the military provide a still stronger warrant for inferring such
congressional power in that context. Congress, again, holds specific
constitutional authority to “raise and support Armies,” “provide and maintain
a Navy,” and “make Rules for the Government and Regulation of the land
and naval Forces.”104 Assigning duties and responsibilities within the military
chain of command may be a potent means of governing and regulating the
military; indeed, as we shall see, it is one that Congress has routinely
employed as a means of shaping and controlling the nation’s armed forces.
As a matter of plain text, furthermore, a provision assigning some
responsibility or command to a particular office can readily be described as
a “Rule[]” regarding the military’s “Government,” if not also its
“Regulation,” even if this constitutional language might more immediately
call to mind legislation prescribing a military code of conduct and procedures
for military justice. For that matter, such a provision might also be
characterized as a valid condition that Congress has imposed on the army or

100.
101.
102.
103.
104.

See infra Part III.
U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
Seila Law LLC v. CFPB, 140 S. Ct. 2183, 2207 (2020).
U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 12–14.
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navy it has raised or provided. At any rate, in cases implicating these
provisions, the Supreme Court has emphasized the breadth of Congress’s
authority. “It is clear,” the Court has ruled, “that the Constitution
contemplated that the Legislative Branch have plenary control over rights,
duties, and responsibilities in the framework of the Military
Establishment . . . .”105 Indeed, in a recent case, the Court upheld a statutory
bar on military officers exercising certain civil governmental functions.106
Far from indicating any constitutional difficulty, the Court characterized this
provision as validly “designed to ensure civilian preeminence in
government.”107
On the other hand, the Commander-in-Chief Clause’s language might
suggest a stronger directive power with respect to the military than the Take
Care Clause provides for the civil service. The Take Care Clause, after all,
obligates the President only to “take Care” that the laws are executed
faithfully, whereas being Commander in Chief implies some power to issue
affirmative commands. This distinction, however, relates to removal and
other means of discipline—the question I address in Part III—and perhaps
also to the strength of any presumption that officers are duty-bound to follow
presidential directives in exercising statutory authorities. It does not affect
Congress’s power to assign duties in the first place. As to that question, the
Take Care and Commander-in-Chief Clauses are parallel: both suggest that
primary government power will at least sometimes be exercised by others. In
other words, much as the obligation to ensure faithful execution implies that
someone else may do the executing, serving as commander in chief implies
having some military force to command.
The framers at the Philadelphia Convention in fact debated whether the
President should even be allowed to exercise direct command over troops in
the field.108 Although President Washington did so during the Whiskey
Rebellion,109 the norm across American history has been to command troops
105. Chappell v. Wallace, 462 U.S. 296, 301 (1983); see, e.g., Loving v. United States, 517
U.S. 748, 768 (1996) (“[W]e give Congress the highest deference in ordering military affairs.”);
Burns v. Wilson, 346 U.S. 137, 140 (1953) (holding that “[t]he Framers expressly entrusted . . . to
Congress” the task of balancing the rights of servicemembers against the “overriding demands of
discipline and duty”); Dynes v. Hoover, 61 U.S. 65, 78–79 (1857) (deriving Congress’s “power to
provide for the trial and punishment of military and naval offenses” from its constitutional
authorities over the military).
106. Ortiz v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2165, 2181–82 (2018) (addressing 10 U.S.C.
§ 973(b)(2)(A)).
107. Id. at 2172. For discussion of this statutory “civil office ban,” see generally Stephen I.
Vladeck, Military Officers and the Civil Office Ban, 93 IND. L. J. 241 (2018).
108. See Barron & Lederman, supra note 1, at 787 (“[T]here were some delegates who wished
to restrict the President from commanding the army and navy in person, as the New Jersey Plan had
prescribed, but that proposal failed.”).
109. PRAKASH, supra note 54, at 160. Presidents Madison and Lincoln apparently considered
leading armies in the field but decided against it. BARRON, supra note 13, at 93, 151.
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only indirectly, through orders to subordinate commanders in the field—a
practice that reinforces the institutional separation between presidential
command and actual military activity that the text itself implies.110 The
Federalist Papers, likewise, emphasized only that the President would be the
military’s overall commander. Stressing that the President would be “in
substance much inferior to” the British King with respect to military powers,
the Federalist No. 69 observed that the American President’s Commanderin-Chief power “would amount to nothing more than the supreme command
and direction of the military and naval forces, as first General and admiral of
the Confederacy.”111
Apart from the Commander-in-Chief Clause, another possible basis for
inferring plenary presidential authority over military duties is the Vesting
Clause. A favorite empty vessel for proponents of broad presidential
authority, this clause grants “[t]he executive Power” to the President.112 But
even if the clause carries substantive import, as opposed to serving as a mere
placeholder for more specific grants of power in Article II, there is no reason
to think it confers preclusive authority to personally exercise military powers
vested specifically in other offices. For one thing, some recent scholarship
suggests the framers would have understood the term “executive power” to
refer exclusively to an authority to execute the law, a meaning with no
relevance to military command.113 If correct, this view would suggest that
unitarian arguments for personal presidential authority over civil or
administrative authorities need not carry over to the military; only civil
administration involves “executive power” in the plain sense of executing
federal law.
But even if this interpretation of the Vesting Clause is wrong and the
term “executive power” carries broader meaning, as indeed some early
authority regarding foreign affairs suggests,114 the Commander-in-Chief
110. See, e.g., 2 DAVID K. WATSON, THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES: ITS
HISTORY, APPLICATION, AND CONSTRUCTION 919 (1910) (arguing that if the President “should
undertake to command the military and naval forces of the government in time of war, he would be
exercising a power which would necessarily prevent him from executing important duties required
of him by the Constitution”).
111. THE FEDERALIST NO. 69, at 347, 349 (Alexander Hamilton) (Ian Shapiro ed., 2009); see
also John C. Dehn, The Commander-in-Chief and the Necessities of War: A Conceptual Framework,
83 TEMP. L. REV. 599, 614–16 (2011) (emphasizing the breadth of Congress’s regulatory authority
over the military as reflected in early practice and the original understanding).
112. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1.
113. Julian Davis Mortenson, Article II Vests Executive Power, Not the Royal Prerogative, 119
COLUM. L. REV. 1169, 1173–74 (2019).
114. See Pacificus No. 1 (June 29, 1792) (Alexander Hamilton) (suggesting that the President
had the power to issue the Proclamation of Neutrality); Thomas Jefferson, Opinion of Thomas
Jefferson (Apr. 24, 1790), in 5 THE PAPERS OF GEORGE WASHINGTON 343 (Dorothy Twohig et al.
eds., 1996) (referencing the Vesting Clause and observing that “[t]he transaction of business with
foreign nations is Executive altogether”).
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Clause more specifically indicates the relationship between the President and
the military, and the power conferred by that clause is, again, a power to issue
commands, not a power to personally discharge other officers’ duties or
reallocate at will what officers will perform them. Congress, furthermore,
even apart from its general authority over the executive branch under the
Appointments and Necessary and Proper Clauses, holds specific authority to
“make Rules for the Government and Regulation of the land and naval
Forces”—an authority that, once again, suggests still broader authority to
structure the military than Congress holds with respect to the civil service.
3. Contemporary Statutes.—Further support for congressional authority
over allocation of military duties may be found in current statutes. Executive
branch bluster notwithstanding, the military establishment’s actual governing
architecture is replete with provisions assigning particular functions to
particular offices. To give just a few examples, the Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff is the “principal military adviser” to the President and certain
cabinet secretaries, but is barred by law from “exercis[ing] military command
over the Joint Chiefs of Staff or any of the armed forces”;115 the Army’s Judge
Advocate General is “the legal adviser of the Secretary of the Army and of
all officers and agencies of the Department of the Army” and “shall direct
the members of the Judge Advocate General’s Corps in the performance of
their duties”;116 the commander of the unified special operations command is
responsible for various functions involving special operations forces;117 the
commanders of other unified combatant commands hold authority over
certain forces and missions assigned to them by the President;118 the
Undersecretary of Defense for Intelligence holds responsibility, subject to the
Secretary of Defense’s direction, for certain intelligence functions and
operations;119 and the brand new Chief of Space Operations prepares certain
plans and supervises certain forces, subject to the Air Force Secretary’s
direction.120
The Commander-in-Chief Clause might well support presuming that
these officers, perhaps unlike their counterparts in civil administration, are
duty-bound to follow presidential directives in carrying out their duties, or
else accept removal or other discipline for failing to do so. But even so, these
statutes carry no implication that the president holds plenary constitutional
authority to personally discharge the functions in question or reallocate
military responsibilities at will. On the contrary, all these statutes presume
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.

10 U.S.C. § 151(b)(1), 152(c) (2018).
10 U.S.C. § 7037(c)(1)–(2) (2018).
10 U.S.C. § 167 (2018).
10 U.S.C. § 164 (2018).
10 U.S.C. § 137 (2018).
10 U.S.C. § 9082(c) (2018).
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that when the Senate confirms individuals for particular offices, those
individuals (or validly appointed substitutes) will perform those
responsibilities and not others.
In the statutes themselves, to be sure, Congress has often provided a
degree of flexibility. In general, for example, the Secretary of Defense holds
broad authority to assign duties and responsibilities within the department (as
do commanders and service secretaries within their commands and
services).121 But these statutes also impose limits. For example, except when
the President considers it “necessary because of hostilities or an imminent
threat of hostilities,” the Secretary of Defense may not “substantially
transfer[], reassign[], consolidate[], or abolish[]” any “function, power, or
duty vested in the Department of Defense, or an officer, official, or agency
thereof, by law”—and even when the President orders a more significant
reassignment or consolidation, the change lasts only until the emergency
justifying it has passed.122 This statute would make no sense if Congress
lacked power to prescribe duties and functions with respect to the military;
the statute’s implicit constitutional theory is that Congress may calibrate by
law the degree of flexibility in reallocating assigned military duties and
authorities. Indeed, even statutes granting flexibility to the President,
Secretary of Defense, and other senior officials negatively imply that
Congress could withhold such flexibility if it wished.
Governing statutes also often specify that functions should be performed
subject to direction from the President, the Defense Secretary, or some other
senior officer, a pattern that might suggest congressional support for broad
presidential prerogatives of command.123 As Kevin Stack has argued with
respect to administrative statutes, however, the “longstanding and active
congressional practice of granting authority to officials expressly subject to
the control of the President” may suggest, by negative inference, that duties
vested without such qualifications belong to the particular officer alone, even
if that officer is subject to removal for disobedience.124 Even if the same
negative inference does not apply with equal force in the military context
given the Commander-in-Chief Clause, it at least undercuts any suggestion
121. See, e.g., 10 U.S.C. § 113(d) (2018) (“Unless specifically prohibited by law, the Secretary
may, without being relieved of his responsibility, perform any of his functions or duties, or exercise
any of his powers through, or with the aid of, such persons in, or organizations of, the Department
of Defense as he may designate.”).
122. 10 U.S.C. § 125 (2018).
123. See, e.g., 10 U.S.C. § 125(b) (2018) (“[I]f the President determines it to be necessary
because of hostilities or an imminent threat of hostilities, any function, power, or duty vested by
law in the Department of Defense, or an officer, official, or agency thereof, including one assigned
to the Army, Navy, Air Force, or Marine Corps by section 7062(b), 8062, 8063, or 9062(c) of this
title, may be transferred, reassigned, or consolidated.”); id. § 162(b) (specifying the chain of
command for combatant commands “[u]nless otherwise directed by the President”).
124. Stack, supra note 85, at 268, 284.
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that Congress’s specification of directive power in some statutes reflects an
assumption that presidents necessarily hold authority to exercise all military
powers vested in other offices.125
As a matter of fact, in at least a few places, Congress has gone so far as
to specifically preclude command discipline, thus effectively insulating
officers performing certain specified functions from any directive control.
Officers serving on courts-martial, for example, are specifically protected
from command influence or retaliation,126 and the Judge Advocates General
are protected from any interference with their authority to provide
independent legal advice.127 Likewise, judges on the Court of Appeals for the
Armed Forces, a non-Article III court that reviews court-martial rulings, are
removable only for cause during their fifteen-year terms.128 In a recent
statute, Congress even restricted considerably the convening officer’s
authority to alter or override a court-martial’s conviction and sentence.129
These changes effectively vest exclusive authority over certain military–
justice functions in the particular officers serving as jurors or judges on a
given court-martial.
These examples may well reflect a particular concern, rooted in due
process, to afford a neutral decision-maker in military tribunals.130 But
Congress has also guaranteed independence with respect to at least one
function with concrete effects on military performance: service on the
promotion boards that effectively determine who occupies the military’s
higher ranks.131 In addition, as noted, one provision addressed in a recent
Supreme Court decision specifically precludes many military officers from
“hold[ing], or exercis[ing] the functions of, [certain] civil office[s] in the
Government of the United States.”132 At the level of senior civilian
leadership, furthermore, Rebecca Ingber has recently highlighted that
Congress quite frequently rejigs procedures, command relationships, and
125. Some of Stack’s examples from the early Republic in fact involve the military. See id. at
278 (discussing 1789 statute vesting authority in the Secretary of the Navy but requiring the
Secretary to execute the President’s orders).
126. 10 U.S.C. § 837 (2018).
127. 10 U.S.C. § 7037 (2018).
128. 10 U.S.C. § 942 (2018).
129. Military Justice Act of 2016, Pub. L. No. 114-328, § 5322, 130 Stat. 2894, 2925 (2016);
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2014, Pub. L. No. 133-66, § 1702(b), 127 Stat.
672, 956–57 (2013). See generally 1 DAVID A. SCHLUETER, MILITARY CRIMINAL JUSTICE:
PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 17-9 (10th ed. 2018) (discussing the effect of the Military Justice Act
of 2016 and the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2014 on the ability of the
convening authority to set aside findings and sentences).
130. The Court in Free Enterprise Fund suggested that removal limitations may be particularly
appropriate for officers with adjudicative functions. Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting
Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477, 507 n.10 (2010).
131. 10 U.S.C. § 616(f) (2018).
132. 10 U.S.C. § 973(b) (2018); Ortiz v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2165, 2172 (2018).
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even allocation of duties within the country’s national security apparatus as
a backdoor means of shaping policy outcomes.133 Again, one recent provision
goes so far as to vest authority over certain cyber operations jointly in the
President and Secretary of Defense, rather than the President alone;134
another requires certain certifications from the Secretary of Defense before
the President may withdraw forces from South Korea.135 Such provisions
would be meaningless if presidents could simply assume and redelegate
duties within the military command structure as they saw fit.
B.

Historical Debates
History adds still more support for congressional authority to vest
military duties in particular offices. Without attempting any comprehensive
account, briefly considering several salient episodes across time highlights
both the extent of debate over these questions and the ultimate weakness of
the executive branch’s current stated view. To the extent historical practice
illuminates constitutional meaning, as the Supreme Court has repeatedly
assumed it does,136 this history reinforces textual, functional, and originalist
arguments for congressional authority to assign military duties to particular
offices.
1. Early Statutes and Practice.—To begin with, some of the earliest
military-organization statutes specified that senior officials held particular
authorities but exercised them subject to presidential direction. A 1798
statute, for example, established the office of Secretary of the Navy and
specified that the Secretary’s “duty . . . shall be to execute such orders as he
shall receive from the President of the United States, relative to the
procurement of naval stores and materials and the construction, armament,
equipment and employment of vessels of war, as well as all other matters
connected with the naval establishment of the United States.”137 The same
statute, moreover, specifically transferred these authorities from the
previously created office of Secretary of War to the newly created position
of Secretary of the Navy, making clear that the Secretary of War could no

133. See generally Ingber, supra note 19, at 399 (discussing Congress’s frequent
“restructur[ing] [of] the decision-making process inside the executive branch in order to preference
decision makers and processes more likely to favor their preferred outcomes”).
134. John S. McCain National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2019, Pub. L. No.
115-232, § 1642, 132 Stat. 2132, 2132 (2018) (codified at 10 U.S.C. § 394 note).
135. National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2020, Pub. L. No. 116-92, § 1254, 133
Stat. 1198, 1671–72 (2019).
136. E.g., Zivotofsky ex rel. Zivotofsky v. Kerry, 135 S. Ct. 2076, 2090 (2015); NLRB v. Noel
Canning, 134 S. Ct. 2550, 2559 (2014).
137. Act of Apr. 30, 1798, ch. 35, § 1, 1 Stat. 553, 553.
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longer exercise them.138 This statute’s sharp division between Army and
Navy commands would persist, with only limited interruptions—and
important institutional consequences139—until 1947.140 Other early statutes
referred, albeit obliquely, to top military officers in the Army and Navy
serving as “commander in chief” with respect to particular operations.141
Provisions for presidential control in these and other statutes might be
understood to endorse a broad view of presidential control over military
functions. As with modern statutes, however, the very specification of
presidential directive power in these provisions more naturally implies
congressional authority to withhold or modify, or at least regulate, such
power if Congress so desired.142 Indeed, Congress’s specification of such
authority in the 1798 statute seems especially telling, given that Congress
extensively debated presidential removal authority less than a decade
earlier—and ultimately used indirect language to indicate that the President
held removal authority by virtue of Article II rather than congressional
grace.143
Early statutes also vested particular duties in particular subordinate
offices; an 1813 law, for example, assigned certain duties relating to military
supplies to a “superintendent general of military supplies,” appointed by the
President with Senate approval, who would act “under the direction of the
Secretary for the War department.”144 At the very least, such duty
assignments and the repeated clarifications and revisions in early statutes—
transferring powers from the Secretary of War to the Navy Secretary,145 for
example, and specifying ranks and authorities within both the Army and
Navy146—provide strong historical support for Congress’s authority to define
the authorities and relationships of offices within the military under the

138. Id. § 5, 1 Stat. at 554 (repealing “so much of” a prior statute creating the department of
war “as vests any of the powers contemplated by the provisions of this act, in the Secretary for the
department of War”).
139. JAMES R. LOCHER III, VICTORY ON THE POTOMAC: THE GOLDWATER–NICHOLS ACT
UNIFIES THE PENTAGON 16–19 (2004).
140. See infra section II(B)(7).
141. See, e.g., Act of Mar. 2, 1799, ch. 24, §§ 6, 11, 1 Stat. 709, 715–17 (discussing share of
prize money owed to “any commander in chief” in the event of a naval capture); Act of Mar. 3,
1797, ch. 16, § 4, 1 Stat. 507, 508 (providing double rations to the brigadier general “while
commander in chief”).
142. See Stack, supra note 85, at 268, 284 (arguing that statutes expressly conferring
presidential directive authority “support the negative inference that when Congress simply delegates
to an agency, without conditioning the delegation on the President’s approval, the statute denies the
President directive authority”).
143. See infra subsection III(A)(1)(a).
144. Act of Mar. 3, 1813, ch. 47, §§ 2, 3, 5, 2 Stat. 816, 816, 817 (codified at 1 Rev. Stat. § 219
(2d ed. 1875)).
145. Act of Apr. 30, 1789, ch. 35, 1 Stat. 553.
146. E.g., Act of Apr. 30, 1790, ch. 10, 1 Stat. 119 (repealed 1795).
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Appointments and Necessary and Proper Clauses, just as it does for
nonmilitary administration.147
For its part, the Executive Branch early on seems also to have accepted
Congress’s authority to structure the military by defining officers’ duties. An
1815 report to Congress from Secretary of War James Monroe appeared to
consider it beyond doubt that “a provision for . . . actual command is an
object of legislative regulation,” whereas “the selection of the person to
whom [the command is] committed” is a matter of “executive discretion.”148
In 1820, an Attorney General opinion by William Wirt observed that the
President, as Commander in Chief, “may suspend, modify, or rescind, at
pleasure, any order issued by the lieutenant-colonel of the marine corps, or
any other subordinate officer.”149 Yet he went on to recognize an exception
to this rule “where a direct authority has been given by Congress to an officer
to perform any particular function—for example, for a commanding officer
to order courts-martial in certain cases.”150 This opinion further concluded
that because the Marine Corps was a component of the Navy, the Navy
Secretary could issue orders to it, unless in a particular operation the
President chose to relay his own orders to Marine officers through the War
Department.151
In 1822, another Attorney General opinion observed that the President
could determine “what should constitute a brigade, or what should be a
command according to brevet rank,” but only “[i]n the silence of the law.”152
A third opinion in 1829 likewise observed that the President could “designate
posts or stations among which the army should be distributed,” but “if
Congress thought proper to assume the power, and expressly to specify a
certain number of military stations for the peace establishment, inhibiting
their increase or diminution, . . . the authority of the President would be
superseded.”153
An episode two decades later suggests that these constraints remained
real and powerful throughout the antebellum period. Though disgruntled with
his top general, Winfield Scott, during the Mexican–American War,
President James K. Polk apparently considered himself powerless to displace
147. See PRAKASH, supra note 54, at 162, 166 (explaining that “Americans [in the early
Republic] were quite familiar with the idea that there could be multiple commanders in chief in a
single branch of the military,” each of which “enjoyed circumscribed military authority”).
148. JAMES MONROE, RELATIVE POWERS OF THE GENERAL AND STATE GOVERNMENTS OVER
THE MILITIA, S. REP. NO. 13-142 (1815), reprinted in 1 AMERICAN STATE PAPERS: MILITARY
AFFAIRS 604, 605–07 (Walter Lowrie & Matthew St. Clair Clarke eds., 1832).
149. Power of the Secretary of the Navy Over the Marine Corps, 1 Op. Att’y Gen. 380, 381
(1820).
150. Id.
151. Id. at 382.
152. Brevet Pay of General Macomb, 1 Op. Att’y Gen. 547, 548 (1822).
153. Brevets’ Pay and Rations, 2 Op. Att’y Gen. 223, 232 (1829).
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Scott without authority from Congress to appoint a different general in a
superior grade.154 Scott, Polk complained in his diary in 1847, “acted with so
little discretion since he assumed the command” that certain confidential
plans were revealed; “[h]is vanity [was] such that he could not keep the most
important secrets of the Government which were given to him”; and he was
“wasting himself in most extravagant preparations, and . . . making such a
parade before the public in all he does that there is danger that the objects of
the campaign may be entirely defeated.”155
Polk accordingly asked Congress to authorize appointment of a
Lieutenant General with overall command of army forces. “An efficient
organization of the army,” Polk argued in a message to Congress, “would
require the appointment of a general officer to take command of all our
military forces in the field.”156 Yet Congress, following heated debates,
rejected the proposal.157 Polk then felt his hands were tied. “I have asked

154. See CLARENCE A. BERDAHL, WAR POWERS OF THE EXECUTIVE IN THE UNITED STATES
126 (1921) (discussing this episode as evidence that “no officer can be appointed by the President
until Congress has created the grade and made provision for it”).
155. Diary Entry of James K. Polk (Feb. 27, 1847), in 2 THE DIARY OF JAMES K. POLK 393–
94 (Milo Milton Quaife ed., 1910).
156. CONG. GLOBE, 29th Cong., 2d Sess. 105 (Jan. 4, 1847) (message to Congress from
President Polk).
157. 1 THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE MEXICAN-AMERICAN WAR: A POLITICAL, SOCIAL, AND
MILITARY HISTORY 638–39 (Dr. Spencer C. Tucker ed., 2013). In congressional debates,
Representatives and Senators took slightly different views regarding the extent of Polk’s existing
authority to determine command precedence. One proponent of the Lieutenant General proposal
argued that the President was bound to give seniority to the existing Major General with the earliest
date of commission (apparently Scott)—an outcome this Senator considered “exceedingly
undesirable” given the “numerous forces as are now to be combined, and in such extensive
operations as are to be carried on.” CONG. GLOBE, 29th Cong., 2d Sess. 175 (1847) (statement of
Sen. Dix) (“At least four of these generals [in the field] have the same rank, that of major general,
the highest rank in the service; and precedence among them in their respective arms is, therefore, to
be determined by their date of commission.”); see also CONG. GLOBE, 29th Cong., 2d Sess. 155
(1847) (statement of Rep. Jacob Thompson) (“The very composition of the army seems to me to
suggest the propriety of the appointment of a leader to direct the movements of the different
divisions and brigades . . . .”). An opponent (who supported an alternative proposal) suggested Polk
could give a different general precedence only by withdrawing others from the campaign. CONG.
GLOBE, 29th Cong., 2d Sess. 522 (1847) (statement of Rep. Garrett Davis) (“He may designate any
one of these major generals, by brevet or otherwise, to act as commander-in-chief of our army in
the field in Mexico. But, in order to do so, he must withdraw from the service those who now outrank
him.”); see also CONG. GLOBE, 29th Cong., 2d Sess. 184 (1847) (statement of Sen. Badger) (“The
President of the United States may assign to the present major general commanding our army the
whole control, under him, of all the operations of this war . . . [or] may confine the present senior
major general of the army to a particular district, to a narrow command, or to a small body of
troops . . . .”). By contrast, one Representative suggested that an existing statute gave the President
flexibility to designate commanders for particular campaigns from among the existing officer corps,
though he conceded that he did “not know that [such a designation] ha[d] ever been done” and that
“it is considered by some that there is ambiguity upon this subject, and the practice of the country
has been otherwise.” CONG. GLOBE, 29th Cong., 2d Sess. 525 (1847) (statement of Rep. Sims). The
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Congress for authority to select a commander in whom I have confidence,”
Polk wrote in his diary, “and some weeks ago they refused it.”158 Polk thus
complained to posterity: “My situation is most embarrassing. I am held
responsible for the War, and yet I am required to entrust the chief command
of the army to a Gen’l in whom I have no confidence.”159
2. Captain Meigs and the Washington Aqueduct.—Perhaps because this
early practice appears unsupportive, the urtext for plenary presidential
authority over military duties is instead an 1860 Attorney General opinion
regarding Captain M.C. Meigs and his work on the Washington, D.C.,
aqueduct.160
A self-confident and ambitious officer who went on to serve as Union
army quartermaster during the Civil War, Meigs had been overseeing the
aqueduct project since 1853.161 He came into conflict, however, with
President Buchanan’s Secretary of War over the latter’s political favoritism
in awarding contracts.162 To forestall termination of the aqueduct project,
Meigs personally (and insubordinately) lobbied congressional allies for
funding. Congress obliged by including provisions in an appropriations
statute that not only provided $500,000 for the aqueduct but also required
that it be completed according to Meigs’s plans and under his supervision.163
Indeed, although an initial version of this legislation would have
accomplished its goal obliquely by requiring that “the Chief Engineer of the
Washington Aqueduct . . . shall be as heretofore an officer of the corps of
Engineers not below the rank of Captain and having experience in the design
and construction of Bridges & aqueducts,”164 the final version brazenly
referred to Meigs by name. It required that the appropriated funds were “to

debate did not suggest, however, that the President could simply designate a preferred commander
without regard to rank or existing statutory restraints. See, e.g., CONG. GLOBE, 29th Cong., 2d Sess.
526 (1847) (statement of Rep. Schenk) (responding to Rep. Sims’s argument by stating, “Had
[Congress] no right to say whether the army should be placed under such an officer as was now
proposed, or should be left as it was! He thought they had, and he desired the army to remain as it
was”).
158. Diary Entry of James K. Polk, supra note 155, at 394.
159. Id. A recent history of the war observes that “Polk’s choice of Scott to command the
campaign was driven mostly by the desire to prevent Whig and potential presidential candidate
[General Zachary] Taylor from gathering even more laurels.” PETER GUARDINO, THE DEAD
MARCH: A HISTORY OF THE MEXICAN-AMERICAN WAR 293 (2017).
160. Memorial of Captain Meigs, 9 Op. Att’y Gen. 462, 468–69 (1860).
161. HARRY C. WAYS, THE WASHINGTON AQUEDUCT 10 (1996).
162. Id. at 35–37; RUSSELL F. WEIGLEY, QUARTERMASTER GENERAL OF THE UNION ARMY: A
BIOGRAPHY OF M.C. MEIGS 101 (1959).
163. WAYS, supra note 161, at 37; WEIGLEY, supra note 162, at 103.
164. WEIGLEY, supra note 162, at 103.
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be expended according to the plans and estimates of Captain Meigs, and
under his supervision.”165
In a statement to Congress, President Buchanan objected to this
provision. Buchanan explained that he would consider it precatory because
he “deemed it impossible that Congress could have intended to interfere with
the clear right of the President to command the Army and order its officers
to any duty he might deem most expedient for the public interest.”166 His
Attorney General issued an opinion to similar effect. “As commander-inchief of the army,” Attorney General J.S. Black opined, “it is your right to
decide according to your own judgment what officer shall perform any
particular duty, and as the supreme executive magistrate you have power of
appointment.”167 In accordance with its view of the proviso, the
administration initially appointed a different officer to serve as chief
engineer, retaining Meigs only as the aqueduct’s disbursing officer and
charging him with “keep[ing] such general supervision of the works as to
assure himself that they are being constructed according [his] plans and
estimates.”168 After Meigs disobeyed orders to approve certain payments,
however, the Secretary of War ordered Meigs to leave Washington and
assume command of a fort in Florida.169 Meigs nevertheless had the last
laugh. Within four and a half months, following replacement of the Secretary
of War and Attorney General, Meigs was ordered back to Washington to
resume control of the project.170
This rather odd episode from an undistinguished administration has
taken on an improbable precedential importance in later executive-branch
imaginings. The Trump Administration, for example, recently cited the
Meigs signing statement and Attorney General opinion in a letter asserting
that Congress lacks authority to prevent reduction in personnel levels for
certain ships.171 The Clinton Administration similarly relied heavily on the
Meigs precedent to conclude that Congress could not forbid placing U.S.
forces under U.N. command.172

165. WAYS, supra note 161, at 37.
166. James Buchanan, Statement to the House (June 26, 1860), in 7 COMPILATION OF
MESSAGES & PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS 3128–29 (James D. Richardson, ed., 1897).
167. Memorial of Captain Meigs, 9 Op. Att’y Gen. 462, 468 (1860).
168. Id. at 464.
169. WAYS, supra note 161, at 39; WEIGLEY, supra note 162, at 105, 107–09.
170. WAYS, supra note 161, at 40–41.
171. 2018 NDAA Views Letter, supra note 4, at 4 (expressing views on the National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2018, H.R. 2810).
172. Placing of United States Armed Forces Under United Nations Operational or Tactical
Control, 20 Op. O.L.C. 182, 185, 187 & n.7 (1996); see also Nevitt, supra note 83, at 459–60 (citing
the Meigs signing statement to indicate that Congress has “largely been unsuccessful” in using “its
appropriations power to thwart the President’s command and organization authority”).
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On examination, however, even granting it precedential force, the Meigs
example is ambiguous and provides only weak support for any notion of
plenary presidential authority over assignment of military duties. For one
thing, notwithstanding broad language about presidential authority over
duties in the statement and opinion, the proviso’s constitutional deficiency
could be understood much more narrowly. By vesting particular
responsibilities in a particular individual, rather than a particular office,
Congress infringed upon the President’s appointment and removal powers,
effectively requiring him, contrary to the principles discussed earlier, to place
a particular individual in a particular office.173 Furthermore, neither President
Buchanan’s signing statement nor the Attorney General opinion ultimately
resolved the constitutional question. Both read the statute (admittedly
counter-textually) as merely stating Congress’s “preference.” For both these
reasons, the executive’s resistance to the provision need not signify that
presidents can reallocate military responsibilities as they see fit, without
regard to the office-holding structure Congress has enacted.174
In actual fact, notwithstanding Meigs’s temporary reassignment, the
administration at least partially complied with the statute’s text. Before
leaving Washington, Meigs deposited all remaining aqueduct funds in the
U.S. Treasury and advised the Treasury Secretary that any disbursements
without his approval would violate the governing appropriation.175 The Army
nevertheless paid out substantial sums (some $150,000 out of the $500,000
appropriation) during Meigs’s absence, but upon his return Meigs made good
on his view of the law by declining to approve payment of $5,600 in
remaining open claims for work done in his absence.176

173. See supra subpart I(C); see also Barron & Lederman, supra note 83, at 987 n.164 (noting
this deficiency in the statute). Congress does appear to have successfully assigned military duties to
particular individuals on at least two other occasions. WAYS, supra note 161, at 37–38.
174. Professors Barron and Lederman have further called it “unlikely Black even intended to
imply that Congress could not assign particular military functions to particular offices,” Barron &
Lederman, supra note 83, at 986 n.164, because in a later opinion regarding the execution of federal
laws, Black opined that “[i]f[] . . . an act of Congress declares that a certain thing shall be done by
a particular officer, it cannot be done by a different officer.” Power of the President in Executing
the Laws, 9 Op. Att’y Gen. 516, 519 (1860). As noted, however, Black’s opinion on Meigs does
state that the Commander in Chief has the “right to decide according to [his or her] own judgment
what officer shall perform any particular duty. . . .” Captain Meigs, 9 Op. Att’y Gen. at 468. In
addition, in a subsequent opinion regarding the aqueduct, Attorney General Black observed that
Meigs “is not authorized to withhold payment which the Secretary of War or the engineer-in-chief
has ordered him to make, though he himself may differ from his superior officers about the justice
of the debt” and that “[h]e cannot make distinctions between orders of that kind, and choose which
he shall obey and which he shall dishonor.” Washington Aqueduct, 9 Op. Att’y Gen. 493, 494
(1860).
175. WEIGLEY, supra note 162, at 108–09.
176. CALABRESI & YOO, supra note 49, at 158–59; WAYS, supra note 161, at 41; Christopher
N. May, Presidential Defiance of “Unconstitutional” Laws: Reviving the Royal Prerogative, 21
HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 865, 949–51 (1994).
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A foundational precedent for plenary presidential authority over military
duties thus offers no compelling reason to disregard earlier, more cogent
examples that support Congress’s authority to assign particular military
duties and authorities to particular offices.
3. The Civil War.—During the Civil War, President Lincoln claimed
authority to allocate particular command responsibilities to individual
officers within the military hierarchy.177 Indeed, along with promotions and
firings, assigning and reassigning particular commands was one of Lincoln’s
main means of controlling the progress of military campaigns.178 Lincoln,
however, appears to have exercised this authority within prescribed statutory
structures, not in defiance of them. While applicable statutes often granted
the President authority to organize military units,179 they dictated the
military’s overall structure, prescribing, for example, the precise numbers of
officers in particular ranks and the general composition of particular units.180
At least some of these statutes, moreover, conferred particular duties on
particular offices,181 and on at least one occasion, Lincoln declined a
general’s request for command authority over certain bureaus because

177. THOMAS J. GOSS, THE WAR WITHIN THE UNION HIGH COMMAND: POLITICS AND
GENERALSHIP DURING THE CIVIL WAR 109 (2003) (“To the president, the power to assign
commanders, which he alone possessed, was the power to steer Union strategy and impose his views
on senior military officers.”).
178. Id. at 109, 111.
179. See, e.g., Act of July 17, 1862, ch. 201, § 9, 12 Stat. 597, 598 (1862) (granting president
discretion to organize army corps); Act of July 22, 1861, ch. 9, § 2, 12 Stat. 268, 269 (1861)
(authorizing president to form volunteers into army regiments).
180. See, e.g., Act of July 4, 1864, ch. 253, 13 Stat. 394 (1864) (reorganizing army
quartermaster-general’s office); Act of Mar. 3, 1863, ch. 82, 12 Stat. 758 (1863) (authorizing
conferral of brevet ranks); Act of Mar. 2, 1863, ch. 78, 12 Stat. 699 (1863) (authorizing additional
general officer appointments); Act of Mar. 2, 1863, ch. 68, 12 Stat. 743 (1863) (reorganizing the
army corps of engineers and ordinance department); Act of July 17, 1862, ch. 201, § 10, 12 Stat.
597, 599 (1862) (prescribing organization of certain army corps); Act of July 16, 1862, ch. 183, 12
Stat. 583 (1862) (specifying naval officer grades, the number of positions in each grade, and the
class of ship subject to command by each grade of officer); Act of July 5, 1862, ch. 134, 12 Stat.
510 (1862) (dividing the Navy Department into nine bureaus to be led by “chiefs” with four-year
terms); Act of Aug. 3, 1861, ch. 42, §§ 2–3, 12 Stat. 287 (1861) (prescribing composition of
adjutant-general’s office and army corps of engineers); Act of July 29, 1861, ch. 24, 12 Stat. 279
(1861) (specifying number and composition of regular army regiments); Act of July 25, 1861,
ch. 19, 12 Stat. 275 (1861) (specifying number of officers in each grade for the Marine Corps); Act
of July 22, 1861, ch. 9, §§ 2–4, 12 Stat. 268 (1861) (specifying organization and number of officers
for regiments and authorizing certain general officer appointments); see also Act of July 28, 1866,
ch. 299, 14 Stat. 332 (1866) (same for peacetime army); Act of July 25, 1866, ch. 231, 14 Stat. 222
(1866) (specifying organization and number of officers in each grade for peacetime navy).
181. See, e.g., Act of Mar. 3, 1863, ch. 75, §§ 5, 7, 12 Stat. 731, 732 (1863) (requiring of
appointment of provost-marshals and obligating them to arrest deserters); Act of July 16, 1862,
ch. 183, § 3, 12 Stat. 583 (1862) (specifying the relative rank of naval officers and the grade of naval
officer required, “as near as may be,” to command each class of ship).
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of statutory constraints.182 One Civil War-era statute specified that
transportation of troops, munitions, and other military property was to occur
“under the immediate control and supervision of the Secretary of War and
such agents as he may appoint.”183 Others specifically granted authority to
detail three naval officers to the War Department for inspecting transport
vessels,184 “assign the command of the forces in [a particular] field or
department” between officers of the same grade “without regard to seniority
of rank,”185 and transfer certain gunboats from the War Department to the
Navy,186 thus implying in each case that the President lacked such powers
without statutory authorization. Likewise, late in the war, Lincoln
specifically obtained statutory authority to appoint a Lieutenant General who
could “be authorized, under the direction, and during the pleasure of the
President, to command the armies of the United States.”187 This law again
implied that, as President Polk recognized during the Mexican–American
War,188 the President otherwise lacked such power to grant one general
precedence over all others in the field.189
4. Reconstruction.—After Lincoln’s death, amid its intense conflict with
President Andrew Johnson over Reconstruction policy, Congress asserted its
powers still more aggressively. In particular, it passed several laws that
assigned particular duties of great importance to particular military officers.
In context and in their practical operation, these laws specifically aimed to
constrain President Johnson’s policy choices, notwithstanding Johnson’s
ultimate authority in most cases to remove and replace the officers in
question.

182. See GOSS, supra note 177, at 174 (“When Grant sought control over the various bureaus
that supplied the army, Lincoln told him that he could not legally change the military
organization . . . .”).
183. Act of Jan. 31, 1862, ch. 15, § 4, 12 Stat. 334 (1862).
184. Act of Feb. 12, 1862, ch. 21, 12 Stat. 338 (1862).
185. Act of Apr. 4, 1862, No. 25, 12 Stat. 617 (1862).
186. Act of July 16, 1862, ch. 185, 12 Stat. 587 (1862).
187. Act of Feb. 29, 1864, ch. 14, 13 Stat. 11, 12 (1864). Nine days later, President Lincoln
appointed Ulysses Grant to this position and “delegated an unprecedented level of authority to his
new commanding general.” GOSS, supra note 177, at 165; see also RON CHERNOW, GRANT 337–
44 (2017) (discussing the appointment).
188. See supra notes 154–59 and accompanying text.
189. GOSS, supra note 177, at 173 (discussing “the congressional effort to revive the rank of
lieutenant general in order to promote Grant over all the generals in the army”). But cf. CHERNOW,
supra note 187, at 335–36 (indicating that Grant expected to “outrank and supersede” other officers
by virtue of the promotion but also noting then-Congressman James Garfield’s view in
congressional debates that “Lincoln already had full authority to name a new general in chief”). The
Lieutenant General rank had previously been held only by George Washington and (by Brevet)
Winfield Scott. Id. at 330.
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a. Statutory Architecture.—To begin with, in the Military Reconstruction
Act of March 2, 1867, which established requirements for readmission of
former rebel states, Congress divided those states into five military districts
and declared it the “duty of the President to assign to the command of each
of [these] districts an officer of the army, not below the rank of brigadiergeneral.”190 The Act gave these district commanders “the duty . . . to protect
all persons in their rights of person and property, to suppress insurrection,
disorder, and violence, and to punish, or cause to be punished, all disturbers
of the public peace and criminals.”191 In addition, “when in his judgment it
may be necessary for the trial of offenders,” the Act gave each district
commander the “power to organize military commissions or tribunals for that
purpose,” and it specified that “all interference under color of State authority
with the exercise of military authority under this act, shall be null and
void.”192
On the same day that Congress enacted this law over President
Johnson’s veto, the President reluctantly signed an Army appropriations
statute requiring that “all orders and instructions relating to military
operations issued by the President or Secretary of War shall be issued through
the General of the army,” who was then Civil War hero and former
Lieutenant General Ulysses Grant.193 This statute further provided that the
General of the Army’s headquarters were to remain in Washington, D.C. and
that he “shall not be removed, suspended or relieved from command, or
assigned to duty elsewhere than at said headquarters, except at his own
request, without the previous approval of the Senate.”194 Any orders issued
contrary to this statute’s requirements were deemed “null and void”; any
officer issuing instructions contrary to those requirements was “deemed
guilty of a misdemeanor in office”; and any army officer who knowingly
“transmit[ted], convey[ed], or obey[ed]” an order issued in violation of the
statute was to be liable for imprisonment for between two and twenty
years.195
In debates over this law, opponents deemed it an unconstitutional
interference with the President’s command authority. One representative
complained that, in the event of an invasion or insurrection in which the
General of the Army was “averse to any action being taken,”
[t]he President, who is made Commander-in-Chief of the Army and
Navy by the Constitution of the United States, is by this provision
190. Act of Mar. 2, 1867, ch. 153, § 2, 14 Stat. 428, 428 (1867).
191. Id. § 3.
192. Id.
193. Act of Mar. 2, 1867, ch. 170, § 2, 14 Stat. 485, 486–87 (1867). “[I]n case of inability,”
such orders were to be issued through the General of the Army’s “next in rank.” Id.
194. Id.
195. Id.
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estopped from sending any other general there to repel the forces
which may be attempting to come upon our soil, or to put down any
insurrection that might take place within any of the States.196
Echoing the Buchanan Administration’s position with respect to Captain
Meigs, another Representative complained, “It has always, so far as my
reading has taught me on the subject, been conceded to [the President] that
he was entitled, as Commander-in-Chief, to assign to officers whatever duty
in his judgment he thought they ought to be called upon and were best
qualified to perform.”197 To do otherwise, this Representative complained,
“is not a practicable thing,” and he “[wa]s inclined to think” it “wholly
nugatory, so far as it attempts to restrain the action of the President or the
action of the General of the Army.”198 The Representative continued,
I never heard it urged seriously anywhere . . . that the Congress of the
United States shall prescribe to what particular duty an officer shall be
assigned, and may by legislation tie up the hands of the President in
such a way that he cannot assign an officer to the particular kind of
duty to which, in his judgment, that officer is adapted.199
A third Representative called the proposed law
a proposition to restrict the office and control the power of the
President of the United States; to tear away from him by a single act
of this Congress his powers under the Constitution of the United
States, which makes him Commander-in-Chief of the Army and Navy
of the United States.200
Despite these constitutional objections, Congress enacted the law,
specifically declining to remove the rider.201 Its actions thus signaled
institutional rejection of arguments that the law violated the President’s
Commander-in-Chief power. For his part, President Johnson complained in
his signing statement that the law “deprives the President of his constitutional
functions as Commander in Chief of the Army.”202 He issued a proclamation
advising military officers of their duty to obey orders from him and others in

196. 37 CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 2d sess., 1353 (statement of Rep. Le Blond).
197. Id. at 1354 (statement of Rep. Niblack).
198. Id.
199. Id.
200. Id. at 1355 (statement of Rep. Wright).
201. Id. at 1404 (House rejects amendment to delete provision in question); id. at 1744, 1752
(final passage in House and Senate).
202. Andrew Johnson, Message to the House (Mar. 2, 1867), in 8 COMPILATION OF MESSAGES
& PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS 3670 (James D. Richardson ed., 1897).
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the chain of command,203 and he later urged Congress to repeal it.204 Yet in
practice Johnson complied with the statute’s terms.205
Later in the spring and summer of 1867, Congress passed further
Military Reconstruction Acts adding to the district commanders’ duties,
overriding a presidential veto each time.206 The third of these statutes, enacted
on July 19, 1867, specifically confirmed a power to displace putative state
officials that district commanders and other occupation officials had already
been exercising.207 The district commanders, the Act provided, “shall have
power, subject to the disapproval of the General of the army of the United
States, and to have effect till disapproved, whenever in the opinion of such
commander the proper administration of [the first Military Reconstruction
Act] shall require it, to suspend or remove” officials claiming governmental
power under nonfederal (i.e., state) authority.208 The district commanders
could appoint other individuals, or detail army officers, to act in such
suspended or removed officials’ place.209 The Act further provided that “the
General of the army of the United States shall be invested with all the powers
of suspension, removal, appointment, and detail” granted by the Act to
district commanders,210 and it specified that “no district commander . . . shall
be bound in his action by any opinion of any civil officer of the United
States.”211
b. Practical Operation.—Grant and other generals who favored
reconstructing the South made deliberate use of the powers conferred on
them by these statutes. Even before Congress enacted specific protections for
his position, Grant employed his position atop the army hierarchy to
influence on-the-ground policy.212 In one instance, as the historian Gregory

203. G. NORMAN LIEBER, REMARKS ON THE ARMY REGULATIONS AND EXECUTIVE
REGULATIONS IN GENERAL 72 (1898).
204. Andrew Johnson, Fourth Annual Message to the House and Senate (Dec. 9, 1868), in 9
COMP. MESSAGES & PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS 3870, 3871–72 (James D. Richardson ed. 1897).
205. CHRISTOPHER N. MAY, PRESIDENTIAL DEFIANCE OF “UNCONSTITUTIONAL” LAWS 91
(1998).
206. Act of Mar. 11, 1868, ch. 25, 15 Stat. 41 (1868); Act of July 19, 1867, ch. 30, § 2, 15 Stat.
14 (1867); Act of Mar. 23, 1867, ch. 6, 15 Stat. 2 (1867).
207. For contemporaneous discussion of district commanders’ exercise of this power, see The
Reconstruction Acts, 12 Op. Att’y Gen. 182, 187, 193–96 (1867).
208. Act of July 19, 1867, ch. 30, § 2, 15 Stat. 14, 14.
209. Id.
210. Id. § 3, 15 Stat. at 15.
211. Id. § 10, 15 Stat. at 16. The Act also specified that its provisions “shall be construed
liberally, to the end that all the intents thereof may be fully and perfectly carried out.” Id. § 11, 15
Stat. at 16.
212. Congress did not create the position of General of the Army until July 1866, but Lieutenant
General Grant was already the most senior officer. Act of July 25, 1866, ch. 232, 14 Stat. 223;
CHERNOW, supra note 187, at 573–74.

PRICE.PRINTER.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2021]

Congress’s Power over Military Offices

2/22/21 12:56 PM

531

Downs recounts, Grant “decided unilaterally” that an Attorney General
opinion addressing the scope of military jurisdiction following Memphis riots
in May 1866 applied only in Tennessee—a decision that effectively allowed
commanders elsewhere to continue following earlier orders to try offenders
in military commissions.213 In April 1867, following enactment of the first
two Military Reconstruction Acts, Grant denied that even he could direct the
district commanders in exercising the powers vested in them by statute. As
he wrote to one district commander, “My views are that District Commanders
are responsible for the faithful execution of the reconstruction Act of
Congress, and that, in Civil matters, I cannot give them an order.”214
One district commander for Louisiana and Texas, the “short, brave, and
often thoroughly unpleasant” Civil War hero Philip Sheridan,215 employed
his powers particularly aggressively. Having earlier dismissed numerous
officials in New Orleans whom he blamed for a notorious 1866 massacre,216
Sheridan took steps to remove more officials in spring 1867 following
passage of the first Military Reconstruction Acts.217 When President Johnson
responded to protests from Louisiana Governor J. Madison Wells by
overruling those firings, Sheridan doubled down, removing the New Orleans
city council and police chief as well as Governor Wells himself.218 Grant
wrote to Sheridan: “I have no doubt myself that the removal of Governor
Wells will do great good in your command if you are sustained, but great
harm if you are not sustained. I shall do all I can to sustain you in it.”219
For his part, President Johnson procured an Attorney General opinion
construing the district commanders’ authority narrowly and specifically
denying their power to remove state and local civilian officials.220 But “Grant
told his commanders to treat the memorandum as an advisory opinion, not an
order, and suggested they ignore it.”221 A month later, in July 1867, Congress
passed the Third Military Reconstruction Act, which confirmed not only the
district commanders’ authority to remove local officials, but also, as noted,

213. GREGORY P. DOWNS, AFTER APPOMATTOX: MILITARY OCCUPATION AND THE ENDS OF
WAR 148 (2015).
214. Letter to Bvt. Major Gen. John Pope (Apr. 21, 1867), in 17 THE PAPERS OF ULYSSES S.
GRANT 117, 117 (John Y. Simon ed., 1991).
215. RICHARD WHITE, THE REPUBLIC FOR WHICH IT STANDS: THE UNITED STATES DURING
RECONSTRUCTION AND THE GILDED AGE, 1865-1896 112 (2017).
216. DOWNS, supra note 213, at 182.
217. Id. at 184.
218. Id.; CHERNOW, supra note 187, at 589.
219. Letter to Maj. Gen. Philip H. Sheridan (June 7, 1867), in PAPERS OF ULYSSES S. GRANT,
supra note 214, at 185.
220. The Reconstruction Acts, 12 Op. Att’y Gen. 182, 187, 189 (1867); CHERNOW, supra note
187, at 589.
221. DOWNS, supra note 213, at 183; see also CHERNOW, supra note 187, at 589 (indicating
that Grant let district commanders “know they could freely interpret [the opinion] as they chose”).
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Grant’s view that civil officers’ opinions did not bind the commanders.222
Armed with this statutory authority, and disgusted by ongoing terrorist
violence against freedpeople in Texas, Sheridan removed Texas governor
James W. Throckmorton in late July.223 Though backed by Grant, Sheridan
did so in defiance of Johnson.224
Johnson responded by removing the “tyrant” Sheridan and transferring
him to other duties.225 Because of the March 1867 General of the Army
provision, however, Johnson could issue the removal order only through
Grant. Though Grant ultimately relayed the order, he took advantage of his
position to “argu[e] with Johnson and warn[] the president that Sheridan was
‘universally, and deservedly, beloved by the people who sustained this
government through its trials.’”226 What is more, presumably because the
Third Reconstruction Act specifically vested the General of the Army with
the district commanders’ “powers of suspension, removal, appointment, and
detail,”227 Grant reconsidered his earlier view that he could not direct the
commanders’ performance of their duties and specifically ordered Sheridan’s
successor not to reinstate the officials removed by Sheridan.228
In an August letter to President Johnson, Grant wrote: “The Act of
Congress of July 19th 1867 [the Third Military Reconstruction Act] throws
much of the responsibility of executing faithfully the reconstruction laws of
Congress, on the General of the Army. I am bound by the responsibility thus
imposed on me.”229 Grant thus insisted that he was “authorized . . . by Acts
of Congress” to approve Sheridan’s prior orders and “instruct[] his successor
to carry out those orders.”230 “I emphatically decline,” Grant further
emphasized, “yielding any of the powers given the General of the Army by

222. Act of July 19, 1867, ch. 30, §§ 2, 10, 15 Stat. 14, 14, 16; see also supra note 213 and
accompanying text.
223. WHITE, supra note 215, at 112–13.
224. Id. at 113.
225. Id. Johnson removed another district commander at the same time. DOWNS, supra note
213, at 184–85.
226. ALLEN C. GUELZO, RECONSTRUCTION: A CONCISE HISTORY 52 (2018) (quoting
Letter from Ulysses S. Grant (Aug. 1, 1867), in 12 THE PAPERS OF ANDREW JOHNSON 447
(Paul H. Bergeron ed., 1995); see also Washington News, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 20, 1867,
at 1, https://www.nytimes.com/1867/08/20/archives/washington-news-the-order-for-gen-sheridans
-removal-issued-gen.html [https://perma.cc/K8YX-SQWX] (reporting that after receiving a
“positive order” to transfer Sheridan to different duties, “Grant visited the President . . . and entered
his earnest protest against the movement, but the President was immovable” and Grant relayed the
order to Sheridan the next day).
227. Act of July 19, 1867, ch. 30, § 3, 15 Stat. 14, 15 (1867).
228. CHERNOW, supra note 187, at 596; DOWNS, supra note 213, at 185.
229. Letter from Ulysses S. Grant (Aug. 26, 1867), in THE PAPERS OF ANDREW JOHNSON,
supra note 226, at 512.
230. Id.
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the laws of Congress.”231 Grant also wrote to Sheridan in September. “I feel
that your relief from command of the 5th District is a heavy blow to
reconstruction . . . ,” Grant complained. “I felt it my duty . . . to do all I could
to keep you where you was until the laws which you were executing so
faithfully were carried through and your District restored to the Union.”232
The House of Representatives eventually impeached President Johnson
for, among other things, attempting to remove Secretary of War Edwin
Stanton in violation of another March 1867 statute, the Tenure of Office
Act.233 Much as the 1867 appropriations rider did for the General of the
Army, that statute precluded removing certain senior officers without Senate
consent.234 Another impeachment article accused Johnson of planning to
circumvent the General of the Army provision, though no evidence at trial
showed that Johnson had in fact done so.235 The Senate ultimately failed to
convict on any counts, in part because key Republican Senators doubted
whether requiring Senate approval for removal of executive officers was
constitutional.236 After Ulysses Grant himself became President in 1869,
Congress repealed the General of the Army provision,237 and it repealed the
Tenure of Office Act altogether two decades later.238
c. Interpreting Reconstruction Examples.—This history offers powerful
support not only for Congress’s authority to vest military duties in particular
offices, but also for that power’s practical importance. Though denied the
power to remove Grant as General of the Army without Senate consent,
Johnson could—and did—appoint and remove district commanders at will.239
Grant, moreover, seems to have respected his ultimate obligation to relay
direct orders from the President to the commanders. Nevertheless,
Congress’s enactments, as interpreted by Grant and other generals, gave
military officials considerable latitude to shape initial Reconstruction policy,
often placing the President in a reactive posture. At the same time, those
statutes placed considerable friction between Johnson’s wishes and on-theground actions, enabling Grant and Sheridan, among others, to elevate issues’
231. Id. at 512–13.
232. Letter to Maj. Gen. Philp H. Sheridan (Sept. 8, 1867), in PAPERS OF ULYSSES S. GRANT,
supra note 214, at 316, 317.
233. Act of March 2, 1867, ch. 154, 14 Stat. 430, 430–31 (1867). For an account of Johnson’s
attempted removal of Stanton, see WHITE, supra note 215, at 92–94.
234. Act of March 2, 1867, ch. 154, 14 Stat. 430, 430.
235. MAY, supra note 205, at 91.
236. BRUFF, supra note 40, at 174–75.
237. Act of July 15, 1870, ch. 294, § 15, 16 Stat. 315, 319 (1870).
238. Act of Mar. 3, 1887, ch. 353, 24 Stat. 500 (1887).
239. Cf. State of Mississippi v. Johnson, 71 U.S. 475, 499 (1866) (observing that the district
commanders’ “duties must necessarily be performed under the supervision of the President as
commander-in-chief”).
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public salience and even defy the President temporarily so as to pursue
instead their understanding of congressional policy. Finally, even if Johnson
could ultimately get his way, his need to employ removal to do so helped
ensure political backlash against controversial actions. These constraints on
Johnson mattered. As Professor Downs argues, although Reconstruction
ultimately ended in the tragic failure of Jim Crow, Military Reconstruction,
while it lasted, “was in a basic way a success,” and it left important legacies,
including ratification of the Reconstruction Amendments.240
Some might dismiss these examples as relating more to domestic
governance than the military. In some sense, of course, the army during
Reconstruction functioned as a form of civilian government; indeed, the
Military Reconstruction Acts allowed military officers to displace state and
local officials and govern in their stead. Yet dismissing these examples as
more akin to civil administration would misunderstand the legal theory on
which the entire occupation was predicated. Congress did not employ
ordinary tools of federal civil administration to govern the defeated
Confederacy in 1867. Instead, congressional majorities viewed the army’s
presence in the South as akin to a foreign military occupation.241 In other
words, Congress presumed it could govern the defeated Confederacy through
the military precisely because the federal government’s war powers remained
active, even after the Confederacy’s nominal defeat.242 Congress’s
enactments during this period thus reflect exercises of congressional power
to regulate the President’s Commander-in-Chief power with respect to
military officials exercising military duties.
More generally, some might dismiss Reconstruction examples as
aberrational, given the period of crisis in which they arose. Reconstruction
today is often considered America’s “second founding,” a “rebirth of
freedom” in which three key amendments and a host of statutes sought to
purge the founding sin of slavery and establish a racially egalitarian
republic.243 Nevertheless, some court decisions and scholarship have
remained curiously dismissive of separation-of-powers precedents from this

240. DOWNS, supra note 213, at 180; see also id. at 247–49 (discussing the long-term
consequences of Military Reconstruction, including the southern states’ compelled ratification of
the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments).
241. DOWNS, supra note 213, at 7–8 (explaining that Congress addressed concerns about
military governance in a republic by creating “a bounded, exceptional time” in which the federal
government employed war powers to govern the defeated Confederacy).
242. Id.; see also WHITE, supra note 215, at 83–84 (discussing how Congress employed war
powers to impose reforms during Reconstruction).
243. See generally ERIC FONER, THE SECOND FOUNDING: HOW THE CIVIL WAR AND
RECONSTRUCTION REMADE THE CONSTITUTION (2019) (generally advancing this view).
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period, at times characterizing Congress’s efforts to constrain President
Johnson as aberrant and illegitimate.244
But even if Reconstruction is not the best model for constitutional
governance in ordinary times, precedents from this period should not all be
lightly dismissed. On the contrary, they might reflect a latent toolkit of
congressional powers that Congress can deploy if hostility to a given
president arouses it to do so. Indeed, the Johnson impeachment’s failure
might indicate a capacity for self-correction that should weigh against
wholesale suspicion of Reconstruction-era separation-of-powers precedents
other than removal limitations.245
From that point of view, the Military Reconstruction Acts and the
General of the Army rider warrant more serious consideration as valid
precedents. Holding aside for the moment the restrictions on Grant’s
removal, these provisions simply exercised Congress’s power to design the
military command structure and vest particular duties in particular offices.
Unlike the Meigs rider, none of these laws, by their plain terms, required any
particular individual to perform the functions in question; nor for that matter
did they vest direct control over the military in any officer other than the
President. On the contrary, all of these statutes simply vested particular
authorities and responsibilities—issuing orders to the Army or controlling
military occupation—in particular officers.
As we have seen, this vesting of duties strengthened these officers’
bargaining position in policy disputes with the President, and Grant and
others in fact employed their authorities to shape on-the-ground policy. In the
event of an impasse, moreover, resignation or removal, or perhaps a court
martial for insubordination, might have been the President’s only means of
getting his way. But building such friction into the command structure could
constitute a valid exercise of Congress’s powers to govern the military and
pass laws necessary and proper to discharging other officers’ powers. In
combination with earlier examples, this history suggests that such measures
are not an unconstitutional imposition on the President’s Commander-inChief authority.

244. See supra note 13; see also BRUFF, supra note 40, at 175 (“The judgment of history has
been that Johnson was right, that the [Tenure of Office Act] was an unconstitutional infringement
on the President’s control over the executive branch.”); CALABRESI & YOO, supra note 49, at 178
(“[R]ather than remove Johnson for unconstitutionally impeding Reconstruction and threatening
congressional authority, Congress responded by passing unconstitutional legislation that would tie
Johnson’s hands with respect to the removal power.”); WILLIAM WINTHROP, MILITARY LAW AND
PRECEDENTS 744–45 (photo. rprt. 1979) (1920) (referring to the “political history” surrounding
enactment of an 1866 statute limiting presidential removal of military officers as a factor counting
against the law’s constitutionality).
245. Cf. BRUFF, supra note 40, at 175 (noting that “the Johnson acquittal provided some
precedential support for the constitutional unity of the executive branch under presidential
command”).
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5. World War I.—A half century later, the United States’ rise to global
preeminence in the two World Wars and the early Cold War prompted a
renewed set of congressional debates over military organization.246
During World War I, the so-called Overman Act gave the President just
the sort of command flexibility that modern presidents, invoking the Meigs
opinion, have claimed as a matter of constitutional right. Under this statute,
the President held authority
to make such redistribution of functions among executive agencies as
he may deem necessary, including any functions, duties, and powers
hitherto by law conferred upon any executive department,
commission, bureau, agency, office, or officer, in such manner as in
his judgment shall seem best fitted to carry out the purposes of this
Act.247
Those purposes specifically included “successful prosecution of the war” and
“the more effective exercise and more efficient administration by the
President of his powers as Commander in Chief of the land and naval
forces.”248 By its terms, the Overman Act expired six months “after the
termination of the war by the proclamation of the treaty of peace,” at which
point “all executive or administrative agencies, departments, commissions,
bureaus, offices, or officers” reverted to “the same functions, duties, and
powers as heretofore or as hereafter by law may be provided, any
authorization of the President under this Act to the contrary
notwithstanding.”249
In congressional debates, some of the Act’s proponents suggested it was
necessary only for civil and administrative functions. “I understand,” one
Senator said, “the powers proposed to be confided to the President under the
Overman bill are chiefly executive powers and not those which he has as
Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy.”250 Yet President Wilson
246. At least one significant debate occurred in the interim, when Congress rejected a proposal
by the Theodore Roosevelt Administration to consolidate powers in the Secretary of War. BARRON,
supra note 13, at 192. In 1903, a joint order by the War and Navy Secretaries established a “Joint
Board” to facilitate cooperation between the army and navy. See 1 VERNON E. DAVIS, THE HISTORY
OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF IN WORLD WAR II 1 (1972) (discussing Joint Board’s
establishment). Reflecting the statutory separation between the two services, however, this board
was “an advisory body for the purpose of making recommendations jointly to the War and Navy
Secretaries looking toward the coordination of the policies and action of the armed forces. It had no
executive functions, and its pronouncements had official force only when approved by the two
Secretaries.” Id. at 15.
247. Overman Act, Pub. L. No. 65-152, § 1, 40 Stat. 556, 556 (1918).
248. Id.
249. Id. §§ 1, 6, 40 Stat. at 556–57.
250. 56 CONG. REC. 5404 (1918) (statement of Sen. Shields). Another Senator argued more
explicitly that “[t]he President as Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy can practically assign
such members of the Army or such officers as he sees fit to such positions as he sees proper to place
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proposed the Overman Act in the first place to counter a proposed law that
would have created a special “war cabinet” and required the President to
“exercise” essentially all war-related authorities “conferred on him by the
Constitution and the laws of the United States” through this new body.251
Even some of the Overman Act’s proponents, moreover, recognized that
then-existing statutes “conferred [certain powers] directly upon [the service
secretaries or their subordinates], so that in these matters these officers are
not subject to the control or direction by the President.”252 Meanwhile, at the
other extreme, one Senator argued the Overman Act was entirely unnecessary
because the President had constitutional authority to reallocate all executive
functions.253 As a contemporaneous scholar observed, “[t]he majority in
Congress” effectively repudiated that view.254 The majority
felt . . . that the act was not only justified in order to avoid suspicion
or necessity of the President setting himself up as a dictator and doing
the same things without definite authority of law, but also that it was
necessary to secure the proper coordination of effort on the part of the
agencies entrusted with carrying on the various war activities of the
government . . . .255
In any event, on the very day he signed the Act into law, Wilson invoked
the statute as authority for an executive order redistributing certain functions
them in.” 56 CONG. REC. 4577 (1918). This Senator, however, appeared to view this power as a
function of presidential removal authority:
It is as useless and senseless to say that the President is handicapped in [controlling the
ordinance, a function then vested by statute in a particular officer] as it is to say that
the colonel of a regiment on independent duty is handicapped by some regulation
which gives a first sergeant certain powers when he can change that first sergeant and
put his own man in at any instant. . . . [T]he President possesses the power either as
President in his civil capacity or as Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy to put
into practically every position except those great independent tribunals and boards a
man who will do exactly what the President wants done.
Id.
251. 56 CONG. REC. 1077 (1918) (reading of bill). For background on this proposal and
Wilson’s support for the Overman Act as a response, see BERDAHL, supra note 154, at 172–73;
BARRON, supra note 13, at 222–24; and DAVID M. KENNEDY, OVER HERE: THE FIRST WORLD
WAR IN AMERICAN SOCIETY 124–25 (1980).
252. 56 CONG. REC. 5406 (1918) (statement of Sen. Shields) (discussing the provisions cited in
supra note 144).
253. 56 CONG. REC. 4520 (1918) (statement of Sen. Knox) (stating that he thought the President
“has the authority to require every executive officer and every department of the Government to do
anything that he directs to be done in order to prosecute this war to a successful conclusion” and
“has the power to delegate from one Cabinet officer to another the discharge of any particular duty
that he thinks such a Cabinet officer can discharge better than the one upon whom it would normally
be incumbent”). But see 56 CONG. REC. 4525 (1918) (statement of Sen. Fletcher) (“[I]f there is a
statute which says that [certain] duties must be performed by a certain officer, then, of course, the
President can not assign those duties to some other officer or appoint some other officer to perform
those duties . . . .”).
254. BERDAHL, supra note 154, at 175.
255. Id.
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of the Army’s Chief Signal Officer and requiring designation of a new
Director of Military Aeronautics by the Army’s chief commander.256
Although he invoked his status as Commander in Chief along with the statute
as authority for the executive order, the order’s directives were to expire six
months after the war’s end—a limitation that conformed with the Overman
Act and thus implied dependence upon it.257
When the war did end, the military sought to preserve the organizational
flexibility it had gained. Thus, in 1919, the War Department proposed
legislation that, among other things, would have preserved presidential
authority to flexibly reallocate military duties and functions.258 Opponents
decried this proposed consolidation of power as antithetical to republican
government; a blistering report by one Senator decried “the spirit displayed
by its framers throughout the whole bill—a consuming desire for despotic,
unrestricted power—militarism run mad.”259 The proposal died. Congress
instead largely prescribed the Army’s structure itself in the National Defense
Act of 1920.260
6. World War II.—At the start of World War II, just days after the Pearl
Harbor attack, Congress reenacted the Overman Act’s key provisions in a
new war powers statute, again providing for the law’s sunset six months after
the war’s end.261 Like Wilson, President Roosevelt invoked this statute along
with his constitutional authority as Commander in Chief to reorganize certain
military functions. In his case, he signed executive orders restructuring
command arrangements in both the Army and Navy, in each case directing

256. Woodrow Wilson, Executive Order (May 20, 1918), in 17 COMPILATION OF MESSAGES &
PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS 8513, 8513–14 (1927).
257. Id. at 8516.
258. 58 CONG. REC. 3600 (1919) (recording the War Department’s transmission of a bill that
would require the President to “merge” existing War Department offices and then grant the
President “authority to make such distribution or redistribution of the duties, powers, functions,
records, property, and personnel of such previously existing departments, bureaus, and offices as he
may deem necessary for the efficiency of the military service,” as well as “authority to prescribe the
duties, powers, and functions of officers of the services, units, and organizations” authorized for the
Army); see also 1 WAR DEP’T, ANN. REP. 1919, at 478, app. at 480 (proposing this legislation).
259. STAFF OF S. COMM. ON MILITARY AFFAIRS, 66TH CONG., ARMY REORGANIZATION BILL:
ANALYTICAL & EXPLANATORY STATEMENT 8 (Comm. Print 1919) (statement of Sen. George E.
Chamberlain).
260. National Defense Act of 1920, Pub. L. No. 66-242, 41 Stat. 759 (1920). In an earlier
controversy during the Theodore Roosevelt administration, Congress rejected a proposal to “abolish
the office of the commanding general and to vest more power in the secretary of war” based on
similar fears that such legislation would pave the way to dictatorship. BARRON, supra note 13, at
192.
261. First War Powers Act, 1941, Pub. L. No. 77-354, §§ 1–5, 401, 55 Stat. 838, 838–39, 841
(1941); see, e.g., 87 CONG. REC. 9838 (1941) (statement of Sen. Van Nuys) (“The bill was prepared
in the Department of Justice . . . . Title I of the bill reenacts the measure . . . commonly known as
the Overman Act, which was approved May 20, 1918.”).

PRICE.PRINTER.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2021]

Congress’s Power over Military Offices

2/22/21 12:56 PM

539

that changes would expire six months after the war’s end—a sunset that again
implied reliance on statutory rather than constitutional authority.262
Despite the President’s organizational flexibility, however, pre-War
institutional structures continued to hamper coordination. In particular,
Army–Navy rivalries and coordination problems repeatedly marred combat
performance; the British Air Marshal observed that “[t]he violence of
interservice rivalry in the United States had to be seen to be believed and was
an appreciable handicap to their war effort.”263 To address these challenges,
Roosevelt designated one admiral as his Chief of Staff and improvised a
coordinating body of “joint chiefs” to advise him and oversee operations.264
He also gave the Army and Navy precedence in different theaters and in some
instances placed units from one service under the command of officers from
the other.265 Though all these actions admittedly could reflect broad
assertions of Commander-in-Chief power, they could also be supported by
the 1941 War Powers Act; the President never issued any formal order
establishing the Chief of Staff position or the joint chiefs.266 In any event,
Roosevelt’s organizational arrangements failed to quell interbranch friction.
In effect, pre-War statutory arrangements, though superseded for the duration
of the war, continued to limit presidential coordination of the armed forces.267
7. The National Security Act of 1947.—After the war, to address the interservice coordination problems, the executive branch once again proposed a
262. Franklin D. Roosevelt, Reorganization of the Navy Department and the Naval Service,
EXEC. ORDER NO. 9096 (Mar. 12, 1942), in 1942 THE PUBLIC PAPERS & ADDRESSES OF FRANKLIN
D. ROOSEVELT 157 (Samuel I. Rosenman ed., 1st ed. 1950); Franklin D. Roosevelt, The President
Reorganizes the Army and the War Department, EXEC. ORDER NO. 9082 (Feb. 28, 1942), in 1942
THE PUBLIC PAPERS & ADDRESSES OF FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT 140–41 (Samuel I. Rosenman ed.,
1st ed. 1950).
263. LOCHER, supra note 139, at 20–21.
264. DALE R. HERSPRING, THE PENTAGON & THE PRESIDENCY: CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS
FROM FDR TO GEORGE W. BUSH 24–25 (2005).
265. Id. at 23–26, 31, 41; James R. Locher III, Has It Worked?: The Goldwater-Nichols
Reorganization Act, 54 NAVAL WAR COLLEGE REV., Autumn 2001, at 95, 96.
266. HERSPRING, supra note 264, at 24; see also EDGAR F. RAINES, JR. & MAJOR DAVID R.
CAMPBELL, THE ARMY AND THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF: EVOLUTION OF ARMY IDEAS ON THE
COMMAND, CONTROL, AND COORDINATION OF THE U.S. ARMED FORCES, 1942-1985, at 18–19
(1986) (noting that “[t]he legal basis of the authority exercised by the wartime Joint Chiefs of Staff
was, to say the least, ambiguous” because “President Roosevelt never issued an executive order
clearly delineating the organization’s functions as he certainly had the power to do under the First
War Powers Act”). For a detailed history of the Joint Chiefs’ origins and organizational evolution,
see DAVIS, supra note 246.
267. In August 1944, then-Vice Presidential candidate Harry Truman wrote in a popular
magazine, “Proof that a divine Providence watches over the United States is furnished by the fact
that we have managed to escape disaster even though our scrambled professional military set-up
has been an open invitation to catastrophe.” RAINES & CAMPBELL, supra note 266, at 37; see also
id. at 37–42 (discussing clashing Army and Navy plans for post-War military reorganization and
Truman’s commitment to unification).
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statutory consolidation of military functions.268 Recognizing that post-War
rivalry with the Soviet Union would necessitate continued mobilization and
an effective global deterrent, Congress took action this time in the National
Security Act of 1947.269 But even this reorganization fell short of the degree
of flexibility sought by the President and some military leaders.270 Among
other changes, the 1947 statute merged the War and Navy Departments into
a single new agency, the National Military Establishment (later renamed the
Department of Defense), to be headed by a new Secretary of Defense.271 It
also created the Air Force as a distinct service; established separate
Secretaries of the Army, Navy, and Air Force with authority over their
respective services, subject to the general direction of the Secretary of
Defense; and authorized the Joint Chiefs to establish unified commands
combining forces from multiple services.272 Though significant, these
changes deliberately stopped short of complete consolidation, and the Act
imposed multiple impediments to direct presidential control over the
services.
For one thing, to address renewed fears about militarism and
dictatorship and appease concerns about preserving distinct service identities,
Congress included statutory definitions of each service’s functions in the
Act.273 It also sharply limited the new Defense Secretary’s authority, giving
the office power to set general policies but not to issue direct commands,274
though subsequent amendments in 1949, 1953, and 1958 expanded the
Secretary’s authority and gave the President greater control over unified

268. Id. at 43, 98.
269. National Security Act of 1947, Pub. L. No. 80-253, 61 Stat. 495 (1947).
270. RAINES & CAMPBELL, supra note 266, at 98.
271. National Security Act of 1947 §§ 201–202, 61 Stat. at 499–500.
272. Id. §§ 205–208, 211(b)(3), 61 Stat. at 501–05.
273. Id. §§ 205(e), 206(b), 207(f), 61 Stat. at 501–03. Senators and Members of Congress
repeatedly expressed concerns about militarism in the Act’s legislative history. See, e.g., 93 CONG.
REC. 9435 (1947) (statement of Rep. Hoffman) (“[T]o permit immediate or gradual growth of
military control of war management is to follow the path of militarism—to disaster.”); 93 CONG.
REC. 8297 (1947) (statement of Sen. Gurney) (responding to “some who express a fear that the
creation of this office [the Secretary of Defense] will lead toward dictatorship”); 93 CONG. REC.
8316–8317 (1947) (statement of Sen. Robertson) (expressing concerns that the bill will foster
militarism); H.R. REP. NO. 80-961, at 7 (1947) (additional views of Clare E. Hoffman, Chairman)
(“A careful reading of the bill, of the hearings, and a realization of the implications justify the
conclusion that the possibilities of a dictatorship by the military are in this legislation.”). More
practical worries about loss of Navy prestige and congressional influence over procurement and
basing decisions appear also to have motivated Congress’s weakening of the proposed
consolidation. See Locher, supra note 265, at 98.
274. National Security Act of 1947 § 202, 61 Stat. at 500 (granting limited duties to the
Secretary and providing specifically that the Army, Navy, and Air Force Departments “shall be
administered as individual executive departments by their respective Secretaries”).
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commands.275 Some critics of the 1947 law, including the Marine Corps
Commandant, worried that unification of the services would cause a
withering and eventual abolition of the Marine Corps and naval aviation,
despite those components’ distinguished contributions to the recent Allied
victory.276 Congress addressed such concerns by adding specific statutory
protections for marines and aviators within the Navy.277 Finally, building on
the jerry-rigged joint command structure developed during the war, the Act
formally established the National Security Council and Joint Chiefs of
Staff.278 In another nod to militarism fears, however, the statute limited these
bodies to advisory rather than command functions.279
Amid all these changes, Congress recognized and preserved the
President’s constitutional authority as Commander in Chief. Some legislative
history even appeared to take a broad view of this presidential power. For
instance, a Senate committee report observed that “[t]he creation of such an
official [as the Secretary of Defense] in no way reduces the responsibility and
authority of the President who, by the Constitution, remains both the
Commander in Chief, and also the source of all executive power in the
Government.”280 Similarly, during floor debates, Senators and
Representatives recognized the President’s ultimate constitutional power;
some, for example, justified the new position of Defense Secretary as a
measure aimed at easing the President’s workload, rather than displacing his
command authority.281
Nevertheless, as a practical matter, this statute, like earlier enactments,
presumed broad congressional authority to structure the offices and
command relationships through which presidential power would be
exercised. Indeed, neither the Act itself nor the extensive debate surrounding
275. Locher, supra note 265, at 99; Gregg Garbesi, U.S. Unified Command Plan, in AMERICA’S
VICEROYS: THE MILITARY AND U.S. FOREIGN POLICY 17, 37–38 (Derek S. Reveron ed., 2004).
276. See, e.g., National Defense Establishment (Unification of the Armed Services): Hearing
on S. 758 Before the S. Comm. on Armed Serv., 80th Cong. 411–13 (1947) (statement of Gen. A.A.
Vandegrift, Commandant, United States Marine Corps).
277. National Security Act of 1947 § 206(b), (c), 61 Stat. at 501–02.
278. Id. §§ 101, 211, 61 Stat. at 496–97, 505.
279. Id. Although less relevant here, another noteworthy innovation in the statute was its
creation of the Central Intelligence Agency. Id. § 102, 61 Stat. at 497.
280. S. REP. NO. 80-239, at 11 (1947) (reporting the bill from the Senate Committee on Armed
Services).
281. See, e.g., 93 CONG. REC. 8297 (1947) (statement of Sen. Gurney) (“It is universally
recognized that all our forces are subject to the direction of the President as constitutional
Commander in Chief. . . . But all of us know full well that the overburdened Chief Executive of our
Government . . . cannot possibly discharge [the] responsibility [of directing all military
subordinates] with a modern military organization.”); H.R. REP. NO. 80-961, at 4 (1947) (explaining
that “[t]he complexity and magnitude of the President’s task in peace and war are such that your
committee believes it is a generally accepted fact that he needs a full-time civilian official to assist
him in the performance of his onerous duties as Commander in Chief of the armed forces,” and
determining that “[t]he Secretary of Defense fills this need”).
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it would have made much sense if the President held constitutional authority
to simply reorganize military forces and command structures as he saw fit.
Stating the constitutional theory implied by the bill itself, one Congressman
observed in floor debate, “I would remind you that the responsibility for the
organization and maintenance of our Army and Navy is not one which the
Constitution places upon the Commander in Chief. It is one which is imposed
upon the Congress . . . .”282
Even the executive branch appeared to acknowledge this view. Early in
the legislative debates, it submitted a joint statement from the War and Navy
Secretaries calling for legislation with particular features, including
provisions to ensure that “[t]he armed forces shall be organized” into separate
services and that “[e]ach [service] shall be under a Secretary and, under the
over-all direction of the Secretary of National Defense, shall be administered
as an individual unit.”283 Likewise, the same Senate committee report that
referred to the President as the “source of all executive power” observed that
“[t]he safeguard against militarism in this country is not to be found in the
costly confusion and inefficiency of uncoordinated executive agencies with
confused lines of authority.”284 With this assertion, the report seemingly
acknowledging that Congress could create, if it wished, just such confused
and inefficient agency relationships within the military. More directly, a
House committee report observed that “[t]he specific powers given the
Secretary of Defense have been carefully delineated in the bill so that there
can be no doubt as to the kind and scope of the powers he will exercise.”285
This report thus asserted unambiguously that Congress may define, and limit,
the military authorities of officers other than the President.
On the whole, then, both the Act itself and its legislative history support
broad congressional power to allocate military duties and authorities by
statute.
8. The Goldwater–Nichols Act of 1986.—A last major military
reorganization took place in 1986, when Congress sought to update and
improve the 1947 structure by enacting the Goldwater–Nichols Department
of Defense Reorganization Act.286 Building on earlier amendments to the
1947 Act, this statute authorized the President, “through the Secretary of
Defense,” to establish so-called “combatant commands” with authority over
forces in particular regions of the globe.287 Under the structure established by
282. 93 CONG. REC. 9419 (1947) (statement of Rep. Cole).
283. Letter to the President from Robert P. Patterson, Secretary of War, and James Forrestal,
Secretary of the Navy (Jan. 16, 1947), in S. REP. NO. 80-239, at 5.
284. S. REP. NO. 80-239, at 11, 16.
285. H.R. REP. NO. 80-961, at 4.
286. Pub. L. No. 99-433, 100 Stat. 992 (1986).
287. Id. § 211, 100 Stat. at 1012–13 (codified at 10 U.S.C. §§ 161, 162).
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the Act, military commanders drawn from the different services would
exercise command authority over particular units, also drawn from different
services and assigned to the command by the service secretaries as directed
by the Secretary of Defense; these combatant commanders would then bear
responsibility for achieving military objectives within the region under their
charge.288 Though earlier statutes had also allowed such unified commands,
Goldwater–Nichols strengthened the combatant commanders’ position and
authority in various ways.289 In particular, the Act relegated the service
secretaries—officers who once held exclusive command authority over entire
branches of the military—to an essentially supportive role, with power over
training, equipping, and disciplining their respective services but no power
of actual military command.290 Finally, the Act made additional adjustments
to the National Security Council, consolidating authority in the Chairman of
the Joint Chiefs while allowing other Joint Chiefs to express dissenting
views.291
As with the National Security Act of 1947, neither this statute nor the
hard-fought “victory on the Potomac” that was necessary to enact it would
have made much sense if Congress lacked power to define duties and
authorities within the military apparatus.292 The legislation’s entire purpose
was to break down prior command relationships and replace them with new
ones better suited (presumably) to achieving the nation’s military and foreign
policy objectives.293 Again, even the Executive Branch appeared to
acknowledge congressional authority to make such changes. In a statement
of executive views early in the legislative process, President Reagan
cautioned that any new statute “must not infringe on the constitutionally
protected responsibilities of the President as Commander in Chief.”294 He
explained: “Any legislation in which the issues of Legislative and Executive
responsibilities are confused would be constitutionally suspect and would not
288. Id. § 211, 100 Stat. at 1012–16 (codified at 10 U.S.C. §§ 162, 164, 165).
289. See Garbesi, supra note 275, at 39, 41 (observing that “Goldwater-Nichols reinforced the
intent of previous reforms by clearly spelling out in the legislation what was often left unsaid” and
that the law had “a profound effect on strengthening the power of the combatant commanders,” who
“[p]reviously[] . . . had difficulty directing their component commanders . . . in joint operations”).
290. Mark P. Nevitt, The Operational and Administrative Militaries, 53 GA. L. REV. 905, 929
& n.128 (2019); see also Andrew J. Bacevich, Elusive Bargain: The Pattern of U.S. Civil-Military
Relations Since World War II, in THE LONG WAR: A NEW HISTORY OF U.S. NATIONAL SECURITY
POLICY SINCE WORLD WAR II 207, 245 (Andrew J. Bacevich ed., 2007) (describing the “drastically
diminished” influence of the service secretaries).
291. Goldwater–Nichols Act § 201, 100 Stat. at 1004–10 (codified at 10 U.S.C. §§ 151–55).
292. See supra note 139.
293. See generally Locher, supra note 265 (examining the background and effects of the Act).
294. RONALD REAGAN, MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES
TRANSMITTING HIS VIEWS ON THE FUTURE STRUCTURE AND ORGANIZATION OF OUR DEFENSE
ESTABLISHMENT AND THE LEGISLATIVE STEPS THAT SHOULD BE TAKEN TO IMPLEMENT DEFENSE
REFORMS, H.R. DOC. NO. 99-209, at 1–2 (1986).
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meet with my approval.”295 But the very same statement went on to discuss
the President’s goals without suggesting any constitutional difficulty with
statutory assignment of duties and command relationships.
For example, President Reagan wrote:
Where the roles and responsibilities of each component of our defense
establishment are necessarily placed in law, they must be clear and
unambiguous, but not so constrained or detailed as to impair
operational flexibility or the common sense of those in positions of
responsibility. . . . [Laws] should establish sound, fundamental
relationships among and between civilian and military
authorities . . . .296
Elsewhere, he advocated strengthening the Secretary of Defense’s
authority297 and “set[ting] apart and establish[ing] in law” the Joint Chiefs
Chairman’s “unique position and responsibilities.”298 Reagan’s eventual
signing statement on the final legislation indicated no constitutional
objections.299
Much like President Reagan’s statement, some assertions in key
legislative documents could imply that Congress believed a degree of
command flexibility was constitutionally required. A key provision in the Act
prescribed that “[u]nless otherwise directed by the President, the chain of
command to a unified or specified combatant command runs—(1) from the
President to the Secretary of Defense; and (2) from the Secretary of Defense
to the commander of the combatant command.”300 Commenting on this
provision, a conference committee report on the final legislation explained
that “the conferees determined that the extremely important chain of
command to the warfighting commands should be clearly prescribed.”301
Accordingly, the report explained, the conference legislation “specif[ied] the
normal chain of command,” but it did so “[w]ithout infringing upon the
President’s authority as Commander in Chief to direct otherwise.”302
295. Id. at 2. Elsewhere Reagan observed cryptically: “Restrictions in the law that prohibit the
establishment of certain command arrangements should be repealed. My authority as Commander
in Chief is sufficient to deal with any necessary command arrangements or adjustments in the
assignment of forces that unforeseen circumstances could require.” Id. at 5. These sentences seem
ambiguous as to whether Reagan was advocating repeal of command restraints because he
considered them unconstitutional or simply because they were unduly constraining.
296. Id. at 3.
297. Id. at 4.
298. Id. at 5.
299. Ronald Reagan, Statement on Signing the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense
Reorganization Act of 1986 (Oct. 1, 1986), https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/statementsigning-the-goldwater-nichols-department-defense-reorganization-act-1986
[https://perma.cc
/YFE7-YS29].
300. Goldwater–Nichols Act § 211, 100 Stat. at 1013 (codified at 10 U.S.C. § 162(b)).
301. H.R. REP. NO. 99-824, at 118 (1986) (Conf. Rep.).
302. Id.
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Though seeming to assert robust authority to prescribe chains of
command, this cryptic qualification by the conferees might imply that
preserving presidential authority to alter command structures was
constitutionally necessary; alternatively, it might suggest only that Congress
saw fit to preserve such flexibility as a matter of prudence. Whatever the
correct view, however, more specific assertions in the very same report
contradict any inference of preclusive general presidential control over
military duties. For example, the very next paragraph addressed separate
provisions precluding the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs from exercising
command authority.303 According to the report, “the conferees intend[ed] that
(1) the JCS Chairman would not be part of the chain of command, and (2) the
chain of command would not run through the JCS Chairman.”304 Likewise,
an earlier Senate committee report indicated that its bill would preserve “the
President’s authority as Commander in Chief” despite also specifically
precluding any exercise of command authority by the Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs.305
On balance, then, both the Act and its history once again support broad
congressional authority to structure the offices and chains of command
through which the executive branch exercises military power.
C.

Implications

Congress’s broad authority to allocate military duties, reflected not only
in the Constitution’s text and structure but also in legislative and executive
practice across the Republic’s history, carries general implications for
separation of powers that I will address later.306 This authority also, however,
has immediate concrete significance.
To begin with, the understanding developed here places recent statutes
assigning military functions to officers other than the President on rock-solid
constitutional foundations. One recent example is the statute mentioned
earlier that grants the President and Secretary of Defense joint authority over
whether to undertake certain cyber operations.307 Another is the provision in
the 2020 National Defense Authorization Act, to which President Trump
objected on constitutional grounds,308 that requires certain certifications by

303. Id.
304. Id.
305. S. COMM. ON ARMED SERV., DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE REORGANIZATION ACT OF 1986,
S. REP. NO. 99-280, at 16–17 (1986).
306. See infra Part IV.
307. John S. McCain National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2019, Pub. L. No.
115-232, § 1642, 132 Stat. 2132 (2018), 10 U.S.C. § 394 note.
308. Donald Trump, Statement by the President (Dec. 20, 2019), https://www.whitehouse.gov
/briefings-statements/statement-by-the-president-34/ [https://perma.cc/KS5L-V73M]; 2020 NDAA
Views Letter, supra note 21, at 3.
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the Defense Secretary before American troop levels in South Korea may fall
below a prescribed threshold.309 If the President’s executive power or
Commander-in-Chief authority entailed preclusive personal authority over
such governmental decisions, then vesting these military functions in an
officer other than the President would be unconstitutional. But they do not,
for all the reasons I have indicated. Such measures are meaningful, moreover,
because, as with civil offices, the choice to vest these powers in a different
officer may impose practical and political restraints on presidents even if they
can ultimately get their way by firing or threatening to fire the officer in
question.
By the same token, Congress might impose measures that go even
further, giving the secretary or another senior officer authority over nuclear
weapons, for example, or giving a particular officer authority over a
particular theater of combat. Lower down the hierarchy, it could also impose
more rigid restraints on particular commands so as to give the Senate greater
say in who actually holds specified operational authorities in the event of a
conflict. Congress imposed similarly severe constraints during
Reconstruction, and more routine legislation at other times reflects the same
constitutional understanding. So long as the President retains some means of
effectuating his or her wishes—either by removing the responsible officers
at will, or by employing other means of discipline afforded by statute—
legislation placing a gap, and thus a potential source of friction, between the
President’s desire and actual government action in this manner is
constitutional.
To the extent past Executive Branch opinions and statements suggest
otherwise, the Executive Branch’s assertions are mistaken. Perhaps the most
thorough and thoughtful opinion in this vein is OLC’s Clinton-era opinion
concluding that Congress could not by statute preclude assignment of U.S.
forces to a non-U.S. commander as part of a United Nations operation.310
Although OLC reasoned that such authority is inherent in the President’s
power to command U.S. forces,311 the President’s Commander-in-Chief
power properly carries no such implication. For one thing, even if the
President generally held broad authority over military assignments, it would
not follow that the President’s command authority entails a preclusive power
to place U.S. forces under officers who are not themselves subject to

309. National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2020, Pub. L. No. 116-29, § 1254, 133
Stat. 1671 (2019).
310. Placing of United States Armed Forces Under United Nations Operational or Tactical
Control, 20 Op. O.L.C. 182, 182–83 (1996).
311. Id. at 184 (“[T]here can be no room to doubt that the Commander-in-Chief Clause commits
to the President alone the power to select the particular personnel who are to exercise tactical and
operational control over U.S. forces.”).
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presidential command.312 Furthermore, and more to the point here, because
Congress holds authority to define military officers’ duties and command
relationships, presidents lack authority to disregard such restraints; they must
instead exercise command authority through the particular mechanisms
Congress has provided. Accordingly, if Congress precludes assignment of
U.S. forces to foreign commanders, thus effectively defining command of
U.S. forces as an exclusive responsibility of American officers, then
presidents lack constitutional power to override Congress’ choice.
This constitutional analysis, of course, does not mean that limiting
presidential command authority in these ways is necessarily prudent or wise.
The best course may often be to retain clear presidential accountability for
matters of war and peace and operational success or failure. Indeed, the broad
and flexible authority over military responsibilities that Congress has
generally provided to the President seems to reflect just that type of
judgment. It might also be the case that binding presidential authority too
tightly, particularly with respect to such weighty matters of national security,
could risk undermining constitutionalism as a whole by tempting presidents
to defy limits on their power during an emergency.313 Under the constitutional
analysis advanced here, however, such judgments are ultimately Congress’s
to make; the Constitution has not already made them for us.
Congressional authority to vest duties in offices also does not
necessarily mean that Congress can simultaneously preclude presidential
supervision and removal of the officer exercising those duties. Grasping the
full contours of this question, however, requires grappling with yet another
question that has been a matter of historic debate but is largely neglected in
contemporary scholarship: the scope of presidential removal authority over
military officers.
III. Presidential Removal Authority
A next key question regarding congressional authority over military
offices concerns presidential removal power. Do presidents necessarily hold
constitutional authority to remove all military officers at will, or can
Congress instead grant such officers tenure protection or require their
removal through specified procedures, such as court-martial prosecution?
Earlier in the country’s history, this question was a matter of extensive
debate, yet for all the ink spilled over removal in general, modern scholars

312. According to John Yoo, presidents had never before claimed that such authority was part
of the Commander-in-Chief power. JOHN YOO, THE POWERS OF WAR AND PEACE: THE
CONSTITUTION AND FOREIGN AFFAIRS AFTER 9/11 173, 175–76 (2005).
313. See generally Adrian Vermeule, The Publius Paradox, 82 MODERN L. REV. 1 (2019)
(advancing this argument).

PRICE.PRINTER.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

548

2/22/21 12:56 PM

Texas Law Review

[Vol. 99:491

have given the question and its broader implications comparatively little
attention.314
In fact, the best view of the constitutional text and structure, interpreted
in light of subsequent practice, supports a result with respect to military
officers that administrative lawyers may find surprising. In the civil and
administrative context, the removal debate has resulted (for the moment at
least) in case law that generally supports presidential authority to remove
officers but grants Congress limited authority to give certain positions tenure
protection. With respect to the military, by contrast, longstanding practice
supports allowing limits on presidential removal authority, at least during
peacetime, even with respect to operational military functions, so long as
Congress has provided by law for robust alternative means of command
discipline. Presidents and those in the chain of command today may often
have authority to relieve an officer of particular duties such as command of
a particular ship or unit, but they do not have authority in peacetime to
unilaterally remove an officer from the service altogether. In this Part, I first
defend this understanding of Article II and then address its implications for
congressional authority.
A.

Congress’s Power to Limit Presidential Removal
1. The Constitutional Text and Structure

a. Removal as Default Commander-in-Chief Authority.—As noted earlier,
the extent of presidential removal authority is one of the oldest and most
fraught debates in constitutional law. Although the Constitution says nothing
specific about presidential removal, the First Congress apparently
determined, following extensive debate, in its “Decision of 1789” that
principal executive officers are at least presumptively subject to termination
by the President.315 At any rate, the debate resulted in a set of statutes that
made no provision for removal but referred obliquely to presidential removal
of the department head. Attorneys General and other commentators at the
314. Two recent treatments have briefly defended these removal limitations. See Kent H.
Barnett, Avoiding Independent Agency Armageddon, 87 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1349, 1399–1400
(2012) (arguing that the limitations are valid exercises of Congress’s power over military discipline
and accord with other cases upholding removal limitations); Barron & Lederman, supra note 83, at
1105 (“Each of the branches has long accepted . . . that Congress can provide for courts-martial to
have a decisive role, even countermanding the President’s judgments, in some personnel questions,
including dismissal from the service.”); see also Dakota S. Rudesill, The Land and Naval Forces
Clause, 86 U. CINN. L. REV. 391, 406 n.51 (2018) (noting “reasonable disagreement” over the
question). Justice Breyer’s dissent in Free Enterprise Fund also called attention to removal
limitations for military officers. Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 561 U.S.
477, 543 (2010). The majority, however, characterized this example as “far afield” from the
questions at issue in the case. Id. at 507.
315. Prakash, supra note 41, at 1067–68.
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time understood this outcome to imply a constitutional removal power for the
President.316
One department addressed in these statutes, albeit not the initial focus
of debates, was the Department of War.317 This early practice thus supports
viewing at least the Defense Secretary and other senior civilian officials with
responsibility for military functions as at least presumptively removable by
the President. Even apart from this history, moreover, the constitutional text
and structure offer particularly strong reasons to presume presidential
removal power, at least as a default rule, with respect to all officers with
military authority. The President, after all, is Commander in Chief. Whatever
else this status entails, it must carry some constitutional power to ensure
adherence to presidential commands. Presuming presidential authority to
impose disciplinary measures other than removal or suspension, however,
would violate more specific constitutional prohibitions on ex post facto laws
and punishment without due process.318 Removal and suspension, by
contrast, hold a deep pedigree as basic aspects of command authority, even
apart from the broader history of removal debates going back to the Decision
of 1789.319
The Constitution’s exclusion of military offices from impeachment
reinforces this inference. Lest the Constitution create a dangerous vacuum of
military unaccountability, military officers must be accountable, directly or
indirectly, to the President if they are not accountable to Congress through
impeachment. Joseph Story’s influential treatise thus explained military
officers’ exclusion from impeachment by reference to the alternative system
of military discipline: “The very nature and efficiency of military duties and
discipline require this summary and exclusive jurisdiction; and the
promptitude of its operations are not only better suited to the notions of
military men; but they deem their honour and their reputation more safe in
the hands of their brother officers, than in any merely civil tribunal.”320
It is true that, even without the Commander-in-Chief Clause, one might
derive presidential removal authority from textual provisions invoked in
other settings, such as the Vesting and Take Care Clauses. But those
provisions seem less readily applicable to the military. By obligating the
President to ensure faithful execution of the laws, the Take Care Clause
arguably implies authority to remove officers who execute laws unfaithfully.
316. Id.; see also infra subsection III(A)(2)(a).
317. See Prakash, supra note 41, at 1023 & n.7.
318. See PRAKASH, supra note 54, at 158 (arguing the President lacks unilateral authority to
impose such penalties).
319. See id. (arguing based on English practice that “the president can suspend or oust
disobedient soldiers and sailors”).
320. 2 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 258–
59 (1991).
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As Saikrishna Prakash has observed, however, it is not obvious that most
military functions constitute execution of the laws.321 The military, to be sure,
has at times performed law-enforcement functions, but since 1878 the Posse
Comitatus Act and other statutes have limited such use of the armed forces.322
A conventional military campaign, by contrast, amounts to law-execution
only in the attenuated sense that it involves seeking to achieve some express
or implied congressional objective.
Alternatively, removal authority might be part of the “Executive Power”
conferred on Presidents by the Vesting Clause. Prakash generally endorses
this view, arguing that “the Constitution’s grant of executive power
encompasses a removal power” with respect to executive officers.323 But
applying that view here requires presuming not only that the Vesting Clause
has substantive content (rather than simply conferring the powers granted
elsewhere in Article II), but also that it properly extends beyond law
execution into other aspects of traditional executive authority. Some recent
scholarship has called that view into question, at least as a matter of original
meaning.324 In any event, whatever the correct interpretation of the Vesting
Clause, the Commander-in-Chief Clause provides a specific textual anchor
for presuming presidential removal authority with respect to military officers.
This conclusion nevertheless is not the end of the story, because here,
as in other areas, the most difficult question is not whether Article II supports
inferring presidential removal authority as a constitutional default, but
whether the Constitution ever allows Congress to limit that authority. Despite
all the reasons for generally inferring presidential removal authority, modern
case law, at least, could support relaxing this requirement with respect to
certain narrow functions, even within the military, such as those relating to
military justice. Simplifying somewhat, after suggesting in one case that atwill presidential removal is essential for executive officers,325 the Supreme
Court held during the New Deal that Congress may grant tenure protection
to “quasi-legislative” and “quasi-adjudicative” offices such as multimember
regulatory commissions, but not to “purely executive” offices.326 Half a
century later, the Court qualified even that conclusion by holding that
321. Prakash, supra note 46, at 1837.
322. 18 U.S.C. § 1385 (2018). For a brief primer on current statutory restraints, see Nevitt,
supra note 83, at 471–73.
323. Prakash, supra note 46, at 1815; see also Prakash, supra note 1, at 363 (“The [Constitution]
grants the power to remove [military officers] via the grant of Executive power.”). Prakash has
argued with respect to the military that Congress has broad authority to regulate the military,
including how operations are conducted, but that within such statutory limits, the President as
Commander in Chief “may direct military operations” and control officers through removal. Id. at
351.
324. See generally Mortenson, supra note 113 (arguing against this view of the Vesting Clause).
325. Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 117 (1926).
326. Humphrey’s Ex’r v. United States, 295 U.S. 602, 627–28 (1935).
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Congress could require for-cause removal for even a purely executive
position such as a prosecutor if the office’s responsibilities were relatively
narrow and some particular functional need justified independence.327 In
Seila, the Court characterized this case law as recognizing a general rule of
at-will removal authority, subject to two limited exceptions: “one for
multimember expert agencies that do not wield substantial executive power,
and one for inferior officers with limited duties and no policymaking or
administrative authority.”328
Under this framework, military offices would presumably be purely
executive (and thus subject to at-will removal) as a general matter, but tenure
protection could be justified for those with “limited duties,” particularly in
settings involving a functional need for independence. In keeping with this
logic, as noted earlier, several adjudicatory military offices hold tenure
protections of the sort associated with independent agencies and adjudicatory
officers in the administrative context. Judges on the Court of Appeals for the
Armed Forces, for example, are appointed to fifteen-year terms and
removable only “by the President, upon notice and hearing, for (1) neglect of
duty; (2) misconduct; or (3) mental or physical disability.”329 Military judges
are similarly protected against adverse treatment based on their rulings even
though they are military officers within the chain of command.330
But it turns out that such narrow, functionally justified limitations are
only the tip of the iceberg with respect to the military. Congress has enacted
much more general removal restraints, albeit ones that involve a model of
independence quite alien to the usual debates in administrative law, and one
that the Court has yet to consider in its modern case law.
b. The Complicating Factor of Military Discipline
i. Statutory Architecture.—Since 1866, governing statutes have
limited disciplinary removal of nearly all military officers in peacetime
without a court martial. The current version of the governing statute provides:
“No commissioned officer may be dismissed from any armed force except
(1) by sentence of a general court-martial; (2) in commutation of a sentence
of a general court-martial; or (3) in time of war, by order of the President.”331

327. Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654 (1988).
328. Seila Law LLC v. CFPB, 140 S. Ct. 2183, 2199–2200 (2020).
329. 10 U.S.C. § 942(c) (2018).
330. 10 U.S.C. § 826(c)(2) (2018).
331. 10 U.S.C. § 1161(a) (2018); see also 10 U.S.C. § 123(a) (2018) (“In time of war, or of
national emergency declared by Congress or the President . . . , the President may suspend the
operation of any provision of law relating to the promotion, involuntary retirement, or separation of
commissioned officers of the Army, Navy, Air Force, Marine Corps, or Coast Guard Reserve.”);
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At the same time, the Uniform Code of Military Justice makes disobedience
of lawful orders, as well as other forms of insubordination, punishable by
court-martial through sanctions including, when appropriate, removal from
office.332
Today, “dismissal” is a term of art for a punitive separation, akin to the
“dishonorable discharge” of enlisted personnel,333 and dismissal by a general
court-martial sentence generally results in a loss of veterans’ benefits.334
Other statutes, however, more generally regulate involuntary separation.
Apart from certain officers in an initial probationary status,335 officers in the
regular military can generally be discharged against their will only if they are
not promoted within certain periods,336 or if a board of inquiry composed of
other officers determines, in accordance with applicable regulations, that
their performance was substandard, that they committed “moral or
professional dereliction,” or that their continued service is “not clearly
consistent with the interests of national security.”337
Furthermore, when Congress first imposed limits on “dismissal” in
1866, the term carried no pejorative implication. Treatises and Attorney
General opinions referred to presidential removals of military officers as
dismissals.338 As a 1915 treatise explained, “Dismissal by executive order is
Kahn v. Anderson, 255 U.S. 1, 10 (1921) (indicating that the term “time of peace” in this statute
requires “not a mere cessation of hostilities, but peace in the complete sense, officially proclaimed”).
Section 1161(b) also provides for an officer’s termination following an extended unauthorized
absence or certain criminal convictions by a court martial or civilian court. 10 U.S.C. § 1161(b)
(2018).
332. See 10 U.S.C. § 890 (2018) (willful disobedience); id. § 889 (disrespect toward superior
officer). For a much earlier statute to similar effect, prescribing “death, or such other punishment as
a court martial shall direct” for “[a]ny officer, seaman, mariner or other person [in the navy] who
shall disobey the orders of his superior”, see Act of Mar. 2, 1799, ch. 24, § 1, 1 Stat. 709, 711 (1799).
333. 2 SCHLUETER, supra note 129, at § 16-17(C).
334. E.g., 38 U.S.C. § 5303(a) (2018); United States v. Reed, 54 M.J. 37, 45 (C.A.A.F. 2000).
See generally Major John W. Brooker, Major Evan R. Seamone & Leslie C. Rogall, Beyond
“T.B.D.”: Understanding VA’s Evaluation of a Former Servicemember’s Benefit Eligibility
Following Involuntary or Punitive Discharge from the Armed Forces, 214 MIL. L. REV. 1 (2012)
(examining the impact of involuntary and punitive discharges on benefits eligibility).
335. 10 U.S.C. § 630 (2018).
336. 10 U.S.C. §§ 631, 632 (2018).
337. 10 U.S.C. §§ 1181–82, 1184–87 (2018) (establishing review process to determine whether
the service secretary may remove an officer from active duty); see also DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY,
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY, SECNAV INSTRUCTION 1920.6D, ADMINISTRATIVE SEPARATION OF
OFFICERS (2019), https://www.secnav.navy.mil/doni/Directives/01000%20Military%20Personnel
%20Support/01-900%20Military%20Separation%20Services/1920.6D.pdf
[https://perma.cc
/8RGV-YH2M] (regulation governing administrative separation of Navy and Marine Corps
officers). Apart from these procedures, the President or Secretary of Defense may also “drop from
the rolls” an officer who has been absent without authority for three months. 10 U.S.C. § 1161(b)
(2018); see also 10 U.S.C. § 804(d) (2018) (providing no right to trial for such discharges).
338. See, e.g., Claim of Surgeon Du Barry, 4 Op. Att’y Gen. 603, 608–09 (addressing “the
power of the President to dismiss military or naval officers from the service without the sentence of
a courtmartial” and equating this authority with removal of civil officers).
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quite distinct from dismissal by sentence. The latter is a punishment; the
former is removal from office.”339 Another treatise from 1920 elaborated that
“a reproach upon [the officer’s] reputation” was “by no means an essential
incident of an executive dismissal,” even if the terms “discharge” or
“mustering out,” rather than dismissal, were typically employed for
blameless separations from service.340 At any rate, during the Civil War,
President Lincoln summarily dismissed officers “in a great number of cases,
sometimes for the purpose of summarily ridding the service of unworthy
officers, sometimes in the form of a discharge or muster-out of officers whose
services were simply no longer required.”341 Nineteenth-century statutes
limiting presidential dismissal were thus understood at the time as
congressional attempts to displace any presidential authority to summarily
remove military officers from service.342
The statutory structure adopted at the close of the Civil War and refined
over time thus raises a somewhat different question from more familiar
debates over at-will removal. Whereas administrative-law debates typically
center on whether Congress can limit presidential control altogether, current
and historic military statutes present the question whether Congress can
displace outright presidential removal power if it provides instead some
alternative mechanism of control. Lacking impeachment authority, Congress,
in effect, has reinforced military officers’ accountability to the President
through the chain of command by criminalizing certain forms of
disobedience. At the same time, however, it has implemented this control
through courts martial, thus affording a degree of due process that would be
lacking if a president simply terminated the officer directly. To the extent this
statutory structure is valid, it affords military officers with the rough
equivalent of the civil-service protections that prevent arbitrary dismissal of
certain personnel outside the military.
ii. Constitutional Questions.—But are such removal limitations
constitutional? On the one hand, Congress not only holds authority to raise

339. MAJOR-GENERAL GEORGE B. DAVIS, A TREATISE ON THE MILITARY LAW OF THE
UNITED STATES 524 (1915).
340. WINTHROP, supra note 244, at 737; see also DAVIS, supra note 339, at 526 (indicating that
the dismissal of an officer by executive order “may have involved no disgrace”). Winthrop did
acknowledge that a nonpunitive dismissal without any adjudicatory process could neither impose
any disability against future employment nor strip an officer of vested rights such as entitlement to
pay. WINTHROP, supra note 244, at 739–40.
341. DAVIS, supra note 339, at 525 n.3; see also WINTHROP, supra note 244, at 737
(distinguishing summary presidential dismissals from punitive court-martial dismissals).
342. BERDAHL, supra note 154, at 128 (indicating that in “the acts of March 3, 1865, and
July 13, 1866,” both discussed infra in notes 373–74 and the accompanying text, “Congress divested
the President of his absolute power of removal at all times”); see also DAVIS, supra note 339, at
524–25, 527–28 (discussing this statutory change); WINTHROP, supra note 244, at 740 (same).
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armies and provide navies, but also to establish “Rules for [their]
Government and Regulation.”343 As a textual matter, prescribing mechanisms
of military discipline is a straightforward exercise of Congress’s power to
establish rules regulating the military. Given that the Constitution expressly
assigns this power to Congress, any such statutory provision might override
any competing presidential authority to exercise command discipline outside
of statutorily prescribed limits. By the same token, statutory limits on
discharging military officers might also constitute necessary and proper
means of “raising” an army or “providing” a navy; after all, an unremoved
officer necessarily remains available for service.
The Supreme Court’s broad holding, noted earlier, that “the Legislative
Branch [has] plenary control over rights, duties, and responsibilities in the
framework of the Military Establishment”344 could reinforce these textual
inferences. As we have seen, furthermore, even absent specific statutes
governing military discipline, early authorities like Joseph Story presumed
that military discipline would generally occur through the judgments of
“military men” rather than the President alone (or impeachment).345 As a
practical matter, such disciplinary mechanisms may help sustain military
professionalism and protect officers’ careers, thus limiting presidents’ ability
to make military service a matter of personal allegiance. That objective
accords strongly with the framers’ oft-stated fear that standing armies could
undermine republican governance.346
On the other hand, the President does, once again, hold the constitutional
status of Commander in Chief. Allowing removal only through courts martial
could greatly burden this command prerogative if it meant that presidents
could be stuck with officers in whom they had lost confidence. As one
Senator put it in a debate discussed further below, “I can not conceive how
discipline could be maintained in the Army if the President of the United
States could not weed out the unworthy, the unfaithful, and the dishonest.”347
Avoiding exercises of government power without presidential accountability
has been a key reason for inferring removal authority in other settings with

343. For an argument that this constitutional provision authorizing Congress to “make rules for
the Government and Regulation of the land and naval Forces,” U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 14, grants
broad authority not only over internal military discipline, but also over the military’s external
projection of force, see generally Rudesill, supra note 314. See also John C. Dehn, Why a President
Cannot Authorize the Military to Violate (Most of) the Law of War, 59 WM. & MARY L. REV. 813,
886–89 (2018) (arguing that Congress may bind the President by statute to follow law-of-war
restrictions on use of force).
344. Chappell v. Wallace, 462 U.S. 296, 301 (1983).
345. See supra note 320 and accompanying text.
346. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST NO. 26, at 128, 132–33 (Alexander Hamilton) (Ian Shapiro ed.,
2009); THE FEDERALIST NO. 41, at 205, 208–09 (James Madison) (Ian Shapiro ed., 2009)
(addressing concern).
347. 41 CONG. REC. 1082 (1907) (statement of Sen. Clay).
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respect to core executive offices.348 The same functional concern might
likewise support recognizing a constitutional removal power over military
officials.
The tension between these two positions has in fact been a matter of
long-running, if largely forgotten, debate. The controversy, moreover, is not
only important in its own right, but also offers an important example of
apparent constitutional resolution followed by renewed controversy and
resolution.
2. Historical Liquidation, De-Liquidation, and Re-Liquidation
a. The Antebellum Understanding.—Although Presidents in the
antebellum Republic appear to have claimed authority to remove all military
officers at will, this practice’s validity was repeatedly contested.
In an 1846 treatise on military law, Captain William C. De Hart argued
that presidents lacked “the legal right . . . to dismiss from the service, without
trial, a commissioned officer of the army or navy.”349 According to De Hart,
the Decision of 1789 provided no authority for such removal power. Officers
in civil departments, according to De Hart, “were appointed by the president
as aids in the administration of the government, and for the proper and
becoming exercise of all its powers he is justly held responsible.”350 Hence,
in the 1789 debates, “it was, in reference to civil officers, conceded, that for
the faithful execution of the law, the power of removal was incidental to that
duty, and might often be requisite to fulfill it.”351 By contrast, because
military officers are subject to military discipline for disobedience, they are
“the mere actors in a subordinate sphere.”352 “[H]armony of opinions
between them and the executive is not requisite for any administrative act or
measure of government; and though the president is responsible to the nation
for the general direction of military forces, yet he is not so for their individual
conduct.”353 Nor, according to De Hart, was a power of immediate
presidential removal practically necessary, “because the legally established
tribunal [a court martial] can always be convoked for the doing of justice . . .
in all cases of military delinquencies.”354

348. See, e.g., Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477, 483 (2010)
(“Since 1789, the Constitution has been understood to empower the President to keep these officers
accountable—by removing them from office, if necessary.”).
349. WILLIAM C. DE HART, OBSERVATIONS ON MILITARY LAW, AND THE CONSTITUTION AND
PRACTICE OF COURTS MARTIAL 228 (1846).
350. Id. at 230–31.
351. Id. at 231.
352. Id.
353. Id.
354. Id. at 233.
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Echoing De Hart’s view, terminated military officers repeatedly
objected to being fired without a court martial. In several antebellum
opinions, exasperated Attorneys General rejected this view, but the argument,
zombie-like, kept coming back. In the first such opinion, in 1842, Attorney
General Hugh Legare considered “whether the President of the United States
may strike an officer from the rolls, without a trial by a court martial,
notwithstanding a decision in that officer’s favor by a court of inquiry ordered
for the investigation of his conduct.”355 “Whatever I might have thought of
the power of removal from office, if the subject were res integra,” Legare
opined, “it is now too late to dispute the settled construction of 1789.”356 That
construction, according to Legare, treated removal as deriving “from the very
nature of executive power, absolute in the President, subject only to his
responsibility to the country (his constituent) for a breach of such a vast and
solemn trust.”357
The Attorney General went on to draw the opposite inference from
De Hart. “[I]f necessity is a sufficient ground” for inferring removal authority
with respect to civil officers, Legare reasoned, then “[i]t is obvious that . . .
the argument applies a multo fortiori to the military and naval
departments.”358 Furthermore, although it may be a “very peculiar hardship”
to subject “brave and honorable men” holding military commissions to the
“capricious despotism” of discretionary presidential removal, prior English
practice, as well as the practice of other “nations jealous of their rights, and
earnest in upholding and enforcing their laws against all prerogative,”
nonetheless recognized “the necessity of such a power in the commander in
chief of their army and navy.”359
Just a few years later, in 1847, Attorney General Nathan Clifford
revisited the issue at greater length. He, too, relied principally on the Decision
of 1789, declaring that “the question was distinctly settled by the Congress
of 1789 in favor of the power of the President, so far as it relates to the civil
officers of the government.”360 This understanding, according to Clifford,
“was acquiesced in at the time, and has since received the sanction of every
department of the government.”361 Like Legare, moreover, Clifford viewed
the Decision of 1789 as a gloss on the nature of executive power, though he
seemed to recognize that Congress could impose some degree of tenure

355.
356.
357.
358.
359.
360.
361.

Military Power of the President to Dismiss from Service, 4 Op. Att’y Gen. 1, 1 (1842).
Id.
Id. at 1–2.
Id. at 2.
Id.
The Claim of Surgeon Du Barry for Back Pay, 4 Op. Att’y Gen. 603, 609 (1847).
Id.
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protection for civil officers,362 and he also suggested that removal authority
should normally be incident to appointment power.363 At any rate, he devoted
much of his analysis to rejecting any distinction between civil and military
officers with respect to their removability at will.364
Finally, in 1853, Attorney General Caleb Cushing reiterated the same
conclusions all over again. “Reasons of a special nature may be deemed to
exist,” he observed, “why the rule [of at-will presidential removal] should not
be applied to military, in the same way it is to civil, officers; but the legal
applicability to both classes of officers is, it is conceived, the settled
construction of the Constitution.”365 Although military officers may “be
deprived of their commissions by the decision of a court martial,” Cushing
saw this possibility as equivalent to the impeachment option for civil
officers.366 “The difference between the two cases is in the form and mode of
trial, not in the principle, which leaves unimpaired, in both cases alike, the
whole constitutional power of the President.”367
Curiously, none of these opinions relied squarely on the Commanderin-Chief Clause. On the contrary, these Attorneys General relied principally
on the Decision of 1789 and the presumed equivalence of civil and military
officers under the pertinent constitutional provisions. In any event, all
concluded, over the repeated objections of disgruntled officers, that the
President held constitutional authority to remove military officers at will.
By the time of the Civil War, then, presidential removal authority over
military officers appeared to be settled; as noted, President Lincoln
repeatedly discharged officers on his own authority, sometimes even after a
court-martial acquitted them.368 In fact, in 1862, Congress codified this
understanding. It enacted a statute providing:

362. Id. at 609 (“It is conceded that [civil officers of the government] are removable at pleasure
in all cases under the constitution where the term of office is not specially declared.”).
363. Id. at 609–11.
364. See id. at 610 (finding it “difficult to appreciate the reasoning which seeks to affix a
permanent tenure to military office, while it is admitted that all civil officers appointed under the
same clause, with the exceptions specially provided for in the constitution, hold their places subject
to the executive discretion”).
365. Military Storekeepers, 6 Op. Att’y Gen. 4, 6 (1853).
366. Id.
367. Id.
368. See supra note 341 and accompanying text. Military appointments and promotions during
the Civil War were often self-consciously partisan. See, e.g., Timothy J. Orr, “All Manner of
Schemes and Rascalities”: The Politics of Promotion in the Union Army, in THIS DISTRACTED AND
ANARCHICAL PEOPLE: NEW ANSWERS FOR OLD QUESTIONS ABOUT THE CIVIL WAR-ERA NORTH
81 (Andrew L. Slap & Michael Thomas Smith eds., 2013) (documenting the role of partisan
patronage in Civil War military appointments); Andrew J. Polsky, “Mr. Lincoln’s Army” Revisited:
Partisanship, Institutional Position, and Union Army Command, 1861–1865, 16 STUD. AM. POL.
DEV. 176, 177–78 (2002) (same).
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That the President of the United States be, and hereby is, authorized
and requested to dismiss and discharge from the military service either
in the army, navy, marine corps, or volunteer force, in the United
States service, any officer for any cause which, in his judgment, either
renders such officer unsuitable for, or whose dismission would
promote, the public service.369
Attorneys General in the years afterwards viewed this statute as
confirming the earlier executive branch view. “This provision did not,” one
wrote in 1868, “clothe the President with a new power, but gave an express
legislative sanction to the exercise of a power incident to the high official
trust confided to him.”370 “So far as [the 1862 Act] gives authority to the
President,” another wrote in an 1878 opinion addressing an 1861 dismissal,
“it is simply declaratory of the long-established law.”371
In the terms employed by some scholars today, legislative and executive
practice thus appeared to have “liquidated” the Constitution’s meaning with
respect to military removal authority, resolving any textual ambiguity on the
question in favor of presidential power.372 Even then, to be sure, it might have
been unclear whether such power existed only in the absence of statutory
restraints or even in the face of them. Whatever its scope, however, no sooner
had this understanding crystallized than Reconstruction destabilized it.

b. The Reconstruction Watershed.—As the Civil War drew to a close,
Congress abruptly shifted its view of military removals. First, in March 1865,
it enacted a statute allowing any officer dismissed by presidential order to
request a court-martial on the charges forming the basis for his dismissal.373
Then, in July 1866, amid its escalating political conflicts with President
Andrew Johnson over Reconstruction policy, Congress went further. As a
rider to an appropriations statute, Congress enacted a provision that not only
repealed the 1862 statute on removals, but also imposed the following
constraint on presidential authority: “And no officer in the military or naval
service shall in time of peace, be dismissed . . . except upon and in pursuance
of the sentence of a court-martial to that effect, or in commutation thereof.”374
Thus, after effectively codifying the Executive Branch view of presidential
authority in 1862, Congress adopted statutes at the start of Reconstruction

369. Act of July 17, 1862, ch. 200, § 17, 12 Stat. 594, 596 (1862).
370. Case of Colonel Belger, 12 Op. Att’y Gen. 421, 426 (1868).
371. Dismissal of Officer in the Marine Corps, 15 Op. Att’y Gen. 421, 422 (1878).
372. See William Baude, Constitutional Liquidation, 71 STAN. L. REV. 1, 4 (2019) (discussing
“liquidation” as a theory of interpretation).
373. Act of Mar. 3, 1865, ch. 79, § 12, 13 Stat. 487, 489 (1865) (requiring the President to
convene a court-martial if a dismissed officer “shall make an application in writing for a trial, setting
forth under oath that he has been wrongfully and unjustly dismissed”).
374. Act of July 13, 1866, ch. 176, § 5, 14 Stat. 90, 92 (1866).
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that effectively codified De Hart’s alternative theory. Limitations on
peacetime removal of military officers have remained in effect, with minor
alterations, ever since.375
Given the context and the statutory exclusion of wartime dismissals, one
might think these restraints, when enacted, were effectively governing a form
of domestic civil administration. The Army, after all, was initially the federal
government’s main instrument for enforcing Reconstruction policy in the
defeated Confederate states,376 and concerns that President Johnson might
disrupt Reconstruction by demobilizing the Army or purging it of disloyal
officers might explain this provision’s enactment in 1866. The next year,
Congress enacted the tenure protections for senior government officials
discussed earlier.377 Again, however, Congress’s legal theory for
Reconstruction governance in the years immediately after the Civil War
depended on war powers, not ordinary means of domestic federal
governance.378 Accordingly, any notion that these tenure protections
reflected a theory of civil rather than military administration is misplaced.
What is more, general restrictions on military dismissals have endured
while those on the Secretary of War, General of the Army, and other cabinet
officials have not. As noted, the House of Representatives ultimately
impeached President Johnson for violating the Tenure of Office Act by
removing the Secretary of War, but the Senate failed to convict in part
because of constitutional doubts about the statute’s validity.379 Following
Ulysses Grant’s election in 1868, Congress repealed the Army Chief rider
and relaxed the Tenure of Office Act (eventually repealing it altogether in
1887),380 but the more general removal restrictions in the 1865 and 1866
statutes remained in effect. They thus continued to govern military removals
well after the Army’s withdrawal from the South and from law enforcement
functions more generally. Indeed, they remain in place to this day, albeit as
part of a more reticulated legal structure.381 Even if such limitations apply
375. See 10 U.S.C. § 1161 (2018) (generally requiring court-martial sentence for peacetime
dismissal of commissioned military officers); supra note 331 and accompanying text. A leading
treatise on military law from 1920 characterized the 1866 Act as “the first instance, since the
organization of the government under the Constitution, in which Congress has expressly prohibited
the exercise by the President of the power of removal from office.” WINTHROP, supra note 244, at
740. The 1866 law rendered the earlier 1865 provision effective only for wartime dismissals. DAVIS,
supra note 339, at 528 n.1.
376. On the federal government’s limited enforcement capacity during Reconstruction, see
BROOKS D. SIMPSON, THE RECONSTRUCTION PRESIDENTS 182 (1998).
377. See supra notes 193–95 and 233–34 and accompanying text.
378. See supra notes 241–42 and accompanying text.
379. SIMPSON, supra note 376, at 125–27.
380. Act of July 15, 1870, ch. 294, § 15, 16 Stat. 315, 319 (1870) (repealing Army rider); Myers
v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 168 (1926) (discussing revision of Tenure of Office Act followed by
full repeal in 1887).
381. See supra notes 331–37 and accompanying text.
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only during peacetime, constraints on presidential removal authority could
significantly constrain presidents’ power to staff the military officer corps on
which they will depend if war erupts.
c. Curious Judicial and Executive Decisions.—Rather surprisingly, case
law appears not to squarely resolve these statutes’ constitutionality, although
courts and the Executive Branch appear to have largely acquiesced to their
validity.
To begin with, in a century-old case addressing the 1866 statute’s
constitutionality, the Supreme Court upheld it, yet it did so based on
reasoning that appears questionable in light of later decisions. Affirming the
Court of Claims and adopting its reasoning, the Supreme Court held in United
States v. Perkins382 that a Naval Academy graduate was an officer and that
statutory career protections thus prevented the Secretary of the Navy from
unilaterally discharging him without cause.383 The Court reasoned that “when
Congress, by law, vests the appointment of inferior officers in the heads of
Departments it may limit and restrict the power of removal as it deems best
for the public interest.”384
Although Perkins thus supports the statute’s validity, the Supreme Court
described the case’s holding narrowly in Seila. According to Seila, Perkins,
along with Morrison v. Olson, which upheld tenure protections for an
independent prosecutor,385 supports an exception to at-will presidential
removal authority “for inferior officers with limited duties and no
policymaking or administrative authority.”386 Though appropriate to the
naval cadet in Perkins, that description may well be inapplicable to other
military officers with more significant duties who are also statutorily
protected from peacetime removal. In addition, in Free Enterprise Fund, the
Court held that two layers of tenure protection—protection for both the
inferior officer and the superior officer with authority to remove him or her—
is unconstitutional.387 Justice Breyer pointed out in dissent that military
officers enjoy a form of two-layer protection insofar as they are removable
only based on the judgments of other military officers serving on courtsmartial or boards of inquiry who are also protected from at-will removal.388
More generally, Seila, Free Enterprise Fund, and other recent cases
have focused on accountability to the President as the central constitutional
value offended by removal limitations. In Seila, for example, the Court
382.
383.
384.
385.
386.
387.
388.

116 U.S. 483 (1886).
Id. at 484–85.
Id. at 485 (quoting Perkins v. United States, 20 Ct. Cl. 438 (1885)).
Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 671–72 (1988).
Seila Law LLC v. CFPB, 140 S. Ct. 2183, 2199–2200 (2020).
Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477, 484 (2010).
Id. at 543 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
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interpreted Article II’s Vesting Clause to afford the President “power to
remove—and thus supervise—those who wield executive power on his
behalf.”389 Even Morrison upheld removal limitations on an independent
prosecutor only because they were functionally justified and the prosecutor’s
mandate was purportedly limited.390 It did not apply Perkins’s logic that
Congress’s discretion over appointment of inferior officers implies plenary
discretion over criteria for their removal.391
At the same time, a separate line of decisions appears to recognize
constitutional difficulties with limiting presidential removal authority over
military officers, but these decisions, too, employ reasoning that is difficult
to square with later case law. Beginning in McElrath v. United States392 in
1880, the Supreme Court interpreted the 1865 and 1866 statutes to allow
replacement of an officer without a court-martial through confirmation of
another individual to take the officer’s place.393 As the Court explained in
another decision that year, Blake v. United States,394 the 1866 statute reflected
“the serious differences existing, or which were apprehended, between the
legislative and executive branches of the government . . . , in the States lately
in rebellion, of the reconstruction acts of Congress.”395 Because “[m]ost, if
not all, of the senior officers of the army enjoyed, as we may know from the
public history of the period, the confidence of the political organization then
389. Seila, 140 S. Ct. at 2191–92.
390. Morrison, 487 U.S. at 671–72.
391. Cf. United States v. Concord Mgmt. & Consulting LLC, 317 F. Supp. 3d 598, 614 (D.D.C.
2018) (“It is unlikely that the broad and dated language of Perkins survived” Edmond v. United
States, 520 U.S. 651 (1997), “which demands that inferior officers be subordinate to superiors and
does not contemplate allowing unremovable officers if ‘for the public interest.’” (quoting United
States v. Perkins, 116 U.S. 483, 485 (1886)), appeal dismissed, No. 18-3061, 2018 WL 5115521
(D.C. Cir. Sept. 17, 2018). Even applying Perkins’s reasoning, furthermore, that case’s holding
might not apply to other officers covered by removal limitations who, unlike the naval cadet in
Perkins, were appointed by the President with or without Senate confirmation and not by a
department head. See, e.g., 10 U.S.C. § 624(c) (2018) (allowing appointment by the President alone
for promotions to lieutenant or lieutenant (junior grade) in the Navy or First Lieutenant or Captain
in the other branches but otherwise requiring Senate confirmation for promotions); id. § 531 (similar
for original appointments). Insofar as officers appointed with Senate confirmation are nonetheless
inferior officers whose appointment Congress could vest in the President alone or the Secretary of
Defense, removal limitations might still be valid under the reasoning in Perkins. But on the other
hand, one might argue that activating the authority to limit removal should require making an
affirmative choice to vest appointment authority in the Secretary or President alone. Cf. Myers v.
United States, 272 U.S. 52, 161–62 (1926) (explaining that “[w]hether the action of Congress in
removing the necessity for the advice and consent of the Senate and putting the power of
appointment in the President alone would make his power of removal in such case any more subject
to Congressional legislation than before is a question this court did not decide in the Perkins Case”
and suggesting that “[u]nder the reasoning upon which the legislative decision of 1789 was put, it
might be difficult to avoid a negative answer, but it is not before us and we do not decide it”).
392. 102 U.S. 426 (1880).
393. Id. at 437–39.
394. 103 U.S. 227 (1880).
395. Id. at 235.
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controlling the legislative branch of the government [i.e., the Republican
Party],” Congress expected that those officers “would carry out the policy of
Congress, as indicated in the reconstruction acts, and suppress all attempts to
treat them as unconstitutional and void, or to overthrow them by force.”396
The Court thus presumed that the statute’s purpose was to prevent willful
presidential depletion of the force, not replacement of some officers with
others confirmed by the Senate.397
Although in these and later decisions the Court expressly avoided
resolving any constitutional questions,398 its reading of the statute might be
understood as a saving construction aimed at preserving presidential
authority over the officer corps. If so, however, the Court solved one
constitutional difficulty only by creating a worse one, at least from the point
of view of later cases. In its landmark 1926 decision in Myers v. United
States, the Supreme Court invalidated a provision directly conditioning
removal of an inferior executive officer on Senate approval, yet its reasoning
extends equally to provisions conditioning removal on Senate approval of a
successor.399 In fact, the Myers majority characterized provisions of the
Tenure of Office Act400 that allowed removal of officers only upon
confirmation of a Senate-approved successor as no different from the
removal condition at issue in the case.401
For its part, the Executive Branch likewise applied the statute without
recognizing any difficulty in at least one legal opinion. In 1910, Attorney
General George Wickersham declined to apply Attorney General Cushing’s
1853 opinion on presidential removal authority because it was written “long
before the enactment [in the 1866 statute], which forbids the dismissal except
396. Id. at 235–36.
397. Id. at 237 (“There was, as we think, no intention to deny or restrict the power of the
President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, to displace [officers] by the appointment
of others in their places.”).
398. See Wallace v. United States, 257 U.S. 541, 545 (1922) (noting statutory construction and
observing that “[t]he validity of these acts has never been directly passed on by this court in any
case”); Mullan v. United States, 140 U.S. 240, 245–46 (1891) (applying statutory construction from
Blake and McElrath); Blake, 103 U.S. at 236 (expressing no opinion as to whether “the power of
the President and Senate . . . could be constitutionally subjected to restrictions by statute”);
McElrath v. United States, 102 U.S. 426, 437 (1880) (likewise avoiding constitutional questions).
399. Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 176 (1926).
400. Act of Mar. 2, 1867, ch. 154, § 1, 14 Stat. 430, 430 (1867) (generally providing that all
civil officers “shall be entitled to hold such office until a successor shall have been in like manner
appointed and duly qualified,” but providing that “the Secretaries of State, of the Treasury, of War,
of the Navy, and of the Interior, the Postmaster-General, and the Attorney General” would hold
their offices throughout the appointing president’s term unless removed “by and with the advice and
consent of the Senate”).
401. See Myers, 272 U.S. at 176 (holding that “the Tenure of Office Act . . . , in so far as it
attempted to prevent the President from removing executive officers who had been appointed by
him by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, was invalid, and that subsequent legislation
of the same effect was equally so”).
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upon sentence of a court-martial. This is a limitation upon the power of
removal from office of one who had been legally appointed.”402 To the same
effect, Attorney General Henry Stanberry opined in 1866 that Congress’s
initial statute allowing court-martial override of presidential removals was
valid.403 As a matter of practice, furthermore, presidents in the decades since
appear to have complied routinely with these limitations on their removal
power. Although a leading treatise on military law in 1920 asserted that the
1866 statute was unconstitutional given the contrary view “firmly
established” in antebellum practice,404 at least one leading practice manual
today does not even indicate any possible constitutional problem.405
d. An Illuminating Later Debate—Plus a Telling Modern Example.—As
for Congress, it extensively debated the scope of presidential removal
authority with respect to the military at least one other time after
Reconstruction, and its apparent conclusions are illuminating, if again not
entirely decisive. A more recent incident, moreover, highlights the value of
current statutory protections for officers and enlisted personnel.
To start with the congressional debate, in November 1906, President
Theodore Roosevelt impulsively dismissed 167 African-American soldiers
in three infantry companies based on reports that some men in the companies
had engaged in a “riotous disturbance,” leading to one death, while stationed
in Brownsville, Texas.406 The evidence supporting these allegations was
weak or nonexistent, and historians have judged them to be false; in fact, the
soldiers were likely framed by racist town residents who wanted the
companies relocated.407 Nevertheless, and despite considerable political
controversy at the time, Roosevelt obtusely resisted calls to reinstate the men
pending a more thorough investigation.408
This sorry episode is relevant here because congressional opposition to
Roosevelt’s action prompted extensive debate in the Senate over the
President’s authority to dismiss military personnel without a court martial.
Leading the opposition efforts, Ohio Senator and Civil War veteran Joseph
Benson Foraker introduced a resolution to call for a Senate investigation of

402. Boatswain in Navy—Revocation of Warrant, 28 Op. Att’y Gen. 325, 328 (1910).
403. Restoration of Dismissed Military and Naval Officers, 12 Op. Att’y Gen. 4, 4–5 (1866).
For some background regarding this opinion, see Barron & Lederman, supra note 83, at 1017.
404. WINTHROP, supra note 244, at 744–45.
405. See 6 C.J.S. Armed Services § 110 (Mar. 2019) (“[C]ompliance with applicable statutory
and regulatory requirements is necessary before an officer validly can be discharged, dismissed,
separated, or released from service.”).
406. EDMUND MORRIS, THEODORE REX 453–55, 467 (2001).
407. Id. at 511; JOHN D. WEAVER, THE SENATOR AND THE SHARECROPPER’S SON:
EXONERATION OF THE BROWNSVILLE SOLDIERS 129 (1997).
408. MORRIS, supra note 406, at 474, 554.
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the President’s action.409 In support of the resolution, Foraker argued at
length on the Senate floor that the President lacked legal authority to fire the
soldiers without a court martial. As a constitutional matter, Foraker asserted:
[N]o one can question that the Congress has power to prescribe by law
what rules and regulations shall govern the Army as to its
organization, as to the size of the Army, its maximum, its minimum,
as to the number of infantry regiments, the number of cavalry
regiments, the number of artillery regiments, and the number of
batteries, and the number of men in each of these units of organization;
and how, Mr. President, particularly, men shall be enlisted and men
shall be discharged from the Army, the terms and conditions upon
which they shall be enlisted, the rights that shall accrue to them on
account of their service—long service, faithful service—whether or
not they shall be recognized by the Government and be rewarded by
the Government. All that rests with Congress as part of that power. As
a part of that power it is competent for the Congress of the United
States to provide that no man shall be summarily discharged from the
Army after he has regularly enlisted except upon certain terms and
conditions . . . .410
Foraker argued that then-governing statutes in fact imposed such limitations
on presidential discharge of enlisted men, much as the 1866 Act did for
officers.411
Foraker ultimately succeeded in getting his investigation but only after
he agreed to modify the resolution so as not to question the President’s legal
authority. In the resolution’s final form, the Senate resolved to authorize a
committee to “ascertain all the facts” regarding the incident, but did so
“without questioning the legality or justice of any act of the President.”412
Foraker thus obtained his investigation at the cost of abandoning his legal
theory.413
Nevertheless, the practical import of this vote is more ambiguous than
the Senate resolution might suggest. Though Foraker’s most articulate
opponents disagreed with his analysis of presidential authority, they
pointedly did so on statutory rather than constitutional grounds. In particular,
409. EVERETT WALTERS, JOSEPH BENSON FORAKER: AN UNCOMPROMISING REPUBLICAN
235–36 (1948).
410. 41 CONG. REC. 568 (1906) (statement by Sen. Foraker).
411. Id.
412. 41 CONG. REC. 1434 (1907); 41 CONG. REC. 1512 (1907).
413. Sadly, the investigation ultimately came to naught. Over the dissent of four Senators,
including Foraker himself, the investigative committee upheld the President’s action. MORRIS,
supra note 406, at 511. Foraker then proposed a bill to create a military board of inquiry to
investigate the terminations. But though Congress ultimately enacted a substitute that convened a
board to consider the soldiers’ eligibility for reenlistment, the board in the end concluded that only
fourteen of the men could reenlist. WALTERS, supra note 409, at 245–46.
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Senator John Coit Spooner of Wisconsin argued, despite professing
sympathy for the discharged soldiers,414 that the President held statutory
authority to terminate their enlistments.415 Accordingly, Spooner argued, “[i]t
is not necessary to discuss whether the President, as Commander in Chief
possesses inherent power to terminate the contract of enlistment.”416 But even
Spooner acknowledged Congress’s extensive power to regulate and structure
the military. At one point, he observed:
The grounds upon which men may be discharged [from the Army] is
within the constitutional capacity of the Congress. Whether any man
can be discharged for offense without a trial is entirely within the
constitutional competency of Congress. Whether the President shall
be given the right to dismiss an officer at will without trial is for
Congress to say.417
Furthermore, despite adding language on presidential authority to
Foraker’s resolution, the Senate rejected several substitute resolutions that
would have asserted more directly that the President held authority to order
the discharges.418 Thus, although President Roosevelt claimed initially to the
Senate that he discharged the soldiers in “the exercise of my constitutional
power and in pursuance of what, after full consideration, I found to be my
constitutional duty as Commander in Chief of the United States Army,”419
the Senate pointedly declined to endorse this view and its claimed power to
investigate the discharges arguably cast doubt upon it.
Overall, then, to quote Edward Corwin, this incident illustrates not only
“the President’s residual power over the forces” but also that power’s
“limits.”420 At most, it leaves ambiguous whether the President holds
preclusive authority to remove military personnel, at either the officer or
enlisted level, in the face of statutory restrictions requiring a court martial.
Decades later, another racial incident played out differently—precisely
because governing statutes gave enlisted personnel clear protection. In 1972,
after a number of African-American sailors on a particular ship occupied the
ship’s mess decks to angrily protest real or perceived discrimination against
them, President Richard Nixon relayed to the Chief of Naval Operations
414. 41 CONG. REC. 1084 (1907) (statement of Sen. Spooner).
415. 41 CONG. REC. 1134 (1907) (statement of Sen. Spooner).
416. Id. (statement of Sen. Spooner). On the merits, Spooner asserted that the Senate lacked
power to override a discharge decision within the President’s power and that, in consequence, it
also lacked competence to conduct the requested investigation. 41 CONG. REC. 1086 (1907)
(statement of Sen. Spooner).
417. 41 CONG. REC. 105 (1906) (statement by Sen. Spooner) (addressing earlier resolution
requesting documents relating to the discharges from the Executive Branch).
418. 41 CONG. REC. 1503, 1508, 1511–12 (1907).
419. 41 CONG. REC. 549 (1906) (message from President Theodore Roosevelt).
420. EDWARD S. CORWIN, THE PRESIDENT: OFFICE AND POWERS, 1787–1984 295 (5th rev. ed.
1984).
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(CNO) through his National Security Adviser Henry Kissinger that he
“wanted the . . . protesters to receive dishonorable discharges immediately if
not sooner.”421 Because of statutory due process requirements for such
punishment, the CNO considered this order “clearly illegal” and refused to
carry it out.422 In response, the President apparently ordered the Secretary of
Defense to fire the CNO, but the Secretary refused as well.423 Thus, in this
case, statutory limitations on punitive discharge, combined with the need to
carry out directives through the chain of command, effectively protected
enlisted personnel against a president’s vengeful commands.
B.

Implications
What to make of this history? At this point, despite considerable
ambiguity and mixed signals, the overall pattern of conduct by all three
branches suggests general acquiescence to Congress’s authority to limit, at
least during peacetime, presidential removal without a court martial or other
procedural protections governing promotions and administrative discharges.
The theory suggested in Perkins in the late nineteenth century to explain this
practical result, however, appears internally unsatisfactory and inconsistent
with subsequent case law, while the limiting construction reflected in
McElrath and its progeny only exacerbates the statute’s arguable
constitutional problems.
An alternative theory, suggested by De Hart’s antebellum treatise and
reflected in subsequent congressional debates, offers a better explanation for
the statute’s validity: Although Congress generally may not displace the
President’s command authority altogether, it can displace the specific
enforcement mechanism of removal, even with respect to personnel
discharging operational functions, so long as it provides a robust alternative
disciplinary mechanism for effectuating the President’s directives.424
Removal, in other words, may be “sufficient” to ensure adequate presidential
control of military officers, but it is not also “necessary”; Congress may
displace it with alternative disciplinary mechanisms.425 By authorizing
421. HERSPRING, supra note 264, at 211 (quoting ELMO R. ZUMWALT JR., ON WATCH: A
MEMOIRE (1976)).
422. Id.
423. Id. at 211–12.
424. Cf. MCCONNELL, supra note 47, at 165 (“In the military, unlike the civil service,
disobedience to lawful orders is actually a criminal offense and may be punished by flogging (as of
1789), imprisonment, or even death—making a plenary power of removal unnecessary for
maintaining the discipline of the chain of command.”).
425. Cf. Rao, supra note 53, at 1208, 1244–47 (advocating this view for civil officers).
Paralleling the analysis here in some respects, Rao defends for-cause removal limitations for certain
inferior civil officers, so long as insubordination is understood to provide cause for termination. Id.
at 1244–47. She does not address the military specifically, however, and appears to extend this
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courts-martial to punish disobedience and insubordination, Congress has
preserved strong incentives to comply with lawful commands—indeed,
incentives arguably stronger than any that exist in civil administration. At the
same time, however, Congress has protected officers’ positions from
arbitrary removal by precluding such punishment without military due
process, even if the President has lost confidence in a particular officer for
reasons other than such disobedience.426
Though generally alien to debates in the civil and administrative
context, the Supreme Court hinted at this view in Free Enterprise Fund.
There, although declining to opine on removal limitations for military
officers, the Court distinguished them from the double-layer tenure
protection at issue in the case by noting that military officers “are broadly
subject to Presidential control through the chain of command and through the
President’s powers as Commander in Chief.”427 In any event, understanding
discipline as a constitutionally adequate substitute for removal here accords
with the constitutional text and structure at least as well as arguments for
inferring preclusive presidential removal authority.
This view also, at least potentially, establishes a valuable equilibrium
well-suited to the military context. While strongly enforcing a general norm
of command discipline, it ensures that officers who disobey directives they
perceive to be unlawful will lose their position only if the military justice
system fails to back up their judgment. In addition, insofar as the function at
issue is vested in their individual office, officers could resist carrying out
directives they consider profoundly unwise, on pain of potentially incurring
later punishment for insubordination.428 President Nixon’s inability to obtain
a punitive discharge for protesting sailors illustrates how valuable this legal
structure may be in protecting military careers and preventing unlawful
orders from taking effect.
Amid the exigencies of war or another declared emergency, Congress
has preserved a different equilibrium that more strongly favors command
authority, making dismissal by court-martial optional rather than

theory only to situations in which “the appointment of [the] officer is vested in the head of a
department.” Id. at 1246. That limitation would exclude some military officers whom current law
protects from removal without a court martial.
426. Current statutes do permit review and eventual removal of officers due to deficient
performance. 10 U.S.C. §§ 1181, 1182, 1184 (2018); see also supra subsection III(A)(1)(b)(i).
427. Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Bd., 561 U.S. 477, 507 (2010).
428. In his study of military “shirking,” Peter Feaver reports that court-martial “conviction rates
remained high throughout the Cold War,” although “these high rates probably reflect a selection
effect, as commanders pursued courts-martial only in the cases where they were fairly certain that
the convictions would hold.” PETER D. FEAVER, ARMED SERVANTS: AGENCY, OVERSIGHT, AND
CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS 167 (2005) (citing other studies).
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mandatory.429 Even outside such contexts, moreover, presidents and other
senior officers within the chain of command generally hold authority to
relieve officers of particular duties, such as command of a ship or unit.
Nevertheless, Congress’s choice to restrict discharging officers without cause
in peacetime provides important career protection to officers and may in
some instances place valuable friction between presidential directives and
on-the-ground actions. For all the reasons discussed, this statutory structure
should stand on solid constitutional ground; any argument to the contrary is
mistaken.
Could Congress go further and require courts-martial for removal even
during wartime or a declared emergency? Although in principle the deterrent
effect of criminal sanctions should still suffice to ensure obedience,
preventing displacement of a recalcitrant or incompetent officer in battlefield
circumstances could more concretely interfere with the President’s ultimate
constitutional authority to direct military operations. Yet this problem could
itself be solved by providing (or presuming) some mechanism for temporary
suspension or relief from specific duties without permanent removal.
Peacetime limitations on removal already mean that presidents may enter an
emergency with an officer corps they would not have chosen; to quote one
Defense Secretary’s glib aphorism, “You go to war with the army you have—
not the army you might wish to have.”430 Extending removal limitations
beyond peacetime into war, if Congress so chose, would thus be more a
change of degree than of kind and should also be constitutional.
IV. Office-Holding Beyond the Military
Congress, then, holds authority not only to allocate military duties to
particular offices, but also to displace the President’s default removal
authority over career military officers by providing sufficiently robust
alternative mechanisms of command discipline. Though these conclusions
are important in their own right for reasons identified earlier, the analysis
supporting them holds at least four broader implications for separation-ofpowers law and scholarship.
429. One early treatise, arguing that the President held constitutional removal power but should
generally allow dismissal by court-martial, identified the benefits of this balance:
A mode of proceeding is interwoven with the military organization of great benefit to
the sound constitution of the army. Although the president is unquestionably
authorized to deprive any military officer of his commission at pleasure, yet the
established practice is, to allow the individual, whose conduct has given
dissatisfaction, an opportunity of explaining and vindicating it, by means of a regular
tribunal, before he is dismissed, suspended, or even reproved. The same usage prevails
in the navy.
WILLIAM RAWLE, A VIEW OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 165 (photo.
reprt. 2003) (2d ed. 1829).
430. DONALD RUMSFELD, RUMSFELD’S RULES 316 app. B (2013).
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Interring the Unitary Executive Branch
First and foremost, Congress’s broad authority over military offices
should undermine the strongest versions of “unitary” executive-branch
theory. Under this theory, all executive power necessarily vests in the
President, even when placed by statute in a particular subordinate officer, and
presidents accordingly may direct how statutory duties are performed or even
(on some accounts) perform those duties personally on their own.431 One
early Federalist treatise-writer went so far as to assert that “the president is
not confined in his executive functions to the use of a particular department”;
governmental actions “are equally [the President’s] acts, whether they
emanate from [one department], or any other department.”432 According to a
more recent statement of this view, the President, as the unitary receptacle of
executive power, necessarily holds authority to “completely withdraw” any
executive power vested in a subordinate officer.433 “Once [the President’s]
authority is withdrawn,” on this account, “the President must make all those
decisions previously vested by statute in the now constitutionally
disempowered officer, at least until the officer leaves office (and a new
officer is appointed) or Congress, by statute, allows some other executive
officer to act as the President’s agent over those matters.”434
The Supreme Court seemed to embrace this theory in its recent Seila
decision. Though this reasoning was not essential to its result, the Court
characterized the President as the sole repository of “executive Power” and
subordinate officers as mere assistants to the President, “whose authority they
wield.”435 To the extent Seila thus implies that the President can always
exercise executive powers personally, or even redelegate them at will within
the Executive Branch, the analysis presented here shows that Seila is
mistaken even for the military, which has conventionally been assumed to be
an area of maximum presidential power. In fact, history and practice confirm
that Congress can vest particular military functions and duties in particular
officers, who then must themselves perform those functions and duties. What
is more, even if it cannot create the same sort of tenure protection afforded to
independent administrative agencies, Congress can calibrate the sanctions for
those officers’ disobedience, either leaving in place the default mechanism
of removal or providing more robust forms of punitive discipline.
Perhaps unlike in the civil and administrative context, military officers
are normally subject to presidential directive authority by virtue of the
President’s position as Commander in Chief. In the civil and administrative
431.
432.
433.
434.
435.

See supra note 54 and accompanying text.
RAWLE, supra note 429, at 165–66.
Calabresi & Prakash, supra note 54, at 598–99.
Id. at 599.
Seila Law LLC v. CFPB, 140 S. Ct. 2183, 2197 (2020).

PRICE.PRINTER.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

570

2/22/21 12:56 PM

Texas Law Review

[Vol. 99:491

context, background normative and constitutional principles may or may not
support presuming such presidential power,436 and non-unitarians maintain
that Congress may, through tenure protections, altogether displace
presidential control over exercises of legal discretion with respect to civil
administration.437 Some history and practice suggests Congress could go that
far for the military as well, at least in some contexts. During Reconstruction,
as we saw, Congress made the General of the Army removable only with
Senate consent,438 and even today certain military judges enjoy tenure
protection and officers involved in certain appointment selections and
military justice functions are insulated from command discipline in their
discharge of those functions.439
But even if the President, as Commander in Chief, must hold power to
issue binding commands with respect to most military functions, Congress’s
authority to vest duties and calibrate sanctions for disobedience still
undermines any account of the military as strongly unitary. As a practical
matter, by vesting authority in a particular officer, especially a civil officer
within the military chain of command such as the Secretary of Defense, and
providing removal as the President’s means of effectuating directives,
Congress may create a legal structure that is functionally little different from
vesting power in a civil officer, such as the Attorney General or Secretary of
Agriculture, without granting those officers tenure protection.
Again, history provides examples not only of Congress adopting such
structures, but also of such structures mattering. Early nineteenth-century
statutes vesting certain military support functions in the Secretary of War440
arguably displaced direct presidential control over those functions.441 At the
least, they rendered the secretaries answerable to the President only through
removal for their performance of those functions. During Reconstruction,
though district commanders were removable at will, statutes vesting
substantial military powers in those officers, particularly when interpreted by
then-General Grant to preclude direction from him or the President in
performance of those functions, gave enterprising generals like Philip

436. Compare Stack, supra note 85, at 295 (arguing against presumed directive authority), and
Percival, supra note 53, at 2490 (same), with Elena Kagan, Presidential Administration, 114 HARV.
L. REV. 2245, 2251 (2001) (arguing in favor), and Kathryn A. Watts, Controlling Presidential
Control, 114 MICH. L. REV. 683, 728–30 (2016) (summarizing the debate and defending Kagan’s
view).
437. E.g., Seila, 140 S. Ct. at 2224–27 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
438. See supra notes 193–95 and accompanying text.
439. See supra notes 126–29 and accompanying text.
440. See supra notes 144 and 183 and accompanying text.
441. 56 CONG. REC. 5406 (1918) (statement of Sen. Shields) (characterizing these functions as
not subject to presidential “control or direction” absent new legislation such as the then-proposed
Overman Act).
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Sheridan substantial power to shape on-the-ground developments.442 In the
Nixon Administration, the Secretary of Defense and CNO could block an
unlawful order to discharge enlisted personnel without proper cause.443 And
more recently Defense Secretary Esper’s position in the chain of command
reportedly enabled him to resist President Trump’s directive to deploy troops
to suppress domestic unrest.444
Furthermore, much as in civil and administrative contexts, prudent
exercise of Congress’s power to structure chains of command can
meaningfully shape executive policy and impose constraints on presidential
action, even if officers are ultimately subject to command discipline. For
good or ill, the Goldwater–Nichols structure of combatant commands creates
different incentives and pathologies from the pre-World War II structure of
separate War and Navy Departments.445 Likewise, in the 1947 National
Security Act, Congress could preserve the Marine Corps and Naval Aviation,
with their distinct competences and esprit de corps, by legislating their
continued existence.446
These conclusions with respect to the military should only strengthen
arguments that Congress holds power to assign duties and structure
disciplinary mechanisms in civil administration. Having taken the unitary
theory’s strongest fortress, non-unitarians might now more easily conquer the
territory beyond. Yet the argument should give pause even to those,
apparently including Chief Justice Roberts and a majority of the Supreme
Court, who remain committed to a unitary Executive Branch in civil
administration. From that point of view, civil administration might be
distinguished from military examples on various grounds, including
Congress’s specific textual powers, longstanding practice, and the special
functional need for civilian oversight. But drawing such distinctions would
require a considerable shift in the current terms of debate: it would suggest
that, contrary to much modern commentary and executive-branch bluster,
Congress’s power to structure the military is especially strong, not especially
weak.
B.

Convention and Constraint

A second, related implication bears on current debates over maintaining
responsive and accountable government amid turbulent and polarized
politics. Recent scholarship has highlighted the importance of “convention,”
as opposed to hard constitutional law, in our federal government’s practical
442.
443.
444.
445.
446.

See supra subsection II(B)(4)(b).
See supra notes 421–23 and accompanying text.
See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
See supra section II(B)(8).
See supra section II(B)(7).

PRICE.PRINTER.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

572

2/22/21 12:56 PM

Texas Law Review

[Vol. 99:491

operation. Conventions, in this sense, “are extrajudicial unwritten norms that
are enforced by the threat of political sanctions, such as defeat in re-election,
retaliation by other political institutions and actors, or the internalized
sanctions of conscience.”447 As recent work has emphasized, norms and
understandings of this sort may do important work buffering maximal
interbranch conflict within our separation-of-powers system, thus enabling
smoother and more responsive governance.448 By the same token,
conventions may help preserve important values and policy commitments—
apolitical law enforcement, for example, or stable monetary policy—even
when elected officials have a short-term political interest in violating them.
Insofar as tribal politics encourage political actors to play for the win in each
case even at the expense of good governance, these effects may be
particularly important in our era of acute polarization.449
To the extent all that is true, the constitutional principles developed here
hold extraordinary importance. Vesting duties in offices by statute creates a
scaffolding on which the political system may build norms and
understandings—“conventions” in this theoretical sense—about how those
duties will be discharged. The Secretary of Defense or a combatant
commander may face different political and reputational pressures (from
Congress, professional networks, the media, or elsewhere) than does the
President. The same is quite manifestly true of the Attorney General,
Treasury Secretary, and any number of other officials. Insofar as these offices
require Senate confirmation, moreover, Senators may constrain presidential
desires regarding the character and policy aims of officials who hold such
positions in the first place.
Even without any legal separation between the President’s wishes and
actual discharge of governmental authorities, the President’s practical
dependence on governmental agents to carry out desired policies might
impede unilateral presidential power. As one study of civil–military relations
proposes, when the military’s preferences diverge from the President’s,
officers face a choice between obeying or dragging their feet based on their
“expectations of whether shirking will be detected and, if so, whether
civilians will punish them for it.”450 Even if some potential for such resistance
447. Adrian Vermeule, Conventions of Agency Independence, 113 COLUM. L. REV. 1163, 1182
(2013).
448. See, e.g., STEVEN LEVITSKY & DANIEL ZIBLATT, HOW DEMOCRACIES DIE 8–9, 106
(2018) (emphasizing importance of “forbearance” to the stability of American democracy).
449. For a sampling of political science literature on current polarization, see generally ALAN
I. ABRAMOWITZ, THE GREAT ALIGNMENT: RACE, PARTY TRANSFORMATION, AND THE RISE OF
DONALD TRUMP (2018); MORRIS P. FIORINA, UNSTABLE MAJORITIES: POLARIZATION, PARTY
SORTING & POLITICAL STALEMATE (2017); and NOLAN MCCARTY, KEITH T. POOLE & HOWARD
ROSENTHAL, POLARIZED AMERICA: THE DANCE OF IDEOLOGY AND UNEQUAL RICHES (2d ed.
2016).
450. FEAVER, supra note 428, at 3.
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is inevitable, however, Congress can ratchet this potential up or down
through its choices of administrative design and allocation of military duties
to particular offices. Doing so may then increase or decrease the chances that
conventions will develop regarding particular officers’ performance of their
duties.
By contrast, if all powers of government could be exercised by the
President personally, then the President would be limited only by his or her
individual electoral accountability and by the need to find some officer
willing to carry out presidential directives. From this point of view,
Congress’s underlying power to vest authorities in offices may be vitally
important to sustaining stable, responsive, and public-spirited government in
our era, in both military and civil or administrative contexts. Indeed, this
power may well be even more important to those goals than the more
contested authority to limit at-will removal, though the latter has received far
more scholarly attention.451
It is true that in many cases accurately identifying the boundary between
constitutional law and political convention may be difficult, in part because
American constitutional law relies heavily on history and practice to resolve
textual ambiguities. Here, however, for all the reasons discussed above, the
deep structure of constitutional practice, along with primary considerations
of constitutional text, history, and structure, supports viewing Congress’s
authority to allocate military and other duties as a matter of constitutional law
rather than mere political convention. The understanding’s centrality to
enabling other mechanisms of political accountability only adds a further
practical reason to support it.
It is also true that norms and conventions themselves may be either good
or bad. While some norms of government behavior protect the public interest,
others may impair it or otherwise deserve repudiation. In particular, too
strong a norm of military independence from civilian control could be
frightening in its implications.452
Nor are current arrangements necessarily optimal. In fact, one recent
appraisal has condemned the current structure of military office-holding

451. Adrian Vermeule has argued that agencies’ real independence is itself a matter of
convention rather than statutory law. Vermeule, supra note 447.
452. In one famous example, during the Korean War, General Douglas MacArthur defied
President Truman’s policies regarding conduct of the war. FEAVER, supra note 428, at 128–29. In
another example, Air Force General Curtis LeMay reportedly indicated during the Cold War that
he would not necessarily abide by civilian limitations on launching nuclear weapons—a prospect
that, absent legislation vesting such authority, would appear undesirable, to put it mildly. Id. at 129.
In one scholar’s assessment, Truman’s firing of MacArthur “proved crucial in shaping military
expectations of punishment throughout the Cold War.” Id. at 164.
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under the Goldwater–Nichols Act as pathological.453 Current statutory
arrangements, according to this critique, give combatant commanders too
much effective authority over foreign policy, while also giving the service
secretaries too little incentive to match procurement policies to the fighting
forces’ real needs.454 On the other hand, amid current political vicissitudes,
some policy inertia could conceivably carry benefits as well as costs.455 But
whatever Goldwater–Nichols’s ultimate merits, this critique of the law
highlights, once again, the powerful effects of agency design on policy
outcomes, even in areas of presumed presidential prerogative like the
military.
In sum, allocating military and other duties, whether in major statutes
like Goldwater–Nichols or through piecemeal measures, is one of Congress’s
most potent means of constraining unilateral presidential action. If employed
wisely, this power may enable Congress to generate and reinforce
expectations about government policy and official decision-making that
foster the long-term public interest, even at the expense of short-term
presidential objectives. To the extent our current erratic politics raise fears
about rash military action, precipitous changes in policy, or imprudent use of
particular weapons systems, Congress might consider responding by more
precisely allocating statutory authority over such matters.
C.

Securing the Civil Service
A third implication relates to the federal civil service. Recent
scholarship has called attention to an arguable mismatch between current
appointments practice and the range of positions apparently treated as
“officers of the United States” under the Appointments Clause as a matter of
original usage and early practice.456 In its 2018 Lucia decision, the Supreme
Court confronted this question but effectively sidestepped it,457 leaving the
door open to further waves of litigation challenging administrative actions by
453. Nevitt, supra note 290, at 988–89. For other critical appraisals of the statute, see, for
example, Derek S. Reveron & Michelle D. Gavin, America’s Viceroys, in AMERICA’S VICEROYS:
THE MILITARY AND U.S. FOREIGN POLICY, supra note 275, 1, 2–3 and Christopher M. Bourne,
Unintended Consequences of the Goldwater-Nichols Act, JOINT FORCE Q., Spring 1998, at 99–100.
454. See Nevitt, supra note 290, at 948–49, 965–67 (advancing this view).
455. Cf. HERSPRING, supra note 264, at 372 (discussing General Wesley Clark’s ability to shape
policy in the Kosovo conflict because “he knew he had the authority of Goldwater-Nichols behind
him”); Stephen D. Wrage, U.S. Combatant Commander: The Man in the Middle, in AMERICA’S
VICEROYS: THE MILITARY AND U.S. FOREIGN POLICY, supra note 275, at 185, 185–86 (arguing
that concerns about the combatant commanders’ influence on foreign policy are overblown because
the commanders have limited authority and are highly accountable).
456. See generally Mascott, supra note 65 (analyzing the original meaning of “officers of the
United States” as it relates to current doctrine); Phillips et al., supra note 65 (same).
457. See Lucia v. SEC, 138 S. Ct. 2044, 2056 (2018) (Thomas, J., concurring) (criticizing the
majority for relying on precedents that “do not provide much guidance” rather than look to the
original public meaning).
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civil-service officials.458 At the same time, the Court in Free Enterprise Fund
suggested without deciding that removal limitations may be more suspect for
officers (whether principal or inferior) than for employees,459 and following
the Lucia decision, President Trump issued an executive order casting doubt
on competitive exam-based appointments for certain civil officers.460
The military history discussed here suggests that any expansive
inferences about removal from Lucia and the Appointments Clause would be
overdrawn.461 As discussed earlier, the set of military positions subject to the
Appointments Clause is generally broader than in the civil service. Whereas
today only the most senior civilian positions are typically filled in accordance
with the Appointments Clause, current governing authority uniformly treats
all commissioned military officers as “officers of the United States” under
the Appointments Clause.462 As OLC observed in a Clinton-era opinion, this
mismatch is difficult to explain: “It is at least arguable . . . that the authority
exercised by second lieutenants and ensigns is so limited and subordinate that
their analogues in the civil sphere clearly would be employees [rather than
officers].”463 To the extent that is true and recent historical scholarship is
correct, military practice may have preserved a broader early understanding
of “officers” even as practice diverged elsewhere.464
458. See Jennifer L. Mascott, “Officers” in the Supreme Court: Lucia v. SEC, CATO SUP. CT.
REV., 2017–2018, at 305, 336 (discussing pending litigation and noting a “potential torrent” of
further cases).
459. Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477, 506 (2010); see
also id. at 540–41 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“I still see no way to avoid sweeping hundreds, perhaps
thousands of high-level Government officials within the scope of the Court’s holding, putting their
job security and their administrative actions and decisions constitutionally at risk.”).
460. Excepting Administrative Law Judges from the Competitive Service, Exec. Order No.
13843, 3 C.F.R. 844 (2019).
461. Cf. Mascott, supra note 65, at 548–58, 563–64 (noting that “in modern practice we seem
to have settled on the expectation that any Article II officer appointment is necessarily a political
one” but suggesting that this inference may not be sound).
462. See supra subpart I(B).
463. The Constitutional Separation of Powers Between the President and Congress, 20 Op.
O.L.C. 124, 144 n.54 (1996).
464. See Mascott, supra note 65, at 528–30 (discussing early statutes regarding the military).
Military practice might be distinguished from civil administration on various grounds. In particular,
one might interpret current practice as reflecting an implicit view that any authority to command
military forces in combat, even down to the level of platoons and similar units, is categorically
“significant” for Appointments Clause purposes. See Constitutional Separation of Powers, 20 Op.
O.L.C. at 144 n.54 (“Even the lowest ranking military or naval officer is a potential commander of
United States forces in combat—and, indeed, is in theory commander of large military or naval units
by presidential direction or in the event of catastrophic casualties among his or her superiors.”).
OLC has also offered two other theories, though they seem less compelling. First, the Office has
observed that “[c]ertain officials are constitutional officers because in the early Republic their
positions were of greater relative significance in the federal government than they are today.” Id.
This theory may have some utility in explaining why certain clerical and administrative positions
are no longer treated as offices. In an era of electronic communications and records, for example,
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Whatever the scope of Appointments Clause officers, however, military
practice should put to rest arguments that an expanded definition of this term
in civil and administrative contexts necessarily undermines civil service
protections that currently govern the hiring, firing, and disciplining of
administrative staff. On the contrary, as we have seen, robust statutory
constraints on appointment, promotion, and removal have long applied to
military officers. There is accordingly little reason to think the Appointments
Clause precludes applying comparable restraints on nonmilitary officeholding.
With respect to hiring (appointments), historic Executive-Branch
opinions have in fact suggested that precisely the same degree of limitation
is permissible for civil and military offices.465 One treatise writer early in the
twentieth century even defended civil-service appointment constraints based
on historic military analogues.466 Accordingly, to the extent the statutory
structure for military offices has successfully professionalized the
appointment process while also preserving an appropriate degree of ultimate
presidential discretion, the broader structure of military statutes could
provide a model for doing the same even if courts ultimately embrace an
expanded reach for the Appointments Clause within the civil service.467
As a matter of fact, some civil-service statutes already require cause to
terminate some officers and employees but treat insubordination as cause for

routine bookkeeping and paperwork functions may lack sufficient responsibility and discretion
today to warrant treatment as offices, even if under different technological conditions they carried
greater significance. But the theory seems not to explain military practice terribly well. Even on the
battlefield, given changes in transportation and communications technology, junior military officers
today are probably more closely controlled and supervised than were their predecessors. Second,
the Office suggested that military appointments reflect a subconstitutional practice rather than a
controlling understanding of what the Constitution itself requires. Id. On this view, although
Congress has consistently chosen to require appointment of military officers in a manner consistent
with the Appointments Clause, it could just as well allow appointment of at least some
commissioned military officers by other means. This view could readily reconcile military and
nonmilitary practice, but it encounters the difficulty that neither the Executive Branch nor the courts
have understood the military appointment process to be optional. As noted, both have instead
defined the category of “Officers of the United States” to include all commissioned military officers,
and Congress’s own unbroken practice supports that understanding. See supra note 69 and
accompanying text.
465. See, e.g., Civil-Service Commission, 13 Op. Att’y Gen. 516, 516, 520–21, 524 (1871)
(indicating that Congress’s authority “to prescribe qualifications [for offices] is limited by the
necessity of leaving scope for the judgment and will of the person or body in whom the Constitution
vests the power of appointment”).
466. 2 WESTEL WOODBURY WILLOUGHBY, THE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES 1180 (1910).
467. Justice Breyer called attention to removal limitations for both military officers and civilservice officials in his Free Enterprise Fund dissent. Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting
Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477, 543 (2010) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
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termination or other discipline through an administrative process.468 If such
structures are permissible for the military, as I have argued, then they should
be even more defensible for the civil service. After all, no constitutional
provision as specific as the Commander-in-Chief Clause prescribes
presidential command authority over civil and administrative functions.
Indeed, insofar as civil offices are created and defined entirely by statute,
subject only to a requirement that the President retain authority to ensure
faithful execution of the laws, Congress should hold still broader authority to
limit the President’s authority to remove such officers at will.
Again, appointment and removal protections might or might not be
appropriate or valid for all positions within civil administration. For the upper
reaches of the civil service, as in the military, accountability concerns, if not
hard constitutional doctrine, might support preserving greater discretion with
respect to appointments and removals. Likewise, just as in the military
setting, removal restrictions even for officers lower in the bureaucracy might
be valid only if sufficiently robust alternative disciplinary mechanisms are
available. I will not attempt to resolve all such questions here. Nor do I
express any view on whether professionalization is more or less appropriate
with respect to the military or the civil service. At present, concerns about
corrupting administrative expertise through partisan appointments may
appear paramount to some, yet at other times in the past concerns about
degrading military competence through patronage appointments were at least
as salient.469
The key point here is simply that military examples warrant greater
attention by both sides in current debates over the civil service’s
constitutionality. While those challenging the civil-service status quo should
grapple with the apparent acceptance of parallel constraints for the military,
by the same token those opposing a broadened understanding of the
Appointments Clause should grapple with the Clause’s broad application to
military offices.
D.

Reconstruction’s Centrality

A last broad implication of my analysis relates to Reconstruction and
the widespread neglect, if not deprecation, of its lessons for separation of
powers. As my analysis throughout has highlighted, Reconstruction proved
to be a watershed for key features of military office-holding and the
constitutional understandings surrounding it. Furthermore, despite departing
in some ways from earlier understandings, many of these changes have
proven to be enduring and time-tested features of constitutional governance
468. For discussion of these statutes and relevant case law, see Barnett, supra note 314, at 1374–
75, 1379–80.
469. See GOSS, supra note 177, at xi–xix (discussing “political generals” during the Civil War).
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ever since. Nor are these changes alone in having such continuing
importance: among other things, key limitations on military involvement in
law enforcement,470 on spending in excess of annual congressional
appropriations,471 and on military officers performing civil duties472 date
from this period.
Insofar as our current polarized era is taking on a troubling resemblance
to the bitter politics of Reconstruction and the Gilded Age, congressional
actions and executive responses from that era may hold important lessons
about how our separation-of-powers system can or should operate in our era.
Any further consideration of this question would go well beyond the scope
of this article. Yet even if Reconstruction was a watershed only for the
questions addressed here, that fact alone would give it a central legacy
deserving more attention not only for civil liberties, but also for separation of
powers, the structural Constitution, and congressional control of the military.
Conclusion
Though widely presumed to be an area of exceptional presidential
authority, military office-holding is in fact an area thick with statutory
constraints. Our Constitution’s text and structure, read in light of the
longstanding practice reflected in those statutes, supports broad
congressional authority to allocate military duties and authorities to particular
offices other than the President. Although the President as Commander in
Chief holds constitutional authority to direct how such functions are
discharged, Congress, if it chooses, may preclude their actual performance
by the President himself or another officer. Congress likewise holds authority
to replace the President’s default removal authority with other sufficiently
robust mechanisms of disciplinary control, such as criminal punishment
through courts martial for disobedience. Beyond their immediate significance
for current proposals to vest authority over cyber operations, force
withdrawals, or nuclear weapons in subpresidential offices, these
conclusions, and the history informing them, shed new light on separationof-powers debates about the unitary executive branch, conventions of
governmental behavior, the civil service’s constitutionality, and
Reconstruction’s historical importance.

470. Act of June 18, 1878, § 15, 20 Stat. 145, 152 (1878) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C.
§ 1385) (Posse Comitatus Act).
471. Act of June 12, 1870, § 7, 16 Stat. 230, 251 (1870) (codified as amended at 31 U.S.C.
§ 1341) (Anti-Deficiency Act).
472. Act of July 15, 1870, ch. 294, § 18, 16 Stat. 315, 319 (1870) (codified as amended at 10
U.S.C. § 973(b)) (Civil Office Ban).

PRICE.PRINTER.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2021]

Congress’s Power over Military Offices

2/22/21 12:56 PM

579

Just as presidents on some accounts are properly “overseers” rather than
“deciders” with respect to civil administration, so too may Congress assign
them a more supervisory than dictatorial role with respect to the military.
Under the analysis developed here, Congress holds broad authority to
structure the United States’ military apparatus by statute, allocating duties
and authorities as it deems best and crafting appropriate mechanisms of
disciplinary control. The prudence or wisdom of any such structure is
accordingly a question the Constitution leaves to political debate. For better
or worse, the framers did not take it out of our hands.

